


**The stepfathers of National Socialism?**  
**An ideological historical analysis of Friedrich Naumann's**  
***Democracy and Empire* (1900) and Oswald Spengler's *Prussia***  
***and Socialism* (1919)**



Of

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## Preface

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 He

*"Turning a communist into a passionate National Socialist is not with God difficult. Both are cut from the same cloth, one thing in common connects them to the same type: the will to power and the principle of struggle."*<sup>1</sup> – Josef Goebbels

When Adolf Hitler became chancellor on 30 January 1933, Germany was in deep crisis. Germany struggled poor economy, and large sections of the population had poor living conditions and problems getting by economic. Millions were unemployed, and strong clashes between National Socialists and communists could recall the times before a civil war. The National Socialists tried to solve this by rejecting economic extremes such as capitalism and Marxism, and replacing this with ethnic nationalism and "German" socialism.

The National Socialists' takeover and consolidation of power in April 1933 marked the end on the Weimar Republic, and thus also the end of the new German democracy.

The Weimar Republic was a modern democratic state, but steadily lost support towards the rise to power of the National Socialists; many who had quit under democracy in 1918-19 turned their backs on democracy in 1933.<sup>2</sup>

A counterfactual thought about a left-liberal, collectivist and not National Socialist combination of nationalism and socialism which could have gained traction around 1900 and given a other historical developments for Germany are undoubtedly exciting. The ideological combination that existed there was promoted by the politician Friedrich Naumann,<sup>3</sup> but it never caught on. Just after World War I, in 1919, the philosopher Oswald Spengler tried to argue for a separate "Prussian" socialism under a national superstructure<sup>4</sup> as a reaction to Marxist socialism, but succeeded in practice only in attacking the new Weimar Republic. Although they advocated that nationalism and socialism could be reconciled, there were nevertheless great differences between them. The existed on both the right and the left in German political life, they were both aristocratic and anti-aristocratic, modernist and anti-modernist and had different views on the way society should be considered, how social problems should be solved, how one should reach the goal of one combination of nationalism and socialism, and what society should look like. What they

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<sup>1</sup> Hoever 1992:73. Sitert fra *proletariat and bourgeoisie*: NS letters no. November 1, 1926.

<sup>2</sup> Henig 1998:83-85.

<sup>3</sup> See Naumann 1905. The book is analyzed in chapter 3.

<sup>4</sup> See Spengler 1921. The book is analyzed in chapter 4.

however, had in common, a desire for a collectivist and nationalist state solution where it the main political line of conflict between the right and the left had been blurred. But can they be counted as stepfathers of National Socialism? Did the National Socialists pick up ideas from them and integrated into their own ideology, or Naumann and Spengler, without wanting to, created a political one dynamics that made it easier for the National Socialists to succeed? Behind Goebbels' swelling quote above, there is nevertheless a kernel of truth: Goebbels was the only one of these three who had one some success in winning over industrial workers, and he was the one who gained by far the most political power and influence.

But why? In my opinion, it is the receptivity among the population that decides whether an idea becomes a success or not. In various historical contexts there is no guarantee that the same political idea gives the same response. Ideology, which consists of a predominantly consistent set political ideas always consist of a dichotomy; on the one hand it must describe the good society, and on the other how to reach the goal.<sup>5</sup> The ideological receptivity in itself itself does not have to say anything about *why* an idea has arisen, but it will always be decisive as to *whether* it will be a success. For example, there is nothing in the way of making one party program today based on an enlightened autocracy, but it will never gain any support because people no longer believe in the ideology.

Naumann and Spengler each conceptualized their own "German" variant of socialism that had not been articulated before. Studying these two and what influenced them in their time is absolutely central to explain *why* attempts to combine nationalism and socialism arose in Germany at the time, and to describe the idea-historical content and the effect it had. An imaginary combination between Nationalism and socialism are paradoxical from a historical point of view because on many sub-points contains antagonistic pairs that are mutually exclusive. They basically aren't ideologies that can merge with each other with little resistance, because because of the big ones ideological differences, it is impossible to form a synthesis between them without exposing one or both for major modifications. So how was this attempted to be resolved?

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<sup>5</sup> Hinich and Munger 1994:2-3.



## 1.2 Problem statement

Based on the above, the following problem can be formulated: *How can one explain that a combination of nationalism and socialism arose in the Germany of the time around 1900 and about 1919; what were the main features of Naumann's and Spengler's attempts to reconcile nationalism and socialism, and what political effect it had on contemporary times and the rise of National Socialism, represented by Goebbels?*

In this thesis I will argue that Naumann's concept was an attempt to create a broad political base from the left, to create a mass party based on liberal tradition. In addition, it is connected with his personal view of social reforms as both ethically correct and desirable. In any case, Naumann's concept had problems in breaking through due to mistrust between the right and the left, and that the concept was primarily based on personal experiences and to a far lesser extent on collective consciousness. Spengler's "Prussian" socialism arose in post-revolutionary Munich as a reaction to the revolution, and as a result of anti-Anglican tradition and cultural cycle theory, in which Marxism was considered a product of "Depraved" British *Zivilisation*, which destroyed German *Culture*.

Both Naumann, Spengler, and Goebbels as National Socialists advocated a collectivist political model in which nationalism and the idea of the national community were central - and in spite of that of major political differences otherwise. The biggest problem with the model was that it didn't fit in with the political realities, where there was political opposition between the right and the left - which both Naumann, Spengler and Goebbels wanted to integrate under a national superstructure. The ideological problem of the divided nation was thought to be solved by integrating the national and the social idea. With the national isolation and the worsening living conditions for most Germans following World War I, such collectivist political models gained increased support, which let conditions favorable to the National Socialists.

All three also turned to Marxists and the political left to get them to stay nationalists and thus secure a mass base for themselves. This in itself was both logical and a political necessity considering that from 1912 the Social Democrats became the largest party in The Riksdag. Oswald Spengler is the only one of these three who can be counted under the political the right, while Naumann was a left-liberal and Goebbels was basically far to the left of Naumann again. Although they had different views on a number of other political areas<sup>6</sup>, all three were collectivists and nationalists, but with different approaches to the problems and different solutions.

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<sup>6</sup> See chapter 5.

### 1.3 Choice of method and the concept of ideology

Method can be defined as the procedure used to find an answer to the problem. For this assignment, it has been chosen to use *authorship, content, and Virkningsanalyse* for Naumann's *democracy and empire* og Spengler's *Prussia and Sozialismus* to answer the first part of the problem. To answer the question of ideological continuity to Goebbels and the NSDAP, a content analysis will be carried out the party program from 1920, and from Goebbels *Der Angriff* (ca. 1927-1932), and carry out comparison with *democracy and empire* and *Prussia and socialism*.

After this, the thesis will have a clear emphasis on the history of political ideas, but a political one contextualization will also be necessary to explain origin and effect.

Since the thesis is an analysis of political philosophy, the concept of ideology is central. I have chosen to use Giovanni Sartori's definition of ideology:

*"[Ideology is] an internally consistent set of doctrines that both make proscriptive and prescriptive requirements for human action. All ideologies have implications for (a) what what is ethically good, and (therefore) what is bad; (b) how society's resources should distributed; and (c) where power should reside"*

Put another and simpler way, ideology tells us what is good, who gets what and who should have the power<sup>8</sup> . but I choose here to call them respectively "ethical ideals" and "economic distribution" and "distribution of power". Through analysis of the points (ac) it is easy to compare different ideologies with each other. And although one can find big differences between apparently conflicting ideologies, one can also find similarities, such as the prominent one the idea of brotherhood in both nationalism and socialism. Furthermore, an analysis of the points (ac) make visible internal consistency in the various ideologies. Internal consistency is also a premise for calling them ideologies. The answers to the questions about what is ethically good, how society's resources should be distributed and where the power should be located will be connected and support each other; they will not be contradictory or unrelated.<sup>9</sup>

The content analysis of the books by Naumann and Spengler, and the content analysis of The party program of the NSDAP and *Der Angriff* is based on the three main points (ac) i

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<sup>7</sup> Sartori 1976:78; Hinich and Munger 1994:11.

<sup>8</sup> Hinich and Munger 1994:11.

<sup>9</sup> Hinich and Munger 1994:12-13. Although the ideology must avoid contradictions, perfect consistency is not required. No ideologies have perfect consistency because in reality it is impossible. Nevertheless, there is a threshold where further lack of consistency leads to reduced support. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

the definition above, both because it hits the concept of ideology and because common variables make it more fruitful to compare them<sup>10</sup> and thus find the answer to the problem.

## 1.5 Research status

Much research has been done on the roots of National Socialism, but here the main focus is traditionally been on the part of National Socialist ideology that dealt with nationalism. Here one can mention historians such as Kurt Sontheimer with his classic *Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik* from 1962 which analyzed the political structures and currents of spirit in mentioned period, or Fritz Stern's equally classic *The Politics of Cultural Despair* from 1961 which analyzed the intellectual background of National Socialism and with a main focus on German nationalism. On the other hand, far less has been written about socialism that developed outside the working class, and as in *this* case, always coexisted with nationalism. An example on this is Ulrich Höver's book *Joseph Goebbels – ein nationaler Sozialist* from 1992. The book's title is a nice summary of Höver's thesis about Goebbels as primarily a socialist. This marked, in my view, a step forward from previous research, where socialism i National Socialism was considered purely tactical and thus superficial. He still goes after mine sense too far in the emphasis on Goebbels as a nationalistic socialist, and thus adds too little emphasis on the racist and anti-Semitic features of Goebbels.

Because the socialism part of National Socialism has been interpreted as a tactic to deceive the working class to the camp of the National Socialists, the study of National Socialism has therefore received strong strike against the nationalist part, while the socialist part has been superficially treated or ignored as insignificant.<sup>11</sup>

Som oversiktsverk for Friedrich Naumann he biographies to Theodor Heuss, *Fridrich Naumann. Der Mann - Das Werk - Die Zeit* towering. Although the book was first published so as early as 1937, the newer - and more thorough - biographical works by other authors are lacking: Heuss, who became the first German Federal President in 1949, knew and used Naumann personally almost exclusively primary sources for the work. For Spengler, several biographies have been written books, including Anton Mirko Koktanek's *Oswald Spengler in seiner Zeit* from 1968, and Detlef Felkens *Oswald Spengler: conservative thinker between empire and dictatorship* from 1988. However, the level of precision is not always as good in relation to the task's problem.

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<sup>10</sup> See Kjelstadli 1999:263ff on comparative method. <sup>11</sup> Werth 2001:21.

The book *Sozialismus und Nation* by Christoph Werth is the only research I have come across above which deals with the combination of nationalism and socialism in German history, where he describes this combination of nationalism and socialism in thinkers such as Friedrich Naumann, Oswald Spengler, Ferdinand Toennies, Walther Rathenau, Wichard von Moellendorff, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Ernst Niekisch, Ernst Jünger and Werner Sombart. He is an overview work that I became aware of late in the writing process. The book is partially overlapping in the case of Naumann and Spengler, but the description is short and superficial. The work carries further impression of being lexical because the author tries to cover a lot in a limited space, and not least a comparison between Naumann, Spengler and Goebbels is missing. He lands moreover, on other conclusions than the undersigned - among other things when he sees Goebbels as one pure manipulator of power, who without an inner conviction only used ideology to achieve power.

## 1.4 Delimitation and structure

The content analysis of books is limited to Naumann's and Spengler's main works on this omradet; Naumann's *democracy and empire* og Spengler's *Prussianism and socialism*. men other sources are used where necessary to complement or nuance this picture or show a political development over time. The task is also limited to the political-ideological historical layers, as they are considered the most central according to the problem statement.

To study the political and ideological historical trends in Germany that led towards Naumann's and Spengler's works, an explanation in this area has been necessary. This is found both in chapter 2, and in the source analysis in the biographical chapters 3 and 4. To study the effect on NSDAP in the party's earlier period it is also necessary to go beyond the year 1919. That is why natural to set a time limit from 1900 to 1933. Although the thesis contains an analysis of the ideological opposition between nationalism and socialism from before the turn of the century in order to shed light on the origin of the books, this is not considered a breach of the time limit.

All the chapters as a whole shall answer the problem and illuminate each of its parts: I chapter 2 I take a closer look at the ideological opposition between nationalism and Socialism in German History. Here is also a more thorough review of the terms nationalism and socialism, which here need more than a brief definition to understand the dynamics between them in German history. I look at ideological historical opportunities and obstacles for collection, and argues that the combination of economic chaos and international isolation i

the aftermath of the First World War was crucial for nationalism and socialism to be able to are combined in one political model with success.

Chapter 3 is a biographical chapter on Friedrich Naumann as through source analysis describes which movements, individuals and events in German society had influence on him as the author of the main political work in this thesis. In addition comes a content analysis of *Demokratie und Kaisertum* from 1900, and an impact analysis of the book and Naumann's national social political activity.

Then, in Chapter 4, comes a biographical chapter on Oswald Spengler which deals with what which influenced him as a thinker and writer – in most cases reception by philosophers and others authors – i.e. an authorship analysis. This is followed by a content analysis and impact analysis of the book *Preußentum und Sozialismus* from 1919, before I consider the effect of his political attempts, with particular emphasis on the relationship with the NSDAP.

In chapter 5, National Socialism's attempt to combine nationalism and socialism, represented by Goebbels, is analyzed with regard to content. The content analyzes of *Democracy and empire* og *Prussianism and socialism* blir deretter sammenlignet med the content analysis of the party program and National Socialism in Goebbels to answer the question of ideological continuity.

Chapter 6 is the last of the thesis and a short summary and conclusion chapter there the results are presented.

## ***2. The ideological opposition between nationalism and socialism in German history***

### **2.1 The rise of nationalism**

In the first half of the 19th century, a bourgeois liberal movement emerged which was also egalitarian and aimed to change the existing society into "progress" in a liberal direction.<sup>12</sup>

However, these early idealistic hopes for liberal reforms turned out to be a disappointment, since many of the German states did not follow them up. Although many early liberals saw centralization as a warning by Napoleonism, the younger liberals gained increasingly stronger influence in favor of centralization was essential for the implementation of the reforms. This centralization was radical of two causes; 1) it included a desire for a federal superstructure that united the states under one political body leadership, 2) it should turn German local patriotism into, for example, Bavarians and Prussians less important and create a German *Volksnation*.<sup>13</sup>

The revolution of 1848 was basically a spread of the French revolution itself year, and brought with it a liberal and nationalist demand for increased civil rights and demands for a parliamentary political system, at the same time as feudalism was to be abolished and the German states gather into one kingdom. The revolutionaries succeeded in some of the aims, albeit briefly and in part the states. But they failed to unify Germany, and by 1851 the reaction had nullified most of the standing achievements with regard to civil rights.<sup>14</sup>

The nationalists achieved their goal of a united Germany in 1871, but in a completely different way than expected. Germany was not united through liberal opposition, but through wars against Denmark, Austria and France, and under conservative Prussian leadership. With this came "*eine substantial Inhaltsveränderung des deutschen Nationalismus*".<sup>15</sup> Nationalism was no more a reformist opposition movement; it gradually moved to the right, becoming stronger

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<sup>12</sup> Ullrich 1997:376; Eley 1994:19; <http://www.pganzusko.freeuk.com/dissertation/nationalism.htm>

<sup>13</sup> For a review of early German nationalism see, for example, Schulze, Hagen. 1991: *The Course of German Nationalism. From Frederick the Great to Bismarck 1763-1867*. Cambridge University Press.

<sup>14</sup> See for example <http://www.germany.info/relaunch/culture/history/1848.html>. See also Blackburn, D. & Eley, G. 1984: *The Peculiarities of German History - Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*. Oxford University Press. The authors argued in the book that the revolution had failed because of the "feudalisation" of the German bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie had been the driving force behind the French revolutions, but in Germany the bourgeoisie was indeed liberal, but not particularly democratic. The bourgeoisie felt threatened economically and socially by the proletariat, and entered into an informal alliance with the agrarian aristocracy in which they assumed a subordinate political role.

<sup>15</sup> Ulrich 1997:376. Sitert from Wehler, H.-U. 1995: German Social History, Vol. III: *From the "German Double revolution" up to the beginning of the First World War 1849-1914*, Munich, p. 947.

taken up by conservatives.<sup>16</sup> The idea of liberal progress was never taken up by the conservatives, and no later than 1880, German nationalism became an "illiberal [...] state-conforming integration ideology" that identified itself with the ruling political and social order.<sup>17</sup> The conservatives had succeeded in making nationalism their own, but not without protests from the liberals.<sup>18</sup>

Nationalism in Germany from the turn of the century until 1914 was not only promoted by it conservative government party, but possibly to a greater extent by the nationalists the interest groups – the so-called *Agitationsverbände*, several of which became nationalist mass organizations with strong influence and influence.<sup>20</sup> Nationalism these represented can be classified under a type of ethnic nationalism,<sup>21</sup> where the membership in the nation was hereditary and the state was based on the idea of safeguarding the interests of ethnic Germans: As Germany functioned as the homeland of the Germans, the German state followed this the mindset to count as the Germans' protector. Ethnicity, but also race, language and culture therefore became, in theory, central markers with regard to who was accepted as German.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>16</sup> The conservatives were often Prussian patriots and basically opposed to nationalism.

<sup>17</sup> Ullrich 1997:376.

<sup>18</sup> Ullrich 1997:376; Jarausch 1982:166ff.

<sup>19</sup> In 1888, for example, Riksdag representative Ludwig Bammerger said the following about the Conservatives' takeover of nationalism: "The national banner in the hands of the Prussian ultras and the Saxon guild members is the caricature of what it once meant, and this caricature came about quite simply in such a way that the vanquished opponents appropriated the discarded robes of the victor and the same according to their style, filled in and supported in order to be able to strut along in it as the laughing heirs of the national movement." Ullrich 1997:376. Sichert fra Winkler, AH 1979: *From left to right nationalism. German liberalism in the crisis of 1878/79*, in: AH Winkler: Liberalism and Antiliberalism. Studies in political social history of the 19th and 20th centuries, Göttingen, p. 36.

<sup>20</sup> Examples of these were *Die Deutsche Flottenverein* from 1898 with over 300,000 members, which advocated naval rearmament with a view to colonial expansion. Another was *Die Deutsche Ostmarkenverein* from 1894, which was created in disappointment at the government's "weak" policy towards the Poles, and advocated strong Germanisation and the expulsion of those Poles who refused. In 1886, the *Allgemeine Deutschen Sprachverein* was formed, which was to "cleanse" the German language of all "unnecessary foreign elements" and in this way "strengthen the national consciousness of the German people". All of these were surpassed by the *Alldeutsche Verband* in terms of radicality and activity. Although the organization had no more than 23,000 members at the turn of the century, it developed into a "spearhead" for the national opposition from the right, where it outflanked the ruling party. The level of education was far above average, with the majority of members from the educated citizenry. Almost two-thirds of the members had an academic education, and more than half were public servants. The organization promoted elements such as anti-modernism, pan-Germanism, racism, expansionism and social Darwinism, and operated with a dichotomy of the world where the good had to fight against the enemies – social democrats, left-liberals, Jews, ethnic minorities and neighboring countries that put themselves in the way of German expansion. See Ullrich 1997:380-383. For a general review of German minority policy, see

<sup>21</sup> See for example Sluga, Glenda. 1998: *Identity, Gender, and the History of European Nations and Nationalisms*, in: Anthony D. Smith (ed.): *Nations and Nationalism*, vol.4, no.1, p. 88. This type of nationalism is also called "classical", or "eastern", in contrast to a "bourgeois", or "Western" nationalism, where membership is linked to the state, regardless of ethnic origin. The distinction between Eastern and Western nationalism has been used to distinguish between German and French or British nationalism, and has been promoted by, among others, John Hutchinson in the book *Modern Nationalism*, London 1994 and Ernest Gellner in the book *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford 1983.

<sup>22</sup> See for example Eley 1994:185ff, 200ff; Geulen 2004:110ff. A good example of this is the Empire's minority policy. Although the Empire tolerated people of, for example, Polish or Danish origin, in practice it required full assimilation and Germanization due to its illiberal and authoritarian nature. See here Berghahn 1994:114. This did not mean that other forms of integration than through the use of force were not attempted, but the advocates of the use of force were repeatedly able to gain traction for their strategies. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

The concept of nation received a far stronger ethnic emphasis through the German *Volksnation*,<sup>23</sup> where the citizens, according to the nationalists' self-understanding, were defined by ethnic affiliation, and not by citizenship. To call oneself a German, in the eyes of the nationalists, one had to be "German" at the same time blood". One must also take into account the often erroneous reception of Nietzsche's idea of power also fitted perfectly into this pattern, and this was very popular on the right. A similar reception came from Charles Darwin's *Origin of the Species*<sup>24</sup>, where the pessimistic one The "struggle for existence" alarmed the nationalists. Along with Nietzsche, Darwin was taken to income for a social Darwinism on the German right, where the moral distinction between man and animal became unclear, and aggressive militarism and colonialism could thus be justified by biological metaphors.<sup>25</sup>

Nationalism also had a corresponding effect on anti-Semitism. <sup>26</sup> Before this, anti-Semitism had a strong anti-modernist dimension, with the Jews among them others were identified as responsible for the negative effects of modern capitalism—but were nevertheless to a far greater extent tolerated to the extent that they were culturally assimilated – which they often were. What was new, however, was that it borrowed to a greater extent from the racial theories first introduced by it the French writer Arthur de Gobineau, who postulated that a superior and civilization-creating "Aryan" race built up high cultures, but which later perished - or are in danger of perishing - due to racial mixing. The answer to the "Jewish problem" could therefore not be assimilation, since the *real* "threat" lay in the "blood", but to prevent immigration and to take away the Jews' civil rights.<sup>27</sup>

As the German historian Dietrich Orlow has pointed out, the generation that helped to founding the German Reich at the same time strikingly uncertain about the future of the Reich. This showed among another through an irrational fear of revolution and anarchy, where Germany's enemies are under Bismarck in turn was identified as "vindictive" Frenchmen, "unnational" Catholics and "treacherous" socialists.<sup>28</sup>

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Towards 1914, both the German elites and wider sections of the German people became both more nationalistic and less tolerant of minorities, refusing to allow minorities to preserve their own culture; and in addition to the fact that this nationalism acquired racist and imperialist undertones that advocated strong German dominance and the subjugation of the minorities. See Berghahn 1994:115.

<sup>23</sup> The inspiration for this ethnic state concept probably came from, for example, Johann Gottlieb Fichte. See for example his *Reden an die deutsche Nation*, which is available on the Internet at the following address: <http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/fichte/dnation/dnation.htm>

<sup>24</sup> The book was first published in 1859, and was available in German from 1875.

<sup>25</sup> Gules 2004:20ff,25ff.

<sup>26</sup> German anti-Semitism at this time was not unique in Europe or particularly strong. See for example Orlow 1997:36.

<sup>27</sup> Orlow 1997:36.

<sup>28</sup> Orlow 1997:35.



Negative integration, understood as the attempt to rally the people about nationalism by pointing out enemies, was not the only way this was attempted. History had an equally important role because it often idylized the German past so that it fit with nationalist ideology. Older history which dealt with internal national strife between Germans was now toned down and thus replaced with a view that was more compatible with nationalism. Conflicts between Germans and Poles were however, not downplayed for the same reason, and it was emphasized how important it was for German civilization to triumph.<sup>29</sup>

The German military also gained a very special position in German society afterwards the unification of Germany, and the phenomenon of the "militarization of the bourgeoisie" - as the historian Gerhard Ritter called it, arose.<sup>30</sup> The military had not only been given a strong constitutional place in the constitution from 1871,<sup>31</sup> but at the same time received credit for the unification of Germany. The boundary between militarism and the idea of national unity thus became unclear. S. Heinrich von Treitschkes *flerbindsverk German history in the nineteenth century* som was published in the period 1879-1894, where he argued that military power alone was decisive for a nation's destiny.<sup>32</sup> It was therefore not without reason that the nationalist the pressure groups at the same time became the most aggressive advocates of naval rearmament and militarising.

## 2.2 The rise of socialism<sup>33</sup>

The rapid industrialization<sup>34</sup> in Germany, which began in earnest in the 1840-50s, was the main reason for the rise of socialism. As the industry was mainly located in and

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<sup>29</sup> Orlow 1997:35.

<sup>30</sup> Orlow 1997:35.

<sup>31</sup> Orlow 1997:35.

<sup>32</sup> Orlow 1997:36.

<sup>33</sup> The concept of socialism itself is very complex, but according to the encyclopedia *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* belongs to a category "*zukunftsorientierter Bewegungsbegriffe*" which have shown theoretical sketches for the future, and which have not been based on historical reality. In principle, therefore, the term has not changed since it originated, but has been filled with different meanings, and in everyday speech is closely associated with the communist concept of the "classless" society. In this thesis, I have chosen to use the term socialism more freely, and then to denote a future-oriented political movement that works for economic and/or social equalization. What these socialist movements had in common was that they fought for the support of the industrial workers, and were initiated from political circles both within and outside the labor movement. The interest they attracted from outside political groups must be attributed to their increased numerical, economic and thus also political importance. See Brunner *et. eel.* 1980:923-924. In Marxist terminology, the term socialism has been synonymous with the first phase after the revolution.

<sup>34</sup> Compared to other European countries, Germany's industrialization started late, but far more violently and upsettingly than in many other countries. Industrialization in Germany began in the 1840s and 1850s with the construction of railways, closely followed by the extraction of coal and the production of iron and steel. What distinguished Germany from, for example, Great Britain, was that the growth of industry in chemistry and electricity came almost *simultaneously* with the powerful

around the big cities, and primarily in the west of the country, these began to grow. Primarily due this migration from the surrounding agricultural areas, but also an increasingly strong one population flow from the east. This eventually created great pressure on the cities, increased prices and bad living conditions.

In Germany, from a party political point of view, socialism was primarily represented by Marxism *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*<sup>35</sup> (SPD), but was towards the end of and after first World War II also represented by two more parties. The SPD was originally a merger of Ferdinand Lassalle's *General German Workers' Association (ADAV)* and August Bebel's and Wilhelm Liebknecht's *Socialist Workers' Party of Germany (SDAP)* in 1875, and got the name *Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SAP)*. After the socialist laws were repealed in 1890, the party changed its name to SPD. In 1917, the SPD was split when fourteen members of the Reichstag officially broke away from the SPD in protest against its support for warfare during the First World War, and founded the party *Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD)*. Knappe to år senere, January 1st 1919 – in the wake of the November Revolution of 1918, the *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD)* founded. What these socialist parties had in common was that the main marker was economic class, where "membership" was related to the relationship to the means of production; in other words, equal position in capitalist society. In German society, there was therefore talk of three classes; namely *the bourgeoisie/capitalists* (the owners of the means of production), *the proletariat* (the workers) and *the petty bourgeoisie*, who ended up in an intermediate position between these two. Marx's point had been that the members of the different social classes had common economic interests, so that financial conflicts of interest would arise between the different ones the social classes. Around 1900, the SPD represented a remarkable and paradoxical mixture of revisionism, which should work for a peaceful transition to socialism without revolution within the existing social order<sup>36</sup>, and orthodox Marxist revolutionary thought through the ideologue Karl Kautsky. Towards 1914, the revisionists in the party became increasingly dominant.<sup>37</sup>

However, socialism was not only purely theoretical, but was also part of the more or less separate German working-class culture, where ideology had a relatively subordinate role.<sup>38</sup> Before In 1914, the SPD was the world's largest workers' party, and had a multitude of sub-organisations and

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the expansion in coal mining and steel production. The result was that, in a very short time in the European context, Germany went from being an agrarian society to being Europe's strongest industrial nation. And around 1900, Germany competed with Great Britain to have the world's strongest economy. See Schulze 1991:36ff; Berghahn 1994:1ff.

<sup>36</sup> This direction was primarily represented through Eduard Bernstein.

<sup>37</sup> Ullrich 1997:175.

<sup>38</sup> Evans 1990:73.

associations.<sup>39</sup> The SPD created its own songbooks, supported socialist literature and drama, and created its own libraries and sports clubs.<sup>40</sup> Although not all of these leisure activities were purely socialist or Marxist it has been argued that they helped to consolidate the unity between the participants.<sup>41</sup>

## 2.3 Ideological and practical obstacles to collection

In addition to the radicalization of German nationalism came what George L. Mosse called "*die Nationalisierung des Massen*".<sup>42</sup> Nationalism was no longer an elite movement, but was disseminated, primarily through the school system and the military, so that it reached increasingly large parts of the population .<sup>43</sup>

Internationalism itself was far from the only obstacle. Although international solidarity based on class and not ethnic affiliation in practice was irreconcilable with the view the nationalists had on the nation, there were also a number of other points the nationalists did not could take up in their ideology without having to go back on the majority of that thought represented. The nationalists, for example, could not take up the internationalism of the socialists without it to make his own definition of the nation, as protector of German interests, meaningless. But also domestic politics, and especially with regard to the radicalization of German nationalism before turn of the century, there were several socialist elements that nationalism could not take over: The socialist egalitarianism, which in the political field fought for democratization and extended suffrage, in the economic area fought for the redistribution of property, and on that social area fought for equal rights for all citizens, both with regard to privileges on background of class and ethnic origin, clashed strongly with those of both the German nationalists view of the nation, racism and social Darwinism that were part of German nationalist ideology at that moment. Socialism was therefore also hit hard through the socialist laws from 1878-90, which banned socialist, social democratic and communist organizations and their aktiviteter på grunn av deres "*[...] efforts to overthrow the existing state or*

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<sup>39</sup> Evans 1990:72.

<sup>40</sup> Evans 1990:72-73.

<sup>41</sup> Evans 1990:73.

<sup>42</sup> Quoted from Ullrich 1997:377.

<sup>43</sup> Ullrich 1997:377.

*social order."*

<sup>44</sup> The combination of two ideologies with such different starting points was therefore a big challenge.

The nationalists' ethnic nationalism and national Darwinist ideology had two important aspects consequences when it came to the relationship with the socialists. As the relationship between nations and races were seen as a struggle for life where the weakest succumbed and the strongest triumphed, one after the other purely biological thinking, it also became absolutely central that the nation stood as strong and united as possible. The biggest problem, however, was that many nationalists felt that the socialists countered this through sabotage and disloyalty. For the nationalists the question was of race and national strength a question of the existence of the German nation, and a question of life or death: Som forfatteren Houston Stewart Chamberlain skrev det i *The fundamentals of the nineteenth century*:

*"No humanitarian talk can take away the fact that this means a struggle. Where the fight is not fought with cannonballs, it takes place silently in the heart of the Society takes place, through marriages, by reducing distances, which Mixtures promoted by different powers of resistance and persistence different types of people [...] More than others, this silent struggle is a struggle of life and death."*<sup>45</sup>

Because of such anti-nationalism became the socialists' internationalism and threat of revolution considered a national betrayal, and the socialists were branded as *"stateless Gesellen"*<sup>46</sup> of the nationalist bourgeoisie. This also had its roots in the fact that in their time they had been opponents of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and had sympathized with the French Paris Commune<sup>47</sup>, which August Bebel called *"ein kleines vorpostengefecht"*.<sup>48</sup>

Historically, this view had also been advanced by Bismarck, who had scolded the socialists as *Reichsfeinde* in order to unite them with the majority and ensure a continued conservative course.<sup>49</sup>

Despite the fact that one can draw certain biological metaphors to the deterministic Marxist view of history, the similarity with the right largely stopped there. On the political left it was

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<sup>44</sup> The laws were published in *Reichs-Gesetzblatt* no. 34, 22 October 1878. A digitized facsimile can be found on the internet: [http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/da/Reichsgesetzblatt34\\_1878.jpg](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/da/Reichsgesetzblatt34_1878.jpg)

<sup>45</sup> Chamberlain 1912:632. A digitized edition of the book can be found at <http://www.hs-chamberlain.net/index.html> The book was first published in 1899.

<sup>46</sup> Ullrich 1997:64.

<sup>47</sup> Ullrich 1997:64.

<sup>48</sup> Ullrich 1997:64.

<sup>49</sup> Ullrich 1997:64.

in reality there was no distinction between nation and state, and as a German one therefore considered all Germans citizens, even if they belonged to ethnic minorities.

The nationalism of the German right was also rejected for other reasons. According to Marxist theory, the state was a superstructure that served the interests of the capitalists, and the capitalists was in turn looking to keep the working class in check. In other words, the bourgeois state was according to Marxist theory, next to the capitalists themselves, to be considered the main enemy of the workers. So for those elements on the German left who adopted this mindset, it worked immunizing against attempts to make nationalists out of them, because a support for the nation after orthodox Marxist theory would at the same time be antithetical to the class struggle.

However, there were also Marxists, especially in Austria, who tried to make nationalism compatible with Marxism. The Austrian politician and later federal president Karl Renner wrote in 1899 a book under the pseudonym Synopticus called *Staat und Nation*, where he operated with a distinction between the "material" state and the "cultural" nation, and argued that different linguistic groups should be given cultural autonomy. Renner thereby rejected a nationalist link between state and nation.

Another example of this was the Austrian Otto Bauer.<sup>50</sup> He wrote a book in 1907 called *Die Nationality question and the social democracy*, hvor han argued for en multietnisk confederation where different ethnic groups had a large degree of local self-government.

## 2.4 Ideological and practical possibilities for gathering

Before 1914, the ideological prospects of bringing nationalism and socialism under one banner were not particularly good. As mentioned, the movements were far from each other both ideologically and politically; the right knew that they had a lot to lose if the socialists gained power and they feared that social conditions would descend into chaos and anarchy in the event of a socialist takeover. The politician and author Eugen Richter depicted precisely this in his science fiction novel *Sozialdemokratische Zukunftsbilder* from 1891, where social conditions were terrible because of of socialist and communist activity.

Initially, there was little danger of something like this happening, because the Empire's state constitution safeguarded itself against a shift in a parliamentary direction: Germany had a bicameral system, consisting of the Riksdag and the Riksdag, where the members of the Riksdag were elected through universal suffrage, while the Riksrådet consisted of aristocrats. Anyway, it was

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<sup>50</sup> Otto Bauer was the chief theorist of the Austrian Social Democratic Party.

parliamentary exercise was limited to control over taxes and the budget, which in practice had no particular effect as it only included 5 per cent of all public expenditure.<sup>51</sup> The large flow of money was still controlled by the states, by local authorities or by it Prussian *Landtag*, where members were elected through a three-class system that favored the aristocracy. Furthermore, all bills had to pass through both chambers, and not just through the popularly elected Riksdag. This effectively gave the Prussian aristocracy veto power over everyone bill.

The real political power rested with the Emperor (who was also King of Prussia) and his advisors. Even if one had universal voting rights on paper, there was still a big discrepancy between the will of the people and the political oligarchy that in practice made the decisions. The elected The Riksdag had very limited power, while a small group; and then especially ministers at state and confederal level, the leaders of the Prussian General Staff, top state-level administrators and the emperor's closest advisers,<sup>52</sup> in reality made the most important political decisions. The circuit was not only small, but also very homogenous socially and politically. It consisted almost entirely of aristocrats who were politically conservative.<sup>53</sup>

Nevertheless, it was primarily the conservatives who should be interested in finding a political one compromise between nationalism and socialism, and to a much lesser extent the socialists themselves. The conservatives were politically on the retreating front, as the election results clearly showed 1912, where the two conservative parties together received 12 per cent of the vote, against the Social Democrats' barely 35 per cent.<sup>54</sup>

As the socialists, according to Marxist class thinking, should have more solidarity towards workers in other countries than to their own government, the nation-state itself was only problematic for the socialists to the extent that those in power exposed them to reprisals - such as Bismarck's socialist laws - for what they perceived as a lack of loyalty to the state. On a theoretical level the nation-state was not in itself an obstacle to internationalism, but the demands from the nationalists in practical politics of national exclusivity was, on the other hand, an obstacle that could raise questions about the socialists' national reliability. In the heyday of the socialist laws, they risked just to be labeled as "*stateless Gesellen*"<sup>55</sup> not only "*Reichsfeinde*"<sup>56</sup>, but also prosecution and imprisonment. Bebel and Liebknecht were each sentenced to two years in prison in 1872 in a *Hoch*

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<sup>51</sup> Orlov 1995:29.

<sup>52</sup> Orlov 1995:71.

<sup>53</sup> Orlov 1995:71. <sup>54</sup>

Ullrich 1997:169,173.

<sup>55</sup> Ullrich 1997:64.

<sup>56</sup> Ullrich 1997:64.

Leipzig.<sup>57</sup> More common, however, were fines or imprisonment for "*Schmähung von Staatseinrichtungen*", "*Inciting different classes of the population against each other*", "*resistance against state authority*" or "*insulting of majesty*".<sup>58</sup>

For the nationalists, on the other hand, the internationalism of the socialists touched the ideology itself, i as much as in practical politics; more precisely at the national thought. The main premise for nationalism by its ethnic definition was the safeguarding of the interests of the German the people on a collective basis, it was, on the other hand, poorly prepared for groups that fell within the definition, but who rejected it.

For that reason the German nationalists could not enter into any synthesis with the socialists without render the ideology meaningless, so the only possibility for a combination of nationalism and socialism was through a *nationally oriented* variant of socialism.

Another promising possibility for an ideological synthesis between nationalism and socialism nevertheless existed in the relationship with other states: A war could lead to a national isolationism which again brought increased focus on the importance of national unity, and where socialists in all countries involved more easily allowed themselves to be mobilized for their own governments. This would also have a marginalizing effect on the internationalist elements, and it would be easier to confess to the socialists materially or political concessions—which were, after all, a small sacrifice to secure their national loyalty—against the gains of a victory or the disaster of a loss.

In Germany, it was primarily the latter circumstances that changed from then on 1914, and which created good conditions for the growth of a synthesis between nationalism and socialism.

## 2.5 SPD's growth and the right-wing's attempt to stop its growth

After the socialist laws came into force in the autumn of 1890, the party changed its name to *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland* (SPD). The SPD promoted a paradoxical mixture of talk of revolution on it on the one hand and political cooperation within the parliamentary system on the other. Despite the socialist laws, the party was able to show stable growth, measured in the number of votes in the Riksdag election, throughout the entire period. In 1890, the party had 27.2 percent of the vote, and after the election in 1912, The SPD is thus the strongest party in the Riksdag.

The strong progress of the SPD is ironically closely linked to Bismarck's own policy. Already shortly after the assembly, Bismarck allied himself with the liberals - his former

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<sup>57</sup> Ullrich 1997:66.

<sup>58</sup> Ullrich 1997:67.

arch-enemies – to strengthen commercial and industrial capitalism in Germany, among other things through reduction of customs barriers. This precisely helped to stimulate a rapid growth of the working class with deteriorating living conditions in the cities due to widespread immigration. This then led to explosive growth for SPD.<sup>59</sup>

On the one hand, Bismarck understood the mechanism behind the growth of the SPD, which in practice was bad material conditions among the industrial workers in the cities, but believed that it would be sufficient to improve workers' material conditions without giving them political power. He therefore implemented a welfare policy which was unparalleled in its contemporaries in its generosity, with the introduction of health insurance (1883), occupational accident insurance (1884), and retirement pension (1889). On the other side, it was hit hard down on the industrial workers' political organizations. After a failed assassination attempt against the Emperor in 1878, which Bismarck tried to link to the SPD, it succeeded in getting a majority in the Reichstag so that the party and associated trade unions had to be dissolved. Printed material or meetings promoting socialist doctrines were also banned, and socialists could be expelled from the city where the offense was committed.<sup>60</sup> This legislation initially only applied for three years, but was renewed up to and including 1890 progressively decreasing majority in the Riksdag.

In conservative circles, there had been different strategies for how to contain it up for socialism, because even though, like the social democrats, they could often lean in anti-capitalist direction, they nevertheless feared the consequences of giving them political power. It the Protestant and anti-Semitic pastor Adolf Stöcker was one of those who claimed that the industrial workers had to be given material concessions, and at the same time hoped that this would lead them over to the conservatives and into the Protestant churches.<sup>61</sup> Domestically, anti-Semitism was an opportunity that could conceivably build a bridge between the right and the left. IN in addition to the fact that it respected the nationalist concept of nation by excluding nationals minorities, anti-Semitism gained anti-capitalist undertones by the fact that the Jews on almost collective foundations were *also* identified as exploiters of the working class. Anti-Semitism was thus a first link between the national and the social in that it combined ethnic nationalism with anti-capitalism.

Others, on the other hand, were not particularly interested in social reforms, but were of that opinion that the use of police force to crush the trade unions and their political organizations should be

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<sup>59</sup> Orlov 1995:45ff.

<sup>60</sup> Orlov 1995:51. Bismarck also proposed legislation that the socialist members of the Riksdag should be expelled, and that it would become impossible for voters to vote for SPD candidates in the future. The Riksdag refused to approve this point, but supported the rest of the bill. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>61</sup> Orlov 1995:50.



sufficient to keep the socialists in check.<sup>62</sup> Bismarck had chosen a middle way, in his combination of material goods and political prohibitions.

The method chosen did not work anyway. The SPD only grew stronger and stronger throughout the prohibition period, and thus increased voter turnout from 493,000 in 1878, to a whopping 1,400,000 in 1890.<sup>63</sup> Representation in the Riksdag had also roughly tripled, to 35 seats in 1889.<sup>64</sup> The workers had definitely not given up on Marxism. Quite the contrary, for industrialization meant that the number of workers increased, while the group also developed cultural and identity characteristics.<sup>65</sup> Time was definitely on the socialists' side. Although the socialist laws were not much more effective than the failed campaign against the Catholics years in advance, it nevertheless had two effects. First, it showed the most radical workers that their own situation could not be improved in any other way than through a revolution against a oppressive regime that was perceived as hostile to the workers. And the other the effect was an increased focus on the election campaign and parliamentary elections, as this was the only one the form of political activity that was still legal for the SPD.

## 2.6 Geist von 1914 as an attempt at political synthesis

The term *Geist von 1914* was first articulated by conservative newspapers about the masses of people who gathered themselves in the larger German cities on 25 July 1914 to hear the answer to the ultimatum to Serbia, which went out at 6pm that night. The journalists were of the opinion that the masses of people were one correct expression of public opinion, and that "all" Germans were unanimous in their "enthusiasm for war". Concretely, *Geist von 1914* meant a feeling that the party political dividing lines were dissolving, and that one had gone from an egoistic and materialistic *gesellschaft*<sup>66</sup> to an altruistic *gemeinschaft*.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Orlov 1995:50.

<sup>63</sup> Orlov 1995:52.

<sup>64</sup> Orlov 1995:51.

<sup>65</sup> See Evans 1990:72ff. See also point 2.2

<sup>66</sup> Verhey 2000:231; Chickering 1998:13ff. The term *Gesellschaft* originates from Ferdinand Tönnies, and describes social relationships that are based on rational order, neutral commitment and obligations, and where the individual's self-interest will most often be the most important. An example of this is a modern company, where the workers, managers and owners may have very little in common apart from the fact that they work in the same company. However, everyone is interested in making money, so that is the way the company sustains itself. A *Gesellschaft* is thus based on secondary relationships, and with a generally lower degree of loyalty towards society. See Harris 2001:52ff.

<sup>67</sup> *Gemeinschaft* describes social relationships based on a sense of community, kinship or participation in a larger society, and which are governed to a far lesser extent by self-interest. Individuals in a *Gemeinschaft* will be subject to stronger social control, and will have a "common will". *Ibid.*, p. 22. According to Tönnies, the best example of a *Gemeinschaft* was a family, but it could also apply to small communities, with regard to religion or kinship. One

Culturally, this development was also welcomed by the same journalists and later also among intellectuals, since the latter was considered a purer and more idealistic society,<sup>68</sup> which was also close to an idyllic agrarian and pre-industrial past.

According to historian Jeffrey Verhey, the very idea of *Geist von 1914* was not based on historical reality. One mistakenly counted the large masses as "enthusiastic" on a collective basis, even if most were curious and went home after hearing the latest news. Of those who actually stayed again and celebrated throughout the evening was only a minority. But there, too, it is not possible to separate between those who joined because of "enthusiasm" and those who joined to experience something out of the ordinary. It was also not taken into account that the experience of these days varied both regionally and between different population groups.

The conservative right wing was generally more "enthusiastic" than average, and actually managed to mobilize purely enthusiastic groups who welcomed the war, usually students and other young men, but never more than a few hundred people.<sup>69</sup> It was this that were the real enthusiastic groups - and they were clearly in the minority. In comparison managed SPD to gather 100,000 people for peace demonstrations on 28 July 1914, which were thus considerably larger than the so-called "enthusiastic" demonstrations in the days before.<sup>70</sup>

What reduced the gap between nationalism and socialism was therefore to a lesser extent the "enthusiasm" of the crowds as the backbone of *Geist von 1914* than the political changes: The antagonistic relationship between the nationalists and the socialists had to be broken down for one to could defend the country effectively. Clearly defined external enemies through Russia, France and England made the domestic political problems seem less important. Both right and the left knew this and reasoned that domestic political enmity had to give way to considerations of defending the nation.<sup>71</sup>

On Tuesday 4 August 1914, the Emperor said in his throne speech that: "*Ich kenne keine Parteien mehr, kenne nur noch Deutsche.*"<sup>72</sup> The SPD had always tried to prevent the war, but as it showed failed, they had to choose whether to stand behind the government or continue in opposition.

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Gemeinschaft was therefore most often based on primary relationships, strong families and simple institutions. The degree of social control was strong and usually exercised within the unit itself. See Harris 2001:22ff.

<sup>68</sup> Verhey 2000:231.

<sup>69</sup> Verhey 2000:38-47. An example of this was in Berlin on 26 July 1914, where there were parades with between 200-400 members of a patriotic youth organization connected to the government. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>70</sup> Verhey 2000:52-53. The conservative right viewed such demonstrations as "treasonous", but did not receive support from the government in the proposal to ban the demonstrations. *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> See Bruendel 2004:29.

<sup>72</sup> Quoted from Bruendel 2004:29. The statement came after the Emperor had said that Germany was surrounded by enemies, and appealed for joint defense of the fatherland. In the speech on 1 August, he had also spoken in a similar way, and with an outstretched hand against the Social Democrats, although he did not say so directly.

Hugo Haase<sup>73</sup> spoke on behalf of the SPD and said that since the war had been unavoidable, and that Germany was threatened by enemy invasion and Russian despotism, the SPD felt compelled to take part in the nation's defence.<sup>74</sup> The speech received tremendous applause from the others the parties, for it marked in practice that the SPD was no longer to be considered an opposition party to the government and that the political contradictions between nationalists and socialists were put to rest for a period because both had an interest in it.<sup>75</sup>

That nationalists and socialists had *de facto* concluded a truce, or *Burgfrieden*, did not mean that they did not continue to advance their own interests. Both the nationalists and the socialists hoped that they would have something to gain from the collection. There was no doubt about it that the socialists wanted concessions for having stood loyally behind the government, and then primarily in the form of democratization. They claimed that they had supported the Emperor of their own free will, and that they should have the same rights and duties as others - also implied that the aristocratic privileges should disappear.<sup>76</sup>

The nationalists added a completely different content to *Geist von 1914*. For them it represented the victory for their pan-Germanic ideology.<sup>77</sup> The Marxists were now perceived to a far greater extent as nationally reliable - and since internationalism seemed to be dissolving, the right finally got a political reality which was more in line with their own wishes. *Geist von 1914* thus became an ideal state which had to be both remembered and relived at regular intervals in order to maintain the political the collection about the nation.

However, the nationalists were far more successful in connecting *Geist von 1914* with their own illiberal ideas than the socialists got by connecting it to social reforms: *Geist von 1914* should overcome the ideas of 1789, it was said: Freedom, equality and brotherhood were to be replaced by "German freedom", "comradeship" and "socialism".<sup>78</sup>

Due to the ongoing war, *Geist von 1914* was extensively used for propaganda purposes, preferably in combination with symbolism and slogans that were close to illiberal tradition, and thus also much closer to the nationalist right. The nationalists had better access to the public space, and had a higher status within it.<sup>79</sup> They were therefore far more successful in popularize his version of *Geist von 1914*.<sup>80</sup> The socialists, on the other hand, lacked the resources to

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<sup>73</sup> Hugo Haase was, together with Friedrich Ebert, leader of the SPD's group in the Riksdag.

<sup>74</sup> Bruendel 2004:29-30.

<sup>75</sup> There was also a certain expectation that the war would be over within the year, because the same mobility in the warfare as in 1871 was expected. As early as 2 December 1914, the SPD's Karl Liebknecht voted against further appropriations for the warfare.

<sup>76</sup> Verhey 2000:234-235.

<sup>77</sup> Verhey 2000:235.

<sup>78</sup> Bruendel 2004:36.

<sup>79</sup> Verhey 2000:236.

<sup>80</sup> Verhey 2000:236.

promote their own ideas, usually had a lower status in society and risked to a higher degree becoming subject to censorship.

Disagreement about war aims and the allocation of money for the warfare led to a breakaway group from SPD founded USPD in April 1917. On 1 August 1917 the *German Fatherland Party* was founded. *Burgfrieden* was therefore in practice broken this year,<sup>81</sup> and the old enemy image of nationally unreliable socialists was back in place.

## 2.7 1918/1919: Volksgemeinschaft as an attempt at political synthesis

The German Revolution of 1918 was triggered by the sailors' mutiny in Kiel, and reached Berlin on the 9th. November. The emperor abdicated, and was forced into exile when the social democrat Philipp Scheidemann and the socialist Karl Liebknecht proclaimed the republic – in competition with each other.

The competition between a democratic republic and the concept of a worker -and

The soldiers' council republic was at the same time the core of conflict in the civil war between the supporters of these political systems.<sup>82</sup>

The government tried early on to link the revolution to the concept of *Geist von 1914*, and called the "[...] beginning of the community of the people" and appealed to "[...] the spirit of the new people's community".<sup>83</sup>

The term *Volksgemeinschaft* was thus used by both socialists and nationalists and several other groups<sup>84</sup>, each of which tried to fill the term with its own meaning. In practice represented *Volksgemeinschaft* a more realpolitik edition of *Geist von 1914*, but as an idea was very close latter. The idea of *Volksgemeinschaft* thus included not only an idea of national gathering which an alternative to the class society of the Imperial Empire, but at the same time outlined a corporative superstructure which was supposed to be based on *Geist von 1914*, and which in theory could make it a permanent one realpolitik situation.

In reality, the purely ideological differences between nationalists and socialists were significant. Leaving political differences aside had not resolved *the causes* of conflict between them, because one had during *the Burgfrieden era* in practice only agreed to prioritize efforts against a common enemy of pure necessity, and leave mutual disagreement for the time being.

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<sup>81</sup> Bruendel 2004:42.

<sup>82</sup> Bruendel 2004:44.

<sup>83</sup> Bruendel 2004:44-45; Verhey 2000:346ff.

<sup>84</sup> Verhey 2000:213. Verhey mentions anarchists, Catholics, Jews, Protestants, Social Democrats, Liberal Democrats, conservatives and national socialists.

Something that advocated a more *permanent* synthesis between nationalism and socialism through a *Volksgemeinschaft* existed within the economic area and as a consequence of the war economy: A certain common acceptance of a planned economy had emerged during the war. The war led to a strong degree of centralization and stronger regulation of the economy, including help of business leaders such as Walther Rathenau and Wichard v. Moellendorff.<sup>85</sup> And with the the great economic challenges resulting from the loss of the war, it was also advocated that such corporatism could also be used in peacetime. The question of overcoming the ideological the differences between nationalism and socialism could therefore perhaps be overcome through a strong state governance, where the state should have the role of independent mediator between different interest groups.

A prerequisite for this to be successful was that one could control the same mechanism which had created *Geist von 1914*, namely to give the political spectrum a feeling that one had to stand politically united for the nation. The war was indeed over, but unexpectedly harsh peace terms created a cross-party bitterness towards the Western powers which caused the image of the enemy from the war to remain difficult to build down in peacetime. The feeling of being nationally isolated was real, so it remained it is relatively easy to argue that the Germans, and often with hindsight towards an idyllic comradeship in the trenches,<sup>86</sup> had to put aside all class struggle and stand together to cope future challenges.

World War I and its political aftermath affected both public opinion and its receptivity to political concepts. Considering the susceptibility to a combination of Nationalism and socialism were, in my opinion, primarily two things that prepared the reason for it, and which in the case of Germany can be called *external* and *internal* pressure. With exterior pressure means in practice the foreign policy stress level. Many Germans sat shortly after the First World War with the feeling of being "surrounded by enemies"<sup>87</sup> who wanted to destroy Germany, and at the same time they had the feeling of being internationally isolated as a nation. If this was always real is in and of itself immaterial, as it was the way public opinion perceived a situation - right or not crazy – who controlled the reaction. The feeling of strong foreign policy pressure made it natural enough easier to find appeal for ideologies that advocated that the Germans as a people had to stick together, if

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<sup>85</sup> Bruendel 2004:39.

<sup>86</sup> Sontheimer 1964:116ff. <sup>87</sup>

For examples of this in the daily press, see the *Münchner Augsburger Abendzeitung*, which on 28 December 1919 had the headline "*Feinde ringt uns um*", and meant that Germany's territorial concessions after World War I made the geopolitical situation untenable. A similar headline appeared in the *Tägliche Rundschau* on 8 January 1920, where one spoke of "*Der militärische Ring um Deutschland*", which consisted of France, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia [sic!].

nothing else in pure self-defense to survive as a nation. This spoke strongly in favor of nationalism.

At the same time, there had been a strong degree of internal pressure in Germany, as you might call it domestic political stress level. The main domestic political conflict line in Germany lay between them the conservative champions of the pre-industrial order and the new social classes that were a result of the industrial revolution – primarily represented by the ruling party SPD, which was under political attack from both the right and the left. The extreme right disliked the Social Democrats because of the democratization and blamed them for causing the war defeat in 1918, while the communists accused them of having failed the revolution.

If one chooses to accept that the feeling of external and internal pressure must have been greater soon after the First World War than it had been around the turn of the century, this has a very important implication: The will to accept radical social solutions must have been much stronger than previously because one felt that one had to accept them out of national necessity, and the emphasis on national unity as well. In plain language, this means that the combination of nationalism and socialism must have had a much better breeding ground after the First World War than before.

### 3. Naumann's national liberal socialism

#### 3.1 Friedrich Naumann – biographical background

Friedrich Naumann was born on 25 March 1860. He was of a priestly family on both his mother's and father's side. His mother was the daughter of the famous *Kanzelredner* Friedrich Ahlfeld and his father was an orthodox and very conservative Lutheran pastor.<sup>88</sup>

When Naumann was eight years old, the family moved to the city of Lichtenstein in Saxony with the father taking over a priestly office there. Lichtenstein was a city like many others an emerging mechanized textile industry. Naumann got to see the hard life of the industrial workers own eyes, and also became familiar with the social democrats' condemnation of the capitalist system.<sup>89</sup>

When he was still in his youth, the social democrat August Bebel came to Lichtenstein to speech at a public meeting. Friedrich Naumann's father, who was conservative and monarchist, but at the same time very concerned with the social question, entered into a debate with Bebel.<sup>90</sup> Something about Bebel must in any case must have impressed the young Naumann, for he admitted in 1913 that as a boy he had a picture of Bebel in his boy's room next to the picture of Bismarck.<sup>91</sup>

After attending the Nikolai-Gymnasium in Leipzig in the years 1874-1876, and St. Afra Fürstenschule in Meißen in the years 1876-1879, he began studying theology in Leipzig in 1879.<sup>92</sup> He went however, several of the next semesters at the University of Erlangen.

In 1881, after hearing a speech by the anti-Semitic pastor and politician Adolf Stöcker at the University of Leipzig, Naumann became a Christian Socialist.<sup>93</sup> On 6 August of the same year, he helped to form the Christian nationalist and anti-Semitic *Verein Deutscher Studenten* (VDSt) in Leipzig,<sup>94</sup> whose local team was the third in the country.

In 1883 he got a job as *Oberhelfer* at the *Rauhe Haus* orphanage in Hamburg. This place was run by *Innere Mission* and with Johann Heinrich Wichern's ideas as an ideal.<sup>95</sup> This the year gave him an opportunity to see how the church's social work worked in practice.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Heuss 1968:14-15; Walz 1972:18.

<sup>89</sup> Krey 2000:131ff; Walz 1972:18.

<sup>90</sup> Walz 1972:18. <sup>91</sup>

Naumann wrote this in his memorial of August Bebel, *Erinnerung an Bebel*, which was printed in *Die Hilfe* 19, no. 34 in 1913; Lindt 1973:7. Quoted from Naumann, F. 1964: *Werke*. Köln-Opladen, p. 501. The story can also be found in

<sup>92</sup> Krey 2000:129.

<sup>93</sup> Christian socialism was - and is - a political orientation, and is dealt with later in the chapter.

<sup>94</sup> Krey 2000:129.

<sup>95</sup> See also point 3.2.1.

<sup>96</sup> Jordan 1960:3; Krey 2000:130.

Naumann took his second theological exam in 1885, and worked as a priest in Langenberg i Saxony from 1886 to 1890. In his work with the poorest of the population, Naumann saw the poor conditions they lived under.<sup>97</sup> Naumann was disillusioned by what he saw; for one thing was Christian charity so small compared to the need that it hardly had any effect. IN addition, he saw that economic differences continued to grow despite Bismarck's social policy.<sup>98</sup> In other words, neither voluntary nor public social work in its then form had enough effect to prevent the industrial workers from being socio-economically contrasted with society otherwise, and that this was also reflected politically.

Naumann's response to this came in 1889 - during his last year in Langenberg - with *Labor catechism or true socialism* og foredraget *What do we do against the faithless Social democracy?*. These two were the first direct political attacks Naumann presented against the teachings of Lasalle, Marx and Engels. Naumann's tactics were simple; on the one hand he pointed out that socialism itself was not forbidden; the only thing forbidden was the revolutionary the struggle against the existing state and social order. He expressed on the other side drunk understanding that the industrial workers wanted an improvement in their situation, but insisted that Christianity and the church could provide the best help in this respect.<sup>99</sup> However, he failed to mention that he did not believe that the problems could be solved in this way alone.<sup>100</sup>

This way of thinking was to characterize Naumann for a few more years. In 1890 he left Langenberg to work as a *Vereinsgeistlicher* in the *Innere Mission* in Frankfurt am Main. When he was there he came in contact with the organization *Evangelisch-sozialer Kongreß*, which led to a collaboration with the organisation's founder – namely Adolf Stöcker. Stöcker was no longer the same idol he had been in 1881. Naumann now had several friends with the same social liberal opinion like himself, and they also joined the organization. Eventually came the political ones the contradictions between the conservative Stöcker and the younger members, stated by Naumann and his friends, more clearly. Stöcker's anti-Semitism was also flatly rejected by the latter group.<sup>101</sup> As Stöcker had no plans to lead the *Evangelisch-sozialen Kongreß* in more liberal direction or to reject anti-Semitism, there was tension between the two groups. And in November 1895, the disagreement was so great that Naumann and the circle around him broke away

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<sup>97</sup> Karl Jordan 1960:3.

<sup>98</sup> Karl Jordan 1960:3.

<sup>99</sup> Karl Jordan 1960:4.

<sup>100</sup> See for example Lindt 1973:9-10.

<sup>101</sup> Karl Jordan 1960:4.



Stöcker<sup>102</sup> and formed the journal *Die Hilfe*. In 1896, they got their political superstructure through *National Social Association*, ledet av Naumann.

A bit of the prehistory of the Christian social movement needs to be included in this connection, both for the contextualization part, because the movement was so central and influential at Naumann in the pre-period of the formation of the *Nationalsoziale Verein*, and because several of his most important norm transmitters and closest colleagues also started from the same movement.

## 3.2 Author analysis

### 3.2.1 Christian Socialism (ca. 1848-1878)

The term Christian socialism itself is not particularly apt. One can get the impression that it represented a fusion between Christian religiosity and Marxist socialism. This was far from the case. Although the Christian Socialists represented a multifaceted movement, one nevertheless on safe grounds if one claims that they collectively rejected ideas from Marxist socialism such as class struggle and revolution.<sup>103</sup>

If one were to try to place them in the political axis of the time, it is difficult to place them anywhere but on the conservative wing. They represented that of hierarchical society life struggle, against features of modern society such as individualism, economic liberalism and capitalism on the one hand, and against Marxism, class struggle and revolutionary thinking on the other – in other words, a struggle for pre-industrial society.<sup>104</sup>

The fact that Germany was sectarianly divided - and still not politically united - also followed Christian socialism this distinction. Until the revolutionary year of 1848, the typical Catholic response was the social issue of concentrating on the interests of the artisans, while it on Protestant side was more common with humanitarian institutions such as orphanages and hospitals as a means of charity.<sup>105</sup> An example of these was the orphanage *Rauhe Haus* in Hamburg, where Friedrich Naumann worked in 1883.

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<sup>102</sup> Spennigen is basically described in Heuss 1968:111-122. The next step is not predicated on strong conflicts, and the length of the gap between them and the split between them. Sommeren 1895 skrev Stöcker til Naumann: "If God grants you what he has denied us, that you are able to form a large workers' party, then no one will be happier than I am." *Ibid.*, p. 122. Se også Naumann, F 1964. Works. Cologne-Opladen, p. 343: "We do not intend to be guardians of a crumbling past." Sitert fra Lindt 1973:13.

<sup>103</sup> Walz 1972:1ff.

<sup>104</sup> Walz 1972:1ff. 105

Walz 1972:6. Before 1848, according to Walz, there was little to indicate a self-conscious Christian socialism. *Ibid.*

The revolutionary year 1848 created certain changes: The attention around the situation of the industrial workers and their demands meant that they could no longer be ignored. Although the industrial workers faced strong opposition from both conservative and liberal sides with regard to the fulfillment of their demands,<sup>106</sup> the response from the religious leaders was far more encouraging. Emanuel Ketteler's speech at the *Katholikentag* in Würzburg in 1848 showed that his views on the social question had gained new sides, in that he emphasized the situation of industrial workers far more strongly than before. He however, seemed unsure how to take the next step, and it was not until 1869 that Ketteler proposed state social legislation to solve the social question.<sup>107</sup>

On the Protestant side, Johann Heinrich Wichern was dominant. He gave a speech to them the Protestant church leaders at the Wittenberg *Kirchentag* in 1848, and were of the opinion that the new social problems were a result of the Germans no longer emphasizing the Christians as strongly social norms. This also explained why many industrial workers sought towards atheistic socialism. The solution Wichern proposed was anything but original; the problems could only be solved through a strengthening of Christian norms among most people.<sup>108</sup>

In 1849, the Protestant church leaders agreed to integrate Wichern's *Innere Mission*, which should promote these ideas, in the church organization. Although the concept might have had potential, it was nevertheless hampered by its own social profile. The vast majority of the leaders were priests and counter-revolutionary aristocrats, who were more than willing to use the organization as a tool to promote their own political interests.<sup>109</sup>

During the next two decades, *Innere Mission* failed to reach the masses. Still stayed demands for increased living standards and greater political influence met with traditional Christian charity and emphasis on Christian values, while the radical non-religious socialists to a far greater extent succeeded in getting the industrial workers on board with their promises of increased material and political prosperity influence.

The really great social political progress came as a result of the political ones the upheavals from and including 1867. They shifted the balance of power also within *Innere Mission*. The organization became more loosely linked to the state, and had more in common with one opposition movement than an extended arm of the state.

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<sup>106</sup> Walz 1972:7.

<sup>107</sup> Walz 1972:7. <sup>108</sup>

One can get the impression that Wichern did not see an increased standard of living for the industrial workers as a solution to the problem, and in many ways this is also correct. He was little concerned with issues such as increased industrial worker wages or increased political influence for industrial workers, but instead saw social work - to help the very poorest - as identical to practicing Christianity. Wichern thus seemed far more interested in remedying the problems where they had become too big for people to cope with on their own, and less concerned with doing something about the underlying causes.

<sup>109</sup> Walz 1972:9.

*Innere Mission* now concluded that one should use state legislation to achieve social reform. Central to this phase was also the association with an economist like Adolf Wagner, who was professor of political economy at the University of Berlin. He gave a speech at the Congress for *Innere Mission* in 1869, and placed great emphasis on the importance of government intervention to solve the social problem the question, and outlined solutions to the problems of the time that were almost identical to the modern welfare state.<sup>110</sup> Wagner and several of his colleagues later formed *the Verein für Sozialpolitik*, which in practice functioned as a think tank for the Christian Socialists.

In the first years after the unification of Germany, however, the Catholics did not have any great influence on the state's social policy. The reason was Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*, which in practice had support the Catholic *Zentrum* party out in the cold. After 1878, this picture changed: The liberals, who had been Bismarck's strongest supporters had their influence steadily reduced, perhaps at first and primarily because they became scapegoats for the financial crash of 1873. At the same time that the death of the archconservative Pope Pius IX in 1878 made this collaboration with *the Zentrum* easier. *The Zentrum* now became a party that gained a real influence on the state's social policy. And accordingly *Zentrum* was often left in a tilting position in the Riksdag, it is difficult to get past their influence on the state's social policy.

Protestant Christian Socialists were at this time far removed from the Catholics in terms of organization. They had no political party of their own to front their interests in the Riksdag, and had until the formation of a new party in 1878 been conspicuously silent with regard to promoting demands for government social policy action. The person behind this new Protestant movement was called Adolf Stöcker.<sup>111</sup>

### 3.2.2 Adolf Stoecker

Stöcker was to some extent influenced by Ketteler's social thinking about a strong state social policy, and at the same time was strongly critical of Wichern's Christian socialism, since he reasoned that Christian charity and missionary work would hardly have the same appeal among industrial workers as Marxist socialism.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Walz 1972:10.

<sup>111</sup> Stöcker was not alone. In the circle around him there was, for example, the pastor Rudolf Todt (1839-1887) who tried to find a connection between the requirements of the New Testament and the ideas of the labor movement. At the end of 1877, Todt, Adolf Stöcker, Rudolf Meyer and Adolf Wagner founded *the "Zentralverein für Sozialreform"*, which was formed on a religious and monarchical basis. See Werth 2001:28-29.

<sup>112</sup> Walz 1972:16.

What Stöcker did was in practice to copy part of the radicalism and agitation activities to the Marxist socialists, but the similarities also ended there. Stöcker was very anti-Semitic, anti-revolutionary and conservative.<sup>113</sup> Politically, there were major differences between Stöcker and the Social Democrats, but both parties fought through modern agitation for that the industrial workers should get better living conditions. Stöcker's Christian Social policy was to be promoted through his own political party from 1878 called the *Christlich-Soziale Arbeiterpartei*.<sup>114</sup>

Stöcker tried to attract the industrial workers by combining anti-Semitism, imperialism, patriotism and Christian social politics to split the industrial workers from the SPD. In Stöcker's world view, both capitalism, socialism, liberalism and atheism<sup>115</sup> were several sides of the same thing case, where all represented ideological mirror images of modern industrial society. Stöcker identified "the Jew" as the common denominator for all of these, so he was able to combine in that way antimodernism with antisemitism.

Stöcker failed to turn the party into a mass movement for industrial workers. The social the profile of the voters indicated that the small party gained its strongest support among the petty-bourgeois middle class and among young academics.<sup>116</sup> In 1881 the group was merged with the the conservative party, which for the first time took up an anti-Semitic line through Tivoli the program, inspired by Stöcker.

The main problem with this uneven merger was that the Christian social profile almost disappeared in the merger with the much larger and more powerful conservative party,<sup>117</sup> and *Innere Mission* still became the most important Protestant response to the social question.

In 1881 Stöcker was invited to the University of Leipzig to give a speech to a student assembly.<sup>118</sup> This speech was given in June 1881 in front of about a thousand listeners.

Naumann heard the speech and also got to talk to Stöcker in person. Stöcker made a strong impression on him, and was strongly instrumental in Naumann becoming a Christian Socialist.<sup>119</sup> Naumann broke with Stöcker for good in 1895, partly because of Stöcker's close association with the conservatives because it became clear that Stöcker did not aim to form a united political front with them anymore liberal Christian socialists. For example, Stöcker publicly criticized the liberals

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<sup>113</sup> Walz 1972:17. 114

In 1881 the party was named *the Christlich-soziale Partei*.

<sup>115</sup> Walz 1972:16-17.

<sup>116</sup> Ullrich 1997:387.

<sup>117</sup> Walz 1972:17. 118

Krey 2000:129. Invtasjonen finnes in the Secret State Archives of Prussian Cultural Heritage, Stöcker Estate, Rep. 92, I, 3a-f, Bl. 25-26.

<sup>119</sup> Friedrich Naumann. *What we owe to Stöcker*. *Help*, May 19, 1895.

the social radicalism of the Christian Socialists, and asked the editors of the Christian daily newspaper *Das Volk* to refer to Naumann and the wing around him as *"bitter enemies"*.<sup>120</sup>

In 1895, however, Naumann wrote an article in *"Die Hilfe"* where he thought back to their first meeting and described how much he influenced him politically:

*"He is and will be the father of our movement. He was the first to arouse our enthusiasm as will continue to drive us forward. [...] He was the first to talk about the greats the social obligations of evangelical Christianity [...]. He stood before us with ideals that we should always be true to - patriotism and evangelism, and he carried these ideals to them the urban masses. We will never forget when he spoke in Leipzig in 1881, about the new times and the new responsibility."*<sup>121</sup>

### 3.2.3 Max Weber

Although Naumann's political opinion was not static after 1896, one can see a marked one clarification and maturation of his worldview from that year because he took the step from being a Christian socialist to a national socialist.<sup>122</sup> One of those who had the most influence on Naumann in this period was Max Weber. As mentioned, Naumann had already known Max Weber from the time in *Innere Mission*, and had a friendship with him that lasted until Naumann's death. Throughout this period they exchanged thoughts and ideas, but with Weber as leading theorist and mentor.<sup>123</sup>

One of the things that had the strongest influence on Naumann was Weber's view of imperialism and social liberalism as two sides of the same issue.<sup>124</sup> Weber's speech *"Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaft"* in Freiburg in 1895 was typical of this view. Naumann himself was not present, but was able to read the well-formulated and sharp speech afterwards:

*"We do not take peace and human happiness with our descendants on their way go, but the eternal struggle for the preservation and cultivation of our national kind."* <sup>125</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Walz 1972:62.

<sup>121</sup> Friedrich Naumann. *What we owe to Stöcker*. Help, May 19, 1895. <sup>122</sup> Werth 2001:32.

<sup>123</sup> See for example Heuss 1968:127. Naumann is also said to have often asked Weber for advice on difficult political issues. *Ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> Janischen 2000:155. <sup>125</sup>

Quoted from Wilhelm Happ 1968:61.

It was the nation's "*Staatsraison*" and the "*politischen Machtinteressen*"<sup>126</sup> which acted as measure of its value. Weber addressed the domestic political issue of the management of the realm: Politically speaking, the Prussian Junkers had their time behind them, he believed. He perceived the bourgeoisie as too satisfied with *the status quo*, and the modern proletariat as politically immature.<sup>127</sup>

Weber's speech emphasized that both politics and economics had to pull in the same direction and have common goals; namely to strengthen national power<sup>128</sup> in the Darwinian struggle against other nations. Secondly, Naumann also took on board Weber's thesis about the necessity of creating one governable socialism. It was not enough to fight for the industrial workers' social welfare interests – they had to be brought up to take responsible political leadership because the industry's increased economic importance also put them closer to increased political power.<sup>129</sup>

The issue of power was not only necessary to resolve issues of power, but also to secure domestic political social policy. Naumann asked rhetorically in an article about Weber's speech:

*"Isn't [Weber] right? What use is the best social policy if the Cossacks come? Anyone who wants to pursue internal politics must first have people, fatherland and borders secure, he must provide for national power."*<sup>130</sup>

### 3.2.4 Rudolf Sohm

Apart from Max Weber, the conservative theology professor Rudolf Sohm also played a hero central role in the change in Naumann's thinking. Rudolf Sohm, like Max Weber, held one speech in 1895 which was of great importance to Naumann. In his speech at the congress for *Innere Mission* i Posing this year, he placed a strong emphasis on the dichotomy between secular *right* and religious *love*:

*"Christianity as working love brings the gospel. Christianity has more not. [...] Christianity itself will never be the answer to the question of the to be able to give justice. It cannot, because the questions of law, the Justice, questions are of this world. [...] The Christian state – away with it.*

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<sup>126</sup> Happ 1968:61.

<sup>127</sup> Heuss 1968:126, 128

Max Weber defined "macht" as "[...] every chance within a social relationship one's own will auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance beruht." Geulen 2005:19. Quoted from Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 28. According to Heuss, Weber is said to have joined the *Alldeutscher Verband* in his youth because of the association's imperialist aims, but left in disappointment because they did not take on board the domestic political assumptions for such a policy. Heuss 1968:128.

<sup>129</sup> Ingrid Engel 1972:63.

<sup>130</sup> Happ 1968:62. Sitert fra *Wochenschau* 1895, nr. 28, p.2; Heuss 1968:126.

***[...] Away with Christian law, away with the Christian state! The state is something secular and natural, and so is the law."***<sup>131</sup>

Sohm spoke against a mixture of Christianity and politics, and repeated these arguments in favor of representatives of the *Nationalsozialer Verein* in Erfurt in 1896, and said to those present: "*Die Politik fight for worldly goods with the worldly sword, then omit the name of Christ.*"<sup>132</sup>

Sohm's speech had not only had an effect on Naumann, but also on the others of the national social. After discussing the question of religion, the National Socialists put forward a resolution which said that the members no longer needed to be Christians.<sup>133</sup> They would nevertheless continue to operate on a Christian basis.<sup>134</sup> The distinction between religion and politics had become much clearer, and Sohm's words also had a direct effect on Naumann himself.

Naumann later admitted that Sohm had shown that the Gospel had no "*rechtsbinding Force*",<sup>135</sup> and that Sohm had influenced his transition from Christian socialism to socialism with a national basis.<sup>136</sup>

### 3.2.5 The National Social Association

With the formation of the *Nationalsoziale Verein* in Erfurt in 1896, Naumann had practically passed over to become a politician in a political association. This association had ambitions to become a party with the political power to carry out the programme. <sup>137</sup>

The background for the formation of the *Nationalsoziale Verein* was closely related to both internal disagreement and that Stöcker's wing in the conservative party experienced increased pressure from the party majority. This was directly related to a strengthening of the right-wing party<sup>138</sup> after Caprivi's departure. The social ones

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<sup>131</sup> Happ 1968:62. Sited from Sohm, R. 1895: *The Christian in public life*; in: Negotiations of the 28th Congress for Inner Mission in Posen from September 23rd to 26th, pp. 35ff. poses

<sup>132</sup> Happ 1968:62. Sited from Sohm, R. 1896: *Discussion speech at the representative assembly of all National Socialists in Erfurt*; in: Minutes of the representative meeting of all National Socialists in Erfurt from November 23 to 26, 1896, see 37. Berlin.

<sup>133</sup> Engel 1972:69. Sited from Wenck, *The History of the National Socialists*, p. 51.

<sup>134</sup> Engel 1972:69. Quoted from Naumann, *Hilfe*, 29/11/1896. Possibly this was in the hope of bringing together the Christian Socialists and the National Socialists.

<sup>135</sup> *The Essence of Christianity*, in: *Die Hilfe*, 1900, nr. 38, p. 10.

<sup>136</sup> Happ 1968:63. Sited from *Die Hilfe*, 1917, pp. 338f.

<sup>137</sup> The name was chosen because, in Naumann's opinion, it would be too pretentious to call such a small group a party. He saw the *Nationalsoziale Verein* primarily as a core of intellectuals who would eventually turn the association into a mass party. Walz 1972:86.

<sup>138</sup> See Ullrich 1997:191. The direct background was that Kaiser Wilhelm II demanded a tougher line against the Social Democrats and the introduction of a new "*Umsturzgesetz*". Caprivi chose to step back, and the conservative elements entered a very strong period. The party now went out and demanded that its members and associated newspapers should take up the fight against "*social politicians like Friedrich Naumann*" or be excluded from the party. Walz 1972:59.

the reformists in the conservative party exposed to increasingly strong criticism, and it became more difficult to identify their political work with the Conservative Party.

For Naumann and the circle around him, who had broken with Stöcker in November 1895, it was which happened to Stöcker in the conservative party a gift package: As Stöcker flew slowly but surely disintegrated under the pressure of Prussian reaction, Naumann took over more and more experienced employees who had previously worked for Stöcker. It was now clear that Stöcker's attempt to introduce a program of social reforms in the conservative party had had been a failure, and that the work for social reforms had in practice been set back by several years. IN meanwhile, Naumann had not changed his view that successful social reforms were dependent of being able to put power behind the demands – political power.

As the path of the conservative party was no longer relevant, Naumann decided to shop. The result of this was the formation of *the Nationalsoziale Verein* in Erfurt in November 1896.

The social profile among the delegates in Erfurt was abnormal to say the least; of 120 delegates were a total of 41 pastors or priests, 13 were professors in social sciences or theology, 11 were business owners, while only 21 were craftsmen and workers.<sup>139</sup> The vast majority of the latter were skilled workers and with a high degree of specialization, such as in stone cutting or engraving. Only four of the delegates were listed in the minutes only as "workers"<sup>140</sup> One had in other words, no worker profile, apart from the fact that one largely *addressed* the industrial workers. The clearly dominant group was the clergy, belonging to Germany's educated citizenry. In other words, the party had a social profile that was well above the average in the population.

The program this group produced in Erfurt was in some ways original; it borrowed from both the right, liberal tradition and the political left with regard to the desire for social reforms. One therefore got a program which stated that nationalism, colonialism and desire for naval rearmament was desirable in order to ensure major domestic political social reforms. The program said furthermore, the same political rights were to apply to all citizens, which must have been coined both on the political anti-Semitism, which existed among other things in Stöcker's wing; and that one Prussian *Dreiklassenwahlrecht*. The next points dealt with subordinate political issues objectives such as a desire to modernize the economy, about the party name and that religious faith should not be made a party matter.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> Hübinger 2000:168; Walz 1972:73

<sup>140</sup> Hübinger 2000:168; Walz 1972:73. The overview of the professions of the delegates is listed in the National Socialists' own meeting minutes from Erfurt: *Protokoll über die Vertreter Versammlung aller National-Sozialen in Erfurt: Vom 23. bis 25. November 1896*. Verlag der Zeit, Berlin., p. 55.

<sup>141</sup> Hübinger 2000:169.



This political compote obviously aimed to reconcile all class interests and create national harmony under an expansive and vigorous nationalism.

The recipe for drowning out domestic political problems by turning the focus onto foreign policy is well known and well used. The big problem Naumann and the circle around him faced above was that the political concept they had launched was completely unknown and completely new to the great majority of the population. For all political ideas, it will still take time before a significant segment of the population have familiarized themselves with it, so that they can next try to promote it political. The program fell outside all established political currents, since it tried to encompass everyone. And the established political currents all had their own political parties, as possible with the exception of the liberals, had a clear anchorage in their own social groupings in society. Naumann and the circle around him lacked all this, and on top of everything they lacked politics experience.

Max Weber was very critical of party formation. Despite the fact that he was satisfied that they had accepted part of his positions and turned them into a political program, he was afraid that for many of Naumann's companions had too little political experience and that they were still thinking about solutions to the social issue in ethical terms - because it was ethically correct - and not because it was the best for the nation.<sup>142</sup> Rather, he wanted the circle around Naumann to work to spread knowledge of this political concept, before possibly starting a party. This advice was not heeded to, and when he saw that it was still moving towards a new political party, he still felt a certain responsibility to guide the party, but was nevertheless annoyed that Naumann had defied his advice not to.<sup>143</sup>

Weber's objections to the party program itself were several: Firstly, he criticized the party's conciliatory optimism, emphasizing that any new party had to choose between "*bürgerliche Entwicklung*" and "*feudal Reaktion*",<sup>144</sup> and said that he feared that the party would become a mere if it "*Caricature*"<sup>145</sup> tried to launch two conflicting appeals, without choosing between them .

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<sup>142</sup> Weber 1989:233-34. <sup>143</sup>

Weber 1989:233-34; Walz 1971:69.

<sup>144</sup> Hübinger 2000:170. See also next footnote.

<sup>145</sup> Hübinger 2000:170. Weber also criticized the party for having deleted two of the points he himself had contributed to utarboth. One scores for political and economic reasons, and the other scores for criticism of regjeringens tøffe linje mot poleakkene øst for Elbe. Det var sistnevnte punkt Weber irritated seg mest over: "*There was talk of the Poles being put down to second-class German citizens. The opposite is true: we made Poles from animals into men.*" *Ibid.* Sitert fra Weber, Max. 1993: *Agricultural worker question, nation state and economic policy.* In: *Writings and Speeches 1892-1899*, ed. By Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Rita Aldenhoff, Tübingen (MWG I/4), pp. 612ff.

He also feared that the party would lose middle-class votes if the party simultaneously tried to appeal to the weakest ("*Bodensatz*") in society.<sup>146</sup>

Weber's criticism was justified. Moreover, the gap between the political left and the right side deeper than in a long time. The Social Democrats viewed the Conservatives with distrust years of political oppression, and did not see the social goods they had introduced as sincere. The conservatives, for their part, feared the progress of the Social Democrats, and were, moreover frustrated that the social welfare schemes had not been enough to stem the tide the rise of the social democrats. By this time the Conservatives had taken another step towards the right and tried to distance himself from social reformists in his own ranks. Naumann and his supporters, on the other hand, remained stuck in the middle in their attempt to transcend all national contradictions, and were viewed with a mixture of distrust and indifference<sup>147</sup> from both the political right and left. They also failed to appeal to the political center, as already were represented by parties that had programs tailored to safeguard their interests.

What the *Nationalsozialer Verein*, in the light of hindsight, should have done in the first instance was to start a workers' party to appeal to the industrial workers: the industrial workers were the most promising segment to create a real mass movement, considering their numerical growth year by year. By introducing a radicalism in the social question that was most to the left moderate social democrats, one could attack them politically from the left and exploit the ideological ones the differences within the labor movement between the orthodox Marxist elements and the revisionists. The *Nationalsozialer Verein* could still have combined this with nationalism, both because it would hardly have scared away the target audience for so long in itself social policy was credible, and because the party would have appeared less "anti-state" than the most radical elements in the labor movement. Only when the party had become one mass movement with real political power, one would be in a position to create a politics beyond class interests. The condition, however, would be that one succeeded with a strong nationalism focus on internal and/or external enemies – imagined or real, so that the majority all the time

<sup>146</sup> Hubinger 2000:170. Sitert fra Weber, Max. 1993: *Agricultural worker question, nation state and economic policy. Writings and Speeches*, ed. By Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Rita Aldenhoff, Tübingen (MWG I/4), pp. 612-622.

<sup>147</sup> See for example Bundesarchiv/N3001/63/3. The social democratic newspaper *Arbeiter-Zeitung* in Vienna wrote an article about Naumann on 7 December 1899 in connection with some lectures he was to give in Vienna. However, the newspaper called Naumann's variant of socialism a huge political counterfeit ("*riesigen politischen Falschmünzer*"), and what Naumann called "national" was in the newspaper's eyes only a euphemism for the word "state"; see also Walz 1971:95-96. Walz referred to minutes of meetings, published in *Die Hilfe*, where members from other parties had turned up to pin down the National Socialist speaker. It must have been the social democrats who were most eager for this. Among other things, the sincerity of the National Socialists with regard to social issues was questioned, and it was claimed that they had no right to speak out on behalf of the working class. For example on this, see *National Sozial: Versammlungen, Die Hilfe*, 30.5.1897. And the conservatives mostly accused the National Socialists of being in cahoots with the Social Democrats. An example of this can be found in *National Sozial: Versammlungen, Die Hilfe*,

had the main focus on the nation and the collective and not on self-interest. In other words; if one had managed to convince most people that enemies threatened the nation's existence, this would too helped to create stronger group cohesion and reduce internal contradictions – or at least create the illusion that it was the case.

The *Nationalsoziale Verein* met none of these criteria, and therefore became a political failure. They never managed to attract other than a relatively insignificant number of intellectuals, and failed miserably in attracting other groups and the aim of becoming a mass movement. It *The Nationalsoziale Verein* was disbanded in 1903 after only seven years. The background was that the elections in 1898 and 1903 only received 27,000 votes, corresponding to 0.3 per cent, and with only one mandate in the Riksdag.<sup>148</sup>

### 3.3 Democracy and Empire

Naumann published boken *democracy and empire* gjennom the *National Social Association* own publishing house – *Hilfe*. The book was published on New Year's Day in 1900 after Naumann had lived retired in Schwarzenberg and worked on the book for several months. The result was a book on 231 pages that attempted to analyze the domestic political power relations.

However, the book was not just purely observational; it was primarily historical-political in his explanation of the social conditions. Naumann tried to explain the contemporary by point to the past, and then show how the National Socialists' political program could be used to solve the major domestic political problems and lead the Germans into a better future.

It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that the book was in practice an extended election program for it *National Social Association*,<sup>149</sup> where the aim must undoubtedly have been to spread knowledge about it the national social movement's program to a wider section of the population up until the election in 1903. In any case, it is not possible to find any clear distinction between Naumann's opinions in the book and official policy of the *Nationalsoziale Verein*.

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<sup>148</sup> Hübinger 2000:171. The lucky one who was chosen was Hellmut von Gerlach – one of the defectors from the circle around Stöcker. <sup>149</sup> Heuss 1968:192.

### 3.3.1 Content analysis

#### Ethical ideals

By describing what was ethically good, Naumann also indirectly described what was ethically bad.

And in some cases he also mentioned this directly, which will be described below.

The main aspects of what Naumann considered to be ethically good are very closely connected with the idea of the state.

The state was supposed to be a strong state - also militarily, founded on a broad, popular nationalism. Loyal cross-political service to the state was central, but in return the citizens were to benefit

increased democratization. For the industrial workers, the most important implication here was that they had to change out internationalism with nationalism, in exchange for increased democratization and social reforms.

Despite the fact that Naumann saw that the socialists promoted a number of elements which were positive and fortunate for an industrial society,<sup>150</sup> and which were necessary to synchronize the economic importance of the new industry with its political influence, he saw at the same time that socialism

had to undergo strong modification in several areas so that it would not compromise the national strength.<sup>151</sup>

In its then form, he saw socialism as "*a French hawk*"<sup>152</sup> – and

foreign concept, whose class struggle would weaken the nation. Naumann's own variant of socialism consisted of a combination of social reforms and increased civil rights for wider sections of the people, with corporatism under a nationalist superstructure.

Social reforms were a means of creating loyal and patriotic soldiers out of it growing group of workers: A strong foreign policy should ensure the social reforms, and they the social reforms were necessary to create domestic political calm and thus the basis for a safe foreign policy.

Naumann spent a lot of space in *Demokratie und Kaisertum* explaining how socialism should be reformed to achieve the desired result, and was on this point completely on wavelength with conservative social reformists, such as Adolf Stöcker. Like him, he was of the opinion that social reforms would only be possible if the workers rejected Marxist socialism and embraced nationalism. Marxist socialism was harmful to

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<sup>150</sup> See for example Heuss 1968:155.

<sup>151</sup> Werth 2001:32. Naumann was undoubtedly on the left of the political axis in contemporary Germany, but he nevertheless rejected dogmatic Marxist socialism. Naumann was of the opinion that one had a lot to learn from socialism; it was both forward-looking and modern, and sooner or later would become politically dominant, at the expense of the agrarian - or conservative - aristocracy.

<sup>152</sup> Naumann 1900:66. Naumann called the socialism of the time a "*French hawk*", which had resulted in absolute kingship, revolution, Napoleonism and centralization. *Ibid.*

society for a number of reasons,<sup>153</sup> Naumann believed, while a good social policy had no purpose if the borders were not secure enough to defend it. It was therefore imperative to combine both of these two. In other words, Naumann proposed a kind of barter: Social reforms against the socialists simultaneously reforming socialism. Apart from the right to vote, which he wanted all grown men to have, the content of these reforms is unclear, especially on that economic area.

The only right thing was therefore for the socialists to support the revisionist wing and work to change society *within* the existing political system. There were simply no reasonable alternatives.<sup>154</sup> The bourgeoisie was also far stronger than the revolutionaries among the social democrats thought.<sup>155</sup>

The revolutionaries tried to bring down something that was not meant to fall, and with the wrong method. If they don't changed course, nothing good would come of it. The revolution therefore only existed "*in der Theorie und auf dem Papier*" <sup>156</sup>, but was still agitatorically necessary for the Social Democrats. IN practice, Naumann concluded, the revolutionary path had been abandoned, although it still existed someone with "[...] *Wolken im Kopf*" <sup>157</sup> who took the agitation for revolution seriously. It the dominant position of the revisionists among the socialists made Naumann optimistic. The revolution was probably the single ideological element that was the biggest challenge and the obstacle to cooperation with other political parties. But as this line of thinking stood weak, it gave hope of a political gathering on the left that could take up the fight against it agrarian nobility.

In contrast to the Christian socialists, who in practice fought for a hierarchical social order which was disintegrating, Naumann obviously knew that time was on his side, and that the left side, due of the strong connection with the new industry, came to be more numerous and to have a corresponding increase political power - at the expense of the conservative right. The Social Democrats were a quick growing mass movement of three million people which could not be neglected politically or socially. A revolution was therefore not necessary either; the democratization of society was not avoidable, and there was nothing that stood in the way of society not being governed by one majority rule from the left in the long term. However, the only question was how long the defensive conservatives could hold the redoubt, and to what extent it succeeds in reforming socialism before that came into a position of power.

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<sup>153</sup> Naumann's attempt to discredit Marxist socialism can be found in particular on pages 1-16, which are devoted to this topic in its entirety.

<sup>154</sup> Naumann 1900:69.

<sup>155</sup> Naumann 1900:87.

<sup>156</sup> Nauman 1900:5.

<sup>157</sup> Naumann 1900:22.

The socialists, for their part, had to put aside all class struggle, embrace the nation and put their efforts into securing the borders.<sup>158</sup> We also see a clear connection between the appeal to the socialists and the fear of a weakened nation-state, unable to withstand attacks from outside: Med democratization as inevitable in the long run, the nationalists needed a mass base to survive. This mass base could be found among the socialists, Naumann was sure. He quoted namely the SPD politician Eduard Bernstein that the workers had to become nationalists if they wanted a decisive role in German political life,<sup>159</sup> and believed that all parties would benefit from it: In according to Naumann, Bismarck had stirred up the fear of revolution in order to gain short-term political benefits from it, and the socialist laws had made the workers more hostile to the state<sup>160</sup>, but without any of the parts being politically necessary. Here it was possible to find a compromise like everyone else could live with: For Naumann, this hostility to the state was something one could simply get rid of by invite them into the political heat, on the condition that they should work for their own rights within the current political system. And they worked within politics system, there was also no reason to fear socialist revolution; whose fear Naumann considered as grossly exaggerated in the first place.

A major obstacle existed in the conservative aristocracy. The conservative aristocracy was overrepresented in the state leadership at all levels and in the army<sup>161</sup>, which meant that "[...] *die Krone in their actions [is] more bound to the conservative aristocracy than to any other*".<sup>162</sup>

Naumann also reacted to the fact that patriotism and royalism, which were promoted by the conservatives, were in reality not aimed at the broad masses. Instead, there was a diffuse separation between these two concepts and pure landed interests: The agrarian aristocracy had deliberately misused these concepts to promote their own narrow class interests<sup>163</sup> – also at the expense of ordinary farmers<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> Naumann's views on foreign policy are only superficially mentioned, which is logical in view of the book's subtitle. An important point is nevertheless his agitation for the strengthening of the navy to protect German trade interests. See for example Naumann 1900:214,217. Naumann's variant of socialism was absolutely necessary to implement this, which Naumann confirmed in his election program speech for the Nationalsoziale Verein: Without the "*strong Nationalsinn der Massen im Innern*" the "*die notwendige Kraftentfaltung des Reiches nach Außen*" was not feasible. Werth 2001:39. Quoted from Wenck, M. 1905. *Die Geschichte der Nationalsozialen von 1895 bis 1903*. Berlin.

<sup>159</sup> Eduard Bernstein ble sitert på side 95 i *Democracy and Empire*: "*Dignity of Social Democracy in Germany the decisive role in which Hans played, like the independents of the English and the Jacobins of the French revolution, they would have to be national if they were to maintain their rule.*"

Naumann did not provide any closer source than that Bernstein had "written" the above quote. *Ibid*.

<sup>160</sup> Naumann 1900:139.

<sup>161</sup> Naumann 1900:94.

<sup>162</sup> Naumann 1900:94.

<sup>163</sup> Nauman 1900:94.

<sup>164</sup> Naumann 1900:90.

As the most ardent champions of hierarchical society, they posed a threat to democracy and was an obstacle in the way of almost all of the changes Naumann considered necessary to create a stable domestic and foreign policy, based on a broad majority rule:

***"The East German nobility is an conqueror's caste that has Germanized a Slavic area has to serve her. [...] It is this political race that today is the fiercest, is the most determined enemy of German democracy, not because it enjoys it, but because it has to."***<sup>165</sup>

Naumann was aware that democratization would be politically disastrous for the agrarian the aristocracy - and of course the aristocracy knew that too.

Naumann observed that this "conqueror caste" clung to power, despite the fact that they stayed stadig mindre politisk betydelige: *"In democracy, industrialism rises to the political mass phenomenon, in socialism machine and people's rights come."*<sup>166</sup> Selv om one can question the legitimacy of causality between political and industrial modernity, Naumann was of the clear opinion that the agrarian aristocracy was fighting a losing battle against modernization and expansion of political rights. And he didn't seem to have something against helping this aristocracy, which in his political landscape stood in the way between the German the people and a bright future, away from the political hegemony this group had. The agrarian the aristocracy was archaic for Naumann, as German society had moved on from agrarian society to industrial state. The agrarian aristocracy was therefore a remnant of a society which was on the way out, with attitudes that were politically out of step with the nation's development.

Naumann also perceived the clerical aristocracy as an obstacle. They had settled on one political course which had its basis in the preservation of hierarchical society, and was consequently in same political category as the agrarian aristocracy. Equipped with the argumentation of both Max Weber and Rudolf Sohm, he dealt with the worst of these variants in *Demokratie und Kaisertum* – namely Catholicism: What Naumann reacted to was that Catholicism was "unnational", strongly "political", and that loyalty was stronger towards Rome than Berlin:

***"The political aspect of Catholicism is the church, that big one, touching all peoples, many Organization that dominates peoples intellectually, the center of which is the old Caesarian seat of Rome, and whose monarch is the spiritual Caesar, who is Pope"***<sup>167</sup> ***"Jesus Christ was not a***

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<sup>165</sup> Naumann 1900:90.

<sup>166</sup> Nauman 1900:90.

<sup>167</sup> Naumann 1900:124.

*Politician. [...] Attempts have often been made to find political norms from the inexhaustible source of his words. [...] The result, however, is the conviction that the Site commandments of the Savior are so universally human, purely moral, that they do not To give instructions on how one could conduct social, democratic or even aristocratic politics at a certain time, for example in the age of industrialism.”<sup>168</sup>*

Naumann reacted to what he interpreted as a flawed distinction between religion and politics,<sup>169</sup> and that Catholics, even if they could have a certain patriotism, could not become nationalists in the proper sense of the word because of the religion's internationalism.<sup>170</sup> In addition, he claimed that democracy had a difficult time under the Catholics, since they were bound by an authority in a system where the majority had no meaning.<sup>171</sup> Both of these points – lack of nationalism and lack of democracy - hit the core of Naumann's politics in a devastating way manner.

### Economic distribution

Naumann was sparse with specific information in the book about how resources should be distributed be, but it is still clear that Naumann envisioned a Germany where property conditions are large set was unchanged, but with which the economic distribution should correspond to a higher degree industrial workers' increased economic importance and need for material improvement of their own situation. In practice, this was to happen at the expense of the agrarian aristocracy, which he wanted to make less economically and politically important:

Naumanns was convinced that the road to social reform had to go through one long process, and within the existing social order, as the revisionists fought for.<sup>172</sup> The socialists were to see that the radical path of revolution had to be rejected because it was

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<sup>168</sup> Nauman 1900:128.

<sup>169</sup> Nauman 1900:125.

<sup>170</sup> Naumann 1900:125.

<sup>171</sup> Naumann 1900:126. See også side 129: "Where Catholicism rules, it is authoritarian."

<sup>172</sup> Naumann 1900:8-16. For å studere dette points nærmere, before Naumann's article "Gägensatz im Sozialismus". The stilte han skjematisk opp fem clear motsetninger mellom de revolusjonære og revisjonistene: Foruten den allerede nevnte måten Kampen for rettigheter skulle foregå på, var det "[...] a contrast between workers and academics", som han ikke gikk nærmere i detalj på. Det tredje motsetningsforholdet var "[...] a contrast between the unskilled race and the learned upper class of the proletariat". Det fjerde var "[...] whether the proletariat must first conquer economic power before it can become politically strong, or whether, conversely, only gaining political power enables the economic upswing". Det femte points var "[...] the point in time at which the proletariat can gain influence". Artikkelen finnes in Bundesarchiv N-3001/56/3.



impossible and would not lead to anything positive for them or the state.<sup>173</sup> The socialists actually had more to lose than their chains;<sup>174</sup> moreover, a revolution would quickly be put down militarily, and in the event of a general strike, the workers and their families would be the first to starve. There was none prerequisites for revolution, since capitalist society was far stronger and more flexible than the revolutionaries imagined. It was not at all on the verge of collapse.<sup>175</sup>

The development could not be stopped, Naumann believed, so the way one acted now would to a large extent determine what society would look like; one should have social reforms and the nation safe or should one let the socialists force through social reforms on their own and get political instability in the bargain? The choice was easy for Naumann. It was far better to come along concessions that sooner or later had to come, and at the same time try to make certain demands the socialists, than to let such an opportunity slip by.

Attempting to prevent democratization could also entail a certain risk for the state. In critical times, the state was dependent on the support of the people.<sup>176</sup> And if the people did not feel that the state represented their interests, this would lead to domestic political instability that was not in step with Naumann's foreign policy visions of the new Germany.

The speech of the numbers was in and of itself clear: the industrial population had grown from 16 to more than 20 million in the period 1882-1895,<sup>177</sup> and Naumann noted that industrialization happened faster and more violently than in countries with which it was natural to compare, which had profound social and political consequences.<sup>178</sup> Not only were the industrial workers the fastest growing group; they got also a stronger political awareness and consequently demanded extensions of the right to vote.

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<sup>173</sup> Naumann 1900:69.

<sup>174</sup> Naumann 1900:11. <sup>175</sup>

Nauman 1900:13. Naumann var av den oppfatning at vilkårene for en vellykket revolusjon var lengten unna enn tidligere: *"Revolutions can only be successful where the state as a state has become weak. This is not the case with us. All of the last half century has meant a steady increase in state energy."* Se også *Ibid.* s. 87 om det han beskrev som socialdemokrater underminering av borgerskapets styrke.

<sup>176</sup> Naumann 1900:49. Naumann var ikke bare for en utvidelse av stemmeretten; han var også sterkt imot at enkelte stemmer kunne veie mer enn andre: *"The form in which the new electoral law was incorporated into the constitution is as follows: 'The Reichstag arises from general and direct elections by secret ballot.' That is missing Word of 'equal' suffrage. But if suffrage enemies want to use this formal loophole to smuggle in preferential rights for age, property or education, they violate the spirit of the constitution [...]."* Naumann 1900:51. Forfatningens ånd, mente Naumann, var at én person hadde én stemme, og at de skulle veie like mye som all others: *"What good is the principle of the majority if it is not fully applied?"*, han retorisk spurtet. Naumann credited Wilhelm Löwe for sitatet. *Ibid.* 177 Werth 2001:23.

<sup>178</sup> Instead of looking pessimistically at the development, Naumann saw the possibilities. Where others might have feared revolution and saw population growth causing major problems, Naumann saw the possibility of many new soldiers who could protect the kingdom, opportunities for economic growth and exciting new technology. There was no point in trying to turn back time. In that case, one could only slow down a development that was on its way, but not stop it. The future was only dangerous if one moved too slowly into it, he wrote in *Demokratie und Kaisertum* (p.38), and thus stood in rather strong contrast to the conservative right.

Nor did Naumann draw any clear distinction between the people and the state. He was a corporatist who saw the nation as a unit characterized by mutual dependence: The people were equally dependent of having a political leadership that the political leadership depended on having the support of the people. Of for the same reason, there was also no natural adversarial relationship between employers and workers, since both groups were completely dependent on each other and both had an interest in the company making a profit.<sup>179</sup> *"Ein Industriepolitik großen Stiles ist undenkbar ohne die workers, but just as unthinkable without the employers."*<sup>180</sup> Naumann therefore refuted it the social democratic program of an industrial policy in which the workers had taken over produksjonsmidlene: *"In reality, however, the entrepreneurless industry does not exist, and will likely not to exist in the next human age."*<sup>181</sup> A well-functioning business community the whole nation would benefit: It was not possible to harm the other party in a labor dispute without indirectly harming oneself. Naumann here called for cooperation between both parties i the industry, which, despite having different ownership interests, had a common interest in power politics and the economic shift towards their own group and their industry.

According to Naumann, the first step was to introduce democratic and social reforms.<sup>182</sup> One of them most important reasons for the radicalization of the labor movement had been a lack of political innflytelse: *"Excluding the lower class makes them hostile to the state."*<sup>183</sup> And the only one the solution to this was to give them an increased opportunity to be heard politically: *"Ein Volk das einen Massenprotest bei Wahlen erheben kann, denkt nicht an Gewalttaten."*<sup>184</sup> Only by expanding the right of the masses to vote could be put to rest under the possibility of an attack on the state. This was one completely different strategy than the German right had had, which had tried to counter the threat from the social democrats with a legal ban, although they had also extended to social politics concessions. However, they were not willing to cede political power. The difference in strategy came obviously because they each represented their own segments of society: Democratization was with certain minors

<sup>179</sup> Naumann 1900:24.

<sup>180</sup> Naumann 1900:24.

<sup>181</sup> Naumann 1900:24.

<sup>182</sup> That betyr imidlertid ikke at that var de sociale reformene that var målet i seg selv. I *Die Hilfe* skrev han at: *"The best armament for the coming wars is effective social reform."* *Die Hilfe* April 10, 1895, sitert etter Werth 2001:39; Happ 1968:92. I practice betyr dette at social reforms bare var et middle for utenrikspolitisk maktpolitikk. At han tillia utenrikspolitikken sterkere vekt enn innenrikspolitikken finner vi fra Naumann selv i andre kilder: *"The overall course of external politics is even more important and more serious than internal ones."* Happ 1968:94. *"Anyone who wants to pursue internal politics must first secure the people, fatherland and borders, must ensure national power."* Happ 1968:93. *"The idea of world power [is] the prerequisite for all social progress."* Happ 1968:93. Naumann may also have clearly over at precious military oppression neppe ville være mulig i lengthen uten bred politisk støtte, sånn- og utenrikspolitikk hang svært tett sammen. *Ibid.* Naumanns ble overbevist om at kapitalismen kom til å seire, blant annet etter å ha lest igjennom Werner Sombarts verk fra 1902, *Der Moderne Kapitalismus*: *"Capitalism [...] only starts (lifts) to seize control of the globe."* Jähnichen 2000:152. Sitert fra Naumann, F.: *The future of capitalism*, in: *Die Zeit* No. 9/1903, p. 230.

<sup>183</sup> Naumann 1900:48.

<sup>184</sup> Naumann 1900:11.

reservations about reform among the social democrats something Naumann was happy about, while there was a serious threat to the conservatives' political power, and which they would obviously prefer to avoid giving up.

Extending the right to vote would of course only solve one of the problems, which was one (at most theoretical) revolution from the socialists. But it could also create new problems, if socialism did not undergo reforms at the same time. Being ruled from the left by a group Naumann described as anti-national and pacifist, he naturally perceived as harmful, both within and foreign policy. First and foremost, he saw these attitudes as harmful to the workers themselves, since they made social reforms impossible, and in addition they were harmful to the nation as a whole, which in terms of security suffered under an increasingly large group "*without a national state ideology*".<sup>185</sup>

#### Distribution of power

Naumann already gave the answer in the programmatic title of the book; *Democracy and Imperialism*, where the emphasis must be on the word *und*. Naumann wanted to unite *the imperial power*, which he considered the strongest political power in Germany at the time,<sup>186</sup> with a broad democracy under a nationalist superstructure. Altogether, this political combination should yield the most viable result. In other words, Naumann wanted to build on the traditional and established imperial power, in combination with modern reforms.

Naumann's justification for this combination was that German democracy was too fragile and weak to challenge the government.<sup>187</sup> Democracy needed a supporter to survive, and its best supporter Naumann could see was the imperial power, which was not only the first and most important factor for national self-preservation - which one in Naumann's world should certainly not take crack - but also a factor that ensured the continued existence of democracy.<sup>188</sup>

The fact that the imperial power, which was closely linked to the conservative and anti-liberal agrarian aristocracy, was suddenly to become a warm supporter of the extension of the right to vote was a paradox Naumann took lightly. Although he realized that in Germany at the time there was an adversarial relationship between the two, he nevertheless claimed that it had not always been like this: "*Das*

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<sup>185</sup> Worth 2001:35. 186

Naumann 1900: 167. See also Naumann 1900: 170. The skrev han at: "*There are two factors that have to reckon with each other in the German Reich: the Kaiser and the Reichstag*". The policy can therefore be carried out based on this to have had a nokkelrolle.

<sup>187</sup> Naumann 1900:148. 188

See også Werth 2001:39: "We therefore want a policy of power to the *outside and reform to the inside*." p. 57.

*System, das 1870 siegte, war militaristisch-kapitalistisch.*"<sup>189</sup> And Bismarck had not been anything conservative at the time, but a ruthless revolutionary, who was undoubtedly capitalist.<sup>190</sup> The strong ties between conservatism and imperial power had come as a result of them close ties with the agrarian aristocracy, but as this group would probably weaken politically in the years to come, it opened up the possibility of compatibility with "[...] *politische Herrschaft des Mehreheitsprinzips*";<sup>191</sup> or to put it another way - democracy.

As mentioned, democracy and imperial power were to form a political and symbiotic pair, where both benefited from the other. The distribution of power between the two was more vague with Naumann describe. Between these two political principles, society could be organized in a number of ways områder, men Naumann gjorde én ting helt clarifies: *"An absolute monarchy is just as impossible in the present as an absolute democracy."*<sup>192</sup> Grunnen til dette var enkel: *"Both parts formally protest against any weakening of the natural opposition within them, but they agree to walk a common path together."*<sup>193</sup> Det var derfor no danger of one party weakening the other.

Although Naumann believed that such a system should be politically self-regulating and in a way balance to prevent extremes, this was due to a different distribution of work domestic politics, which meant that one could not do without the other: *"Der Kaiser führt die Nation as dictator of the new industry. But in doing this, he needed the masses, democracy."*<sup>194</sup> Og en av de all the most important groups here var de nye millions of industrial workers which was to come in the years.

He realized that time was on his side anyway, that the conservative aristocracy was on both sides on the defensive and on a retreating front, but nevertheless proposed economic changes that would undoubtedly have further weakened the conservative aristocracy, although he never directly wrote that it was the intention: When Naumann proposed fleet building and expansion policy, it was not just foreign policy considerations behind this. He was fully aware that it would be "[...] *deeply anti-agrarian*"<sup>195</sup>, and would hit the conservative aristocracy and their core areas. But politically it was necessary, and that the conservative aristocracy would thereby become smaller economically and politically important is in any case clear.

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<sup>189</sup> Naumann 1900:157.

<sup>190</sup> Naumann 1900:153.

<sup>191</sup> Naumann 1900:181.

<sup>192</sup> Nauman 1900:181.

<sup>193</sup> Naumann 1900: 181.

<sup>194</sup> Nauman 1900:181.

<sup>195</sup> Naumann 1900:138.

According to Naumann's analysis, the new Germany was to be characterized by three currents under one powerful national superstructure: Imperial power, industrial aristocracy and democracy, where imperial power and democracy were prerequisites for Naumann's combination of nationalism and socialism, while too strong an industrial aristocracy could potentially become a threat. It was therefore important to clear any political or structural obstacles out of the way. Since he saw imperial power as the strongest force in German political life, he saw no immediate threat either which could weaken it. Democracy, on the other hand, had obstacles in its way because it ran against a undemocratic system, which had its clearest expression in the Prussian *Landtag*.<sup>196</sup> Democracy had time on his side, but there was still little doubt that Naumann was impatient, and happy to see that such a stronghold of Prussian conservatism was significantly weakened. This was a prerequisite for the fusion of democracy and imperial power, and for the union between the political right and left side.

### 3.3.2 Reception

I was unable to find book reviews of *Demokratie und Kaisertum* during the archive visits in Germany. The reception the book received, on the other hand, is mentioned in Heuss' biography, but is also the only one the book I have found where the reception of *Demokratie und Kaisertum* is devoted space. Naumann himself was of the opinion that the book had been a clear success.<sup>197</sup> It possibly sold more than expected, since it had to be printed in four editions, with 25,000 books in total.<sup>198</sup>

Outside the circle of *the Nationalsoziale Verein*, the book received a very lukewarm reception: Reviewers in the political daily press were unanimously negative about the book, for various reasons and in different tones:<sup>199</sup> The harshest criticism of the book came in the liberal conservative newspaper "*Post*", which called the book an "*impotent Machwerk*".<sup>200</sup>

The main reason for the poor reception in the press is probably just as much in the book structure as in the political polarization among the German parties at the time. Had the book was about a single topic, the content would probably correspond fairly well to one or other political wing, whose newspapers would have found it very difficult to butcher the content.

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<sup>196</sup> Naumann 1900:148. In other words; profound changes in the distribution of power in German society could hardly be made without the agrarian aristocracy coming out as losers. And if they wanted to lose from changes, they would no doubt oppose them out of sheer necessity.

<sup>197</sup> Heuss 1968:157. 198

The last edition came in 1905, and this edition ran from 15,000-25,000.

<sup>199</sup> Heuss 1968:157.

<sup>200</sup> Heuss 1968:157.

The problem, however, was that Naumann tried to outline a total political solution that should lie beyond class antagonisms, but which nevertheless contained individual parts like absolutely everyone except his own followers could take offense. And then the road to the slaughter of the entire book was sudden very short.

Some groups had more to gain (and lose) from the book than others: The agrarian aristocracy would become much less economically and politically important<sup>201</sup> if Naumann had the opportunity to realize program in the book, so they had no reason to like it. The rest of the political right could probably have sympathies with the nationalist, military and colonial part of the programme, but hardly with the democratization that would in practice lead to Germany being governed as well mass basis from the left. For the conservative right, Naumann's program would in practice be tantamount to giving up political control, which would be unacceptable.

The political center on the Protestant side, and especially the left wing of the center - was it the only part of German political life where one had the greatest chance of success. They had little to lose on a combination between nationalism and socialism, and was intended to play an important political role in the new Germany. They also remained relatively untouched by the extensive reforms described in the book, and would gain traction for an increased degree of democratization.

The Catholic minority, which was most strongly represented through the (centre) party *Zentrum*, didn't have as good a reason to be satisfied with the book. Naumann had set a clear goal questioning the Catholics' sense of nationalism, and saw the Catholic Church as an obstacle to the implementation of the policy. And if Naumann had been able to carry out his nationalist plan program, it would undoubtedly lead to stronger conformity pressure for this group.

The Social Democrats initially had a lot to gain from the book. Courage to record nationalism, they were able to gain increased political acceptance, increased civil rights and improved material conditions situation. In addition, as an increasingly important economic and numerical group, they would constantly receive one stronger degree of political influence. As a political offer, this was very good, and The social democrats were therefore the only group which, in addition to the left-liberals, had the most to gain from it. However, the political distance between the right and the left was such great that Naumann was never considered sincere by the Social Democrats. They saw him as one politician who sailed under a false flag, and who deep down was not a friend of the political the left side.

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<sup>201</sup> Due to economic liberalization with regard to the import of agricultural products, as well as democratization.

### 3.5 Impact analysis

To measure the political effect Naumann's national social ideas had on the contemporaries, it is useful to take a closer look at the impact of the national social experiment, especially because the material is larger degree completes the picture than the relatively sparse material that is to be found

Virkningshistorien til *democracy and empire* alone.

The election results of the *Nationalsoziale Verein* were disastrous both in 1898 and 1903.

The goal of erasing the political contradictions between the bourgeois-democrats the forces and the socialists proved to be far beyond their reach. Their political naivety led Max Weber to state that they were "[...] like children who put their fingers between the spokes of the wheel of fortune".<sup>202</sup>

The political publications were not successes either. *Die Hilfe* was published in modest editions, and probably had little interest outside the party's own circle. Naumann's own *Democracy und Kaisertum* was not a great success either, with its 25,000 copies over one five-year period.

The answer can only be that his national social period can only have had a minimal popular character influence, and that the concept of combining socialism and nationalism by and large became overlooked by most people.

A large part of the explanation must be attributable to Naumann and the circle around him on this at the time were politically inexperienced and made several gross tactical blunders. Instead of creating a party that was tailored for either the bourgeoisie or the industrial workers, and work for a close political cooperation with the other party - so that one would have been perceived as sincere in any case one of the groups - one chose to place himself in the middle, only to be overlooked by both: One *Nationalism* with a certain social profile, on the other hand, could have potential among the bourgeoisie, at the same time among which a *socialism* with a certain national profile could have had stronger potential the industrial workers than something in between.

Everything indicated that they were unable to reach any of the target groups, which they had anyway parties that could represent them better than a mixed party that is both from the right and the left was viewed with great skepticism.

Nevertheless, one must admit that the national social experiment may have had a certain effect in two areas. First, Naumann conceptualized something through *Demokratie und Kaisertum* and the *Nationalsoziale Verein* which was new – namely a combination of nationalism and socialism

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<sup>202</sup> Cited after Walz 1972:207.

which was both detached from the traditional right and with a clear distinction between religion and policy.

The political conditions, with strong polarization and strong mistrust between the right and the left, did their part to make it difficult to build something constructive in politics no man's land in which the *Nationalsoziale Verein* tried to establish itself.

Although Naumann was by no means the first to combine nationalism and socialism, he differed from his ideological predecessors on the two points mentioned above. This brought about the need for a new arrangement in the electorate's view of this concept, or at least that those who were not aware of the concept from before were informed about it. (To be receptive to the message, one must actually know what the message is!) One must therefore be able to assume that those who were the most receptive to Naumann's political concept, were among the most politically active and the most interested in society, something also the strong element from the education citizenry in *the Nationalsoziale Verein* may indicate, although it is hardly the whole explanation of the profile.

Rudolf Sohm stated after the dissolution of the *Nationalsoziale Verein* that the high social profile was far more important than trying to form a mass movement, and that it would ensure at idéene ble videreført: *"The educated are the rulers, what the educated want, happens. The greatest great power in the German Empire represents German education."*<sup>203</sup> Mot one can of course object to this view that the leadership of *the Nationalsoziale Verein* did not remain in German political life as a unified bloc after its dissolution. The majority formed a common front with them liberal; and although Naumann in many ways continued to promote remnants of it national social policy, there is still no doubt that he could be placed within it liberal tradition, where he is also remembered as an important politician. Regardless; the approach to them liberals caused several of the central party workers to either leave the party or join other political trends: Adolf Damaschke, who had helped found *the Nationalsoziale Verein* with Naumann in 1896, left party politics for good, while the general secretary in *The National Social Association* is also published for *Die Hilfe*, Max Maurenbrecher, and in liten circle around him joined the SPD.

It is therefore difficult to find any ideological *continuity* from Naumann's national social period, as outlined in *Demokratie und Kaisertum* and forward in time: The circle around Naumann disintegrated and in several political directions. However, Naumann himself did not take this too seriously. He was of the opinion that he had found a patent solution to German domestic and foreign policy which sooner or later would become a political reality.<sup>204</sup> If he himself does not succeed

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<sup>203</sup> Cited after Heuss 1968:195.  
<sup>204</sup> Werth 2001:40.



party politics was, in his opinion, of less importance. He was convinced that sooner or later the concept would catch on.<sup>205</sup> On 3 May 1903 he wrote in *Die Hilfe*:

*"The development towards national socialism will come [...] even if our club should not be able to win an election victory; because this development ultimately does not depend on whether individual constituencies already have the necessary number of votes is available. [...] After all, German history will end without it to pursue our electoral success along the path that we have recognized most clearly and definitely of all political parties."*<sup>206</sup>

Naumann's analysis of the future, as outlined in *Demokratie und Kaisertum*, never materialized reality, and was also theoretically out of date with the political changes of 1918, which made an effective end of imperial power. However, Naumann was right in the basic features of his economic analysis; namely that Germany was to be economically and politically dominated by the social groups that were emerged as a result of industrialization. He was also right that it was possible to collect liberals and social democrats to a binding political cooperation, but was at the same time wrong about that was to take place under a national social superstructure.

The dissolution of *the Nationalsoziale Verein* in 1903 effectively marked the end of politics the attempt to combine nationalism and socialism for Naumann. Naumann realized with the election fiasco this year that the attempt had failed, and entered the liberal alliance *Freisinnige Vereinigung* together with most of the delegates from the disbanded *Nationalsoziale Verein* and under Naumann's leadership.<sup>207</sup>

In 1907 he was elected to the Reichstag for the city of Heilbronn after winning the constituency against a candidate from the conservative party.<sup>208</sup> In 1910 *the Freisinnige Vereinigung* and *Deutsche The Volkspartei* merged into the *Freisinnige Volkspartei*, becoming the first party in Germany which merged the left-liberal and bourgeois side.

In the Riksdag, Naumann worked for an economically liberal policy, combined with social ones reforms, at the same time as he argued for the strengthening of national power through colonialism and naval rearmament.

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<sup>205</sup> Worth 2001:40, 206

Help May 3, 1903, cited by Heuss 1968:189.

<sup>207</sup> Hübinger 2000:171.

<sup>208</sup> In 1912, Naumann suffered electoral defeat against a Social Democratic opponent in Heilbronn, but managed to be re-elected to the Riksdag in a by-election in 1913 for Waldeck-Pyrmont. He retained this mandate as a representative of the Riksdag until 1918. Heuss 1968:269ff.

Naumann worked to avoid the outbreak of the First World War, and in 1915 published his clear most successful book, called *Mitteleuropa*, in which his post-war vision of a central European union under German domination was elaborated.<sup>209</sup>

In 1917 he started a *citizenship school*, som ble forløperen for *Hochschule für Politik*.

In November 1918, he helped found the left-liberal and bourgeois *Deutsche Demokratische Partei* together with Max Weber, among others, who had now finally got it the kind of party he had wanted in 1896 – not ideological, but a party with a certain popular appeal support. (Parallel to this, Naumann helped draft the Weimar constitution.) DDP was on liberal grounds, but sought cooperation with the Social Democrats in what they hoped would be a strong left coalition. Naumann was elected the first leader of the party in 1919. However, he became more and more afflicted with asthma and had to retire from politics.

On 24 August 1919, Naumann died of a stroke at his home in Travemünde. His death did not go unnoticed in German newspapers. Several of them wrote long articles about him in connection with his death.<sup>210</sup> *The Berliner Tageblatt* called him an artist in writing and speech, and with an unparalleled world of ideas.<sup>211</sup> *The Magdeburgische Zeitung* wrote that his idealism was mocked, and th sosiale keisermakten ikke falt på fruktbar jord fordi "*The empire remained under the spell of those layers that surrounded it.*"<sup>212</sup>

The most remarkable of these articles was from the newspaper *Der Tag*, where the author, one W. Rein from Jena, remembered having warned Naumann against entering politics, because it "*verdirbt den Charakter*".<sup>213</sup> He remembered that Naumann replied that this did not necessarily have to be the case, but Rein then wrote in practice that it had nevertheless happened; because his utterances in the time i

<sup>209</sup> What Naumann put in the term *Mitteuropa* is described on pages 100-101 of the book: "*Und über das alles, über deutsche, französische, dänische, polnische, Reichsdeutsche, über magyarische, deutsche, rumänische, slowakische, kroatische, serbische Ungarn, aber deutsche, tschechische, slowakische, polische, südslawische Österreicher denken wir uns nun nochmals den Oberbegriff Mitteleuropa. Mitteleuropa wird im kern deutsch sein [...]*." Naumann 1916:100-101. The idea of *Mitteuropa* was not new and was geopolitically related to the idea of Greater Germany. However, Naumann's concept differed from the latter in that it was more liberal and federalist. Considering the ongoing war and the questions people were asking about the new order after the war, it was in any case the right time to court such trends: Unlike *Demokratie und Kaisertum*, which was printed in only 20,000 copies over a five-year period, *Mitteuropa* sold 100,000 copies within one year alone of publication.

After book reviews in as many as 65 newspapers, there was naturally further interest in the book. New editions were also printed in 1916 and 1917, and the publisher did not stop advertising the book until May 1918. Frölich 2000:259; See also Heuss 1968:363. After 100,000 copies had gone to press in July 1916, a so-called *Volksausgabe* was published in October 1917 where a further 27,000 copies came on the market. Part of the joy was possibly that the book was used extensively in Allied propaganda as a symbol of German "imperialism". *Ibid.*, p. 361.

<sup>210</sup> Se for eksempel *The day* September 10, 1919; *Berliner Tageblatt*, August 25, 1919; *Plutus* 8/27/1919; *Magdeburg Newspaper* August 30, 1919; *Democratic Party Correspondence*, Aug. 25, 1919; *Aaschener Allegemeine Zeitung*, August 30, 1919; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Stuttgart, August 26, 1919. See also the Christlige sheet of *The Christian World* 20.11.1919, so i stedet for å trykke en own article brukte Naumann's article *Selig sind die Toten fra Hilfe*, 1895, no. 47

<sup>211</sup> *Berliner Tageblatt*, August 25, 1919.

<sup>212</sup> *Magdeburg Newspaper*, August 30, 1919.

<sup>213</sup> *The day*, September 10, 1919.

nasjonalforsamlingen i Weimar hadde "[...] hurt his old friends bitterly [...]". Han also concluded by writing that it was "*tragic*" that he chose to become a politician, which was so "*alien*" from his being and education.<sup>214</sup>

Considerably more praise was to be found in Max Weber's letter of condolence after Naumann's death, only one year before he himself died of pneumonia:

*"Again and again one has humanly raised oneself to the fact that [...] someone existed, which politics does not humanely solidify, mechanize, brutalize, or ingeniously render had. [...] The proud modesty, serenity, warmth and fulfilment personally offered how ennobling he was in the discussions and struggles of our public Life worked, how immensely greater his being was than his work and his work again as his external success. [...] The greatness of his appearance did not lie in what he wanted, but how he wanted it and how he conducted his business. [...] And not lost Above all, the fact remains: that a human being asserted himself inwardly in a time that was not made for him. Either he came too early or too late."*<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> The day, September 10, 1919.

<sup>215</sup> Krey 2000:117.

## 4. Spengler's "Prussian" socialism

### 4.1 Oswald Spengler – biographical background

Oswald Spengler was born on 29 May 1880 in Blankenburg am Harz. His father was postal clerk, and the family moved to Halle in 1891. At school, Spengler was known as anxious and withdrawn<sup>216</sup>, and compensated by finding excitement in the world of books. The pocket money was most often used to buy books, and he read everything from highly topical Darwinism to literature Goethe, Shakespeare and Kleist, besides French and Russian novels, and was able to read books in English, French, Italian and partly Russian.<sup>217</sup>

He missed military service because of a congenital heart defect. He took the artium in Halle, and was so privileged that he had parents with financial means enough for him to get university education - something that was largely reserved for families more affluent than the average. After giving up a dream of becoming a poet and dramatist<sup>218</sup>, the choice of profession fell into place the teaching profession "*[...] weil das nicht so konkret und etwas Philosophischeres war als Jura und Medizin*",<sup>219</sup> and he began studies in mathematics and natural sciences at the University of Halle. IN 1901, after his father died, he matriculated at the University of Munich. In Munich he became acquainted with the collegium of the "catheter socialist" Lujo Brentano, who argued for social reforms and a third way between capitalism and socialism.<sup>220</sup> Spengler then studied in Berlin for a year, and visited the Riksdag where, among others, he heard August Bebel speak - a politician who made a strong impression on him.<sup>221</sup>

Spengler returned to Halle to complete his doctoral thesis on Heraclitus.<sup>222</sup> He brushed it off first defense, but passed six months later. After this he taught in Saarbrücken and Düsseldorf, before in 1908 he got a position as a teacher in Hamburg. As the school was small he taught German, history and geography in addition to his special areas of mathematics and natural science.<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> Felken 1988:14.

<sup>217</sup> Felken 1988:14. He did not get his interest in books from his parents. He wrote himself: "*Meine Eltern beide. unliterary, never opened the bookcase, never bought a book.*" *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>218</sup> Just before he started university, Spengler planned to write dramas with names such as *Cäsar*, *Tiberius* and *Socrates*, and also a tragedy about a Norwegian Viking-era prince named Harald who had converted to Christianity, and who in disappointment took up the mountain faith again. Felken 1988:18.

<sup>219</sup> Felken 1988:18.

<sup>220</sup> Felken 1988:18.

<sup>221</sup> Felken 1988:18.

<sup>222</sup> Fischer 1989:81. <sup>223</sup>

Hughes 1992:4.

In connection with his mother's death in 1910, Spengler inherited enough money for him to take leave from the teaching job. He initially planned to stay in Hamburg, but after finding that the climate worsened the headaches he so often suffered from,<sup>224</sup> he decided to move to Munich.<sup>225</sup> The inheritance from his mother secured him a modest income, and he supplemented that by working as a freelance writer.<sup>226</sup> Since he was without a permanent job and was a bachelor, he had the opportunity to continue spending his days reading books, primarily classic philosophy. He had also begun work on what was to become the culturally pessimistic work *og bestselgeren demise of the West*.

Spengler was optimistic about the outbreak of war in 1914:<sup>227</sup> *"Ich bin da durch optimist. We will conquer in such a way that the great sacrifices will be amply repaid."*<sup>228</sup>

The first draft of the first volume of *Untergang des Abendlandes* was finished in 1914<sup>229</sup>, but he continued to change the manuscript until 1917. He had great difficulty in finding someone to publish the book, and only 1,500 copies were printed in the year of publication in 1918.<sup>230</sup>

## 4.2 Author analysis

Since it was *Prussianism and socialism* in 1919, it was all mentioned for *the downfall of the Abendlandes*, so people must have had some interest in reading his analysis of political contemporary issues. *Preußentum und Sozialismus* was his first political writing, and was intended as a reaction to Marxist socialism, which he considered a kind of capitalism for the working class. Spengler protested both against the Marxists' use of the term socialism, and that Marxism itself was an expression of inferior English *Zivilisation* which should never – or could - be applied in German society. Instead, he proposed a distinctive German variant of socialism in the form of a Prussian corporatist monarchy.<sup>231</sup>

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<sup>224</sup>

Koktan 1963:41. <sup>225</sup>

Hughes 1992:3.

<sup>226</sup>

Hughes 1992:5; Felken 1988:26. He worked as a freelance writer throughout the First World War as well.

<sup>227</sup>

Felken 1988:39.

<sup>228</sup>

Koktanek 1963:29. Videre skrev han, ikke helt uten entusiasme: *"Just owning Belgium, which will certainly remain German, is a tremendous gain: 8 million inhabitants, a seaport on the canal, huge industry and the oldest culture. We will also get what we still need, an African colonial empire."* Ibid.

<sup>229</sup>

Koktanek 1963:29. Letter to Hans Klöres, 25/10/1914.

<sup>230</sup>

Hughes 1992:7

<sup>231</sup>

See Spengler 1921:64,69,104.

### 4.2.1 Niccolò Machiavelli, Giambattista Vico or a

The most problematic thing about determining who Spengler's role models were is that they were not primarily built on personal acquaintances, but on Spengler's reading. Spengler read enormously, and already in 1921 Spengler himself complained that he had *"[...] mehr als fünfzig Vöränger met, including Lamprecht, Dilthey and Bergson. By now it will be well over to have turned a hundred. If I had wanted to read even half of it, I would still be there not to today end."*<sup>232</sup>

The fact that one observes kinship with other authors does not necessarily mean that Spengler was influenced by them, or for that matter that he had once read their books. If they had the same role models, this can explain the striking agreement in both argumentation and analysis, even without being familiar with each other's works. An example of this is the Frenchman Georges Sorel (1847-1922), who combined values closely associated with conservatism with a strongly modified Marxism, where he rejected elements such as internationalism and historical and dialectical materialism. Sorel was seen as a forerunner of both anarcho-syndicalism and Italian fascism, and had several strong features in common with Spengler; Sorel had both Nietzsche and Bergson as role models - Spengler had Nietzsche as a role model, and was accused of plagiarizing Bergson.<sup>233</sup> In other words, it was no wonder that it was many common features.

That Spengler had direct knowledge of Sorel is doubtful. It is true that Spengler in *Jahre der Entscheidung* mentioned Sorel among *"socialists of higher quality with conservative ways of thinking"*,<sup>234</sup> but this did not happen until 1934. Sorel was never mentioned, neither in *Untergang des Abendlandes* nor in *Preußentum und Sozialismus*, so there is no guarantee that his acquaintance with Sorel is of a later date.<sup>235</sup> Spengler preferred to read classical literature anyway, rather than the works of authors of his own time<sup>236</sup>, so it is entirely possible that he was completely ignorant of Sorel da han skrev *Prussianism and socialism*.

One must therefore try to distinguish between the authors one *thinks* may have influenced Spengler, and those one knows for *sure* has influenced him. And here, of course, a purely quantitative approach does not hold review of Spengler's reading material: Even if one reads a book, it does not necessarily mean that one becomes influenced by it – or that one thinks the book is good. An example of this can be found in the autumn of 1918.

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<sup>232</sup> Felken 1988:60. Letter to Oscar Beck 18.9.1921.

<sup>233</sup> Hughes 1992:52.

<sup>234</sup> Spengler 1934:133.

<sup>235</sup> Hughes 1992:52.

<sup>236</sup> Hughes 1992:55-56.

Then Spengler was visited in his apartment in Munich by August Albers, who later became a zealot admirer of Spengler. He then discovered that Spengler had many of the Frenchman's books the philosopher Henri Bergson lying forward. According to Albers, Spengler must then have said that he just had read an insignificant work by Bergson when he wrote *Untergang des Abendlandes*, but since he was accused of having plagiarized Bergson in the latter work, he said that it was necessary to familiarize oneself with his books.<sup>237</sup>

The below-mentioned authors represent a selection which cannot be said to be exhaustive. It is rather a description of the most important authors, as Spengler perceived and interpreted the ideas their. It is therefore Spengler's own reception of these thinkers that makes them countable, but it must therefore be opened to the possibility that Spengler's perception of their ideas was not free from

misinterpretations.<sup>238</sup> It is uncertain to what extent Spengler was influenced by several of these, but the The cultural cyclical thinking that also pervaded *Preußentum und Sozialismus* can be traced back to both Joachim of Floris (ca. 1145-1202) and Nikolaus von Kues (1401-1464).<sup>239</sup> The Arab Ibn Chaldun (1332-1406) wrote in the 14th century a cultural morphological work which has many features in common with Spengler's work, and Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) set up a comparison between the human biological cycle and the historical world.<sup>240</sup>

It is also likely that Spengler drew inspiration from the Italian philosopher, the historian and jurist Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), who in his book *Scienza Nuova* argued that civilizations develop in cycles - "*ricorso*" - and could be divided into three ages which were universal to all civilizations: he called these *the divine*, *the heroic* and *the human*, and at the same time claimed that it was possible to identify which phase a civilization was in through certain political and social characteristics.<sup>241</sup>

As a political skeptic, it is nevertheless reasonably certain that the Renaissance historian Jacob Burckhardt, with whom Spengler was familiar, also influenced him politically.<sup>242</sup> Bismarck has also probably influenced him politically, with his state welfare policies and conservatives value base was considered a representative of Prussian socialism. <sup>243</sup> Spengler admired

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<sup>237</sup> Hughes 1992: 52.

<sup>238</sup> Nietzsche is possibly the most abused and misinterpreted of the two. The subject is thoroughly treated in Jacob Golomb, J. & Wistrich, R. (ed.) 2002: *Nietzsche, godfather of fascism? : on the uses and abuses of a philosophy*. Princeton University Press. Princeton – Woodstock.

<sup>239</sup> Felken 1988:58.

<sup>240</sup> Felken 1988:59; Fischer 1989:83.

<sup>241</sup> Felken 1988:59; Fischer 1989:83.

<sup>242</sup> Hughes 1992:51.

<sup>243</sup> Hughes 1992:51.

him also as a politician because he had a "*true political instinct*", and could foresee the political development, so that he could try to steer it in the direction he wanted.<sup>244</sup>

Although there are many similarities with those mentioned above, it is impossible to know about Spengler was influenced directly or indirectly by them, or through one of the role models who are certain. Spengler himself stated his role models in his revised edition of *Untergang des Abendlandes* i 1923 to be *Johann Wolfgang von Goethe* and *Friedrich Nietzsche*.<sup>245</sup> These two who original authors are not only valid against his work on *Untergang des Abendlandes*, but have also been central components of his world view, which has been central during the writing of both the latter work and *Preußentum und Sozialismus*. At the very center enkeltpunkter i *Prussianism and socialism*, blant annet i kultur- og historiesynet, makttanken and elitism, there are also great similarities with his interpretation of Goethe and Nietzsche.

#### 4.2.2 Goethe

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) was a writer, dramatist, scientist, philosopher and politician, and became one of the most important authors in German literature in its classical heyday, if works were used as primary sources for music, drama and poetry. Goethe was particularly popular in Germany among *the Bildungsbürgertum* – the educated middle class, to which Spengler belonged. He got practically a cultural prophet status in his own *Bildungsreligion*.<sup>246</sup>

Spengler never hid the fact that his reception from Goethe had a great influence on him. Both because he wrote it directly in *Untergang des Abendlandes*, and because he mentioned Goethe more often than any other author in the work – even more often than Nietzsche.<sup>247</sup>

Spengler primarily emphasized that he had learned method from Goethe's books, and with this is meant in practice the morphological method which was the very starting point for Spengler's philosophy. Morphology itself was a method that could be written directly back to the Romantic the movement in Germany, represented among others by Goethe; and it aimed to create

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<sup>244</sup> Hughes 1992:51. Quoted from *Decline of the West I*, p. 28; Spengler 1934:118. Spengler still called him one "*late romantic*" with a "*one-sided aesthetic view of antiquity*". *Ibid*.

<sup>245</sup> Hughes 1992:59; Felken 1988:157. I forordet til 33.000-47.000 opplaget av *Untergang des Occident*, writes Spengler on side IX: "*I feel compelled to repeat the names to whom I owe almost everything: Goethe and Nietzsche. I got the method from Goethe, the questions from Nietzsche, and if I have to put my relationship to this into a formula, then I can say: I have made an overview out of his outlook.*"

<sup>246</sup> See for example the following article from *Die Zeit*, 40/2002: [http://zeus.zeit.de/text/2002/40/200240\\_s-](http://zeus.zeit.de/text/2002/40/200240_s-girard.xml)

<sup>247</sup> girard.xml Felken 1988:53.



a methodical understanding between inner and outer forms, represented through nature and art/history.<sup>248</sup>

Hughes explained the concept of morphology thus:

*"[...] it represented a use of history that corresponded to biology's concept of life forms. Every culture, according to this view, was an organism, which just like other living things passed through a regular and predictable course through birth, growth, maturation and decay. [...] This biological metaphor created the conceptual framework and created unity and coherence for the rest."*<sup>249</sup>

This line of thinking is perhaps most easily associated with *Untergang des Abendlandes*, but was later my assessment equally strong and central in *Preußentum und Sozialismus*, where Spengler assessed Germany up against England by cultural age and used this to point out that the Germans, with Prussia as the leader, culturally speaking, was a "younger" and more vital people than the English, if culture had passed into decay.

Spengler also used the same morphological argument against Marxism, as he did considered a cultural expression of the decline phase, imported from abroad. He also used the morphology to set the strong state in Prussian version as the most natural of the German people cultural expressions. In other words, there was a complete correspondence between Prussian culture, that the German people, and their political superstructure in the form of the strong German state. Thus integrated Reflects both nationalism, socialism, culture and history in one frame.

On other points too, Spengler had more in common with Goethe than with many others in his contemporary. Goethe argued that cultural differences in reality had their origin in geographical and historical differences. Goethe thus ended up at odds with the rationalists, who were dominant in the Enlightenment, which was of the opinion that reason alone was sufficient to create good societies. A parallel to this can be found in Spengler's description of them different types of spirit in *Preußentum und Sozialismus*, which had also arisen after becoming shaped by geography and history. More generally, this also had the effect of making Spengler stronger emphasis on the supersensible than what a pure rationalist would have done.

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<sup>248</sup> Felken 1988:52; Fischer 1989:89. Culture cycle theory was revitalized in Germany during the Romantic movement (c. 1770-c. 1830), and was, in addition to the already mentioned Goethe, promoted by, among others, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and Wilhelm von Schelling (1775-1854). *Ibid.*

<sup>249</sup> Hughes 1992:10.

### 4.2.3 Nietzsche

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) was a philosopher and was perhaps best known for his criticism of culture, religion and philosophy, which primarily questioned the foundations of ethics and morality.<sup>250</sup> Nietzsche did not reach full popularity in his relatively short career as a philosopher. Forty-four years Nietzsche had a mental breakdown when he was old, and consequently never published anything again.

Around the turn of the century, the cult surrounding Nietzsche reached a tentative peak, and it was practically no educated German who was not in some way influenced by him, although this did not mean that they embraced his ideas.<sup>251</sup>

Spengler, on the other hand, was one of those who claimed to be strongly influenced by Nietzsche. A central factor here is the idea of power, which said that a living being is not only looking for self-preservation, but will always strive to grow and expand. Not because it was right or wrong from a moral point of view, but because it was part of living.<sup>252</sup> In other words, the idea of power was a very fundamental organic function according to this view.

The idea of power itself is clearly found in Spengler in *Preußentum und Sozialismus*, when he last page of the book wrote that "*socialism means power*", and that socialism, as the most vital of all trends of the time had to be given a central place in political life. Spengler's interpretation of Nietzsche was that, like organic life, the German state had to be strengthened and made more powerful - or approaching doom. There was no other alternative.

Spengler also interpreted Nietzsche as an elitist, which may be derived from both the idea of power and undoubtedly Nietzsche's emphasis that there were "*individuals and classes who [were] born to rule*".<sup>253</sup> This also corresponded to Spengler's view of the German aristocracy, which according to his mening hadde en "*superiority [sic!] in all areas of practical national life*".<sup>254</sup> Selv om Spengler ikke skrev noe direct om aristokratiets plass i *Prussia and Sozialismus*, it is still difficult to imagine a form of government like the one he advocated without one

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<sup>250</sup> Pippin 1999:78ff.

<sup>251</sup> Felken 1988:157; Woods 1996:49.

<sup>252</sup> Nietzsche 2000:259; Woods 1996:54-55.

<sup>253</sup> Hughes 1992:62; Woods 1996:52.

<sup>254</sup> Se Spenglers tale on Adelsdagen in Breslau May 16, 1924; fra *Deutsche Adelsblatt* 1.7.1924: "*Every real nobility is within a people "race" in its purest form, not only defined by descent, but the epitome of certain instincts of commanding, organizing, negotiating, feeling responsible, in short, superiority in all areas of practical national life. [...] The nobility therefore has the duty, not only for its own sake, to regain its former importance, not by trying, which would be futile, to regain old privileges, but through education for inner superiority, an education that Friedrich Wilhelm I proved possible in himself and in his officials and officers.*" Bavarian State Library, Ana 533/110.

strong aristocracy. This was some of what he advocated in practice in his speech in Breslau on 16 May 1924.<sup>255</sup>

Spengler, on the other hand, did not agree with everything Nietzsche wrote. The view of the state and the view of the individual in society was diametrically opposed: Nietzsche had been openly hostile to the state and was an opponent of the new German Reich,<sup>256</sup> while Spengler had the state as the foundation for practically everything else. In the tradition Spengler promoted, the individual was totally subordinate to the state and the community, while Nietzsche instead held the individual who could create his own values and live according to them, without regard to the dominant values in the rest of society, as the highest value.<sup>257</sup> And it was the independent individual – not the state or the individual as an obedient and submissive citizen – who thus represented the highest moral value.<sup>258</sup>

#### 4.2.4 The November Revolution

The events in Munich in November 1918 and their ripple effects were, according to Spengler, a direct reason<sup>259</sup> for him to write *Preußentum und Sozialismus*.<sup>260</sup>

Spengler wanted a gathering between elements from the right and the working class, and that they could agree to turn their backs on both money power and "Jewish" Marxist theory. In line with he perceived both the cultural cycle thinking as the product of a cultural cycle on the brink of breakdown.

The reason why he became so involved in this can, in my view, be partly explained by walking several months back - to the revolution on 7-8 November 1918 in Munich. Here it is useful to show how Spengler reacted to them when they happened.

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<sup>255</sup> *Deutsche Adelsblatt* 1 July 1924; Bavarian State Library, Ana 533/110.

<sup>256</sup> Hughes 1992:62.

<sup>257</sup> Hughes 1992:62.

<sup>258</sup> Hughes 1992:62-63.

<sup>259</sup> Kottanek 1963:126. Letter to Hans Klöres 26.3.1919.

<sup>260</sup> I et brev til sin venn Hans Klöres forklarte Spengler om Prussianism and socialism og effekten han håpet at den skulle få: "By the way, the effect among younger politicians and industrialists is stronger; Only from here can the construction take place, which is based on the tactical merger of decent workers with the right-wing nationalists in the fight against the stock market and the mob. [...] What we need most today are workers' leaders, ie not imposed, but coming from the Independent S[ocialist] P[artei] (so to speak) who do not attack radicalism from the outside, which makes it only strengthens, but gradually takes the lead from within. I know that there are endless elements on the right who want an alliance with working class.

But in its current Jewish organization, which it directs not against the stock exchange but against "Junkerism," the left is simply not capable of forming an alliance. Marxism with slogans like proletariat, class struggle etc. must first fall."<sup>260</sup> Se Kottanek 1963:160. Brev to Hans Kloeers 20.5.1920. Boken hadde follows svært bra frem til slutten av mai 1920, there han skrev brevet: "From my 'Prussianism and Socialism' comes the 21st-30th Thousand out – that should be a record at the moment." *Ibid.*, p. 160.

Oswald Spengler wrote a letter to Hans Klöres in December about the events of this day: *"Ich I experienced some of the disgusting scenes of November 7th up close and am disgusted almost suffocated."*<sup>261</sup> The explanation for this reaction is not difficult to understand. Spengler's vision for Germany was, after all, to restore a Prussian ideal state, where Prussian socialism was the only and true socialism.<sup>262</sup> But with the revolution on 9 November, the political the development exactly the opposite of what Spengler wanted.

"Today I look more calmly into the **German future.**"  
måneder senere, the 27th of December. *"The mob revolution takes such a school-like course, as a result of the absolute mental and practical incapacity of the leaders at such a pace that a quick end is in sight."*<sup>263</sup>

On May 4, the revolution had been crushed, just as Spengler had predicted: *"Endlich sind we are freed from the hell of these 4 weeks. [...] I haven't heard anything for weeks, no letter, no newspaper, foreign newspapers were forbidden on pain of death. Nothing but hunger, plunder, dirt, mortal danger, and an unparalleled idiocy."*

had something to do with the Marxist variety, and that it was fully compatible with the German one the folk soul. In other words, Marxism was a materialistic misguided path that the German people did not have to take is led out on. In a letter to Hans Klöres, he elaborated on the purpose of *Preußentum und Sozialismus*, which they had talked about privately earlier:

*"Now is the moment to make these crucial statements about the meaning and direction of the socialism and its relationship to time. Liberating socialism from Marx – because he is older and deeper than this - him from the rabble instincts, from the mere negation and criticism of the To lead what has become historical, from the dilettantism of these days to its predetermined – “Prussian” – goal: the best minds are ripe for that today."*<sup>265</sup>

Spengler rejected the Marxist view, where the "evil" capitalist society was to be replaced of "good" proletarian socialism, and relied on Nietzsche's terminology to describe the possibility

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<sup>261</sup> Kottanek 1963:111; Felken 1988:91. The unrest started in the Bavarian capital Munich on 7 November. Early on November 8, USPD politician Kurt Eisner established the Workers' and Soldiers' Council and declared Bavaria a republic and a *Volksstaat*.

<sup>262</sup> Kottanek 1963:123.

<sup>263</sup> Kottanek 1963. 114. Letter to Hans Klöres 27.12.1919.

<sup>264</sup> Kottanek 1963:127. Letter to Hans Klöres 4.5.1919. <sup>265</sup>

Kottanek 1963:126. Letter to Hans Klöres 26.3.1919. Italics in original text.

for a state beyond class differences:<sup>266</sup> "But the Prussian state is beyond good and evil. It consists of the whole people."<sup>267</sup>

## 4.4 Prussianism and Socialism

Shortly after Kurt Eisner was killed, Spengler met August Albers at the publisher CH Beck to talk about a book Spengler had the idea for. The book was actually supposed to be called *Römer und Preußen*,<sup>268</sup> and should in practice summarize his political analysis of the present. Originally was the manuscript part of the preparatory work for *Untergang des Abendlandes*, but was planned to be published in the second volume of the book.<sup>269</sup> Due to the book's topicality in connection with the revolution in 1918, at the end of December 1918 at the latest, he brought forward the preparatory work with a view to publishing in December 1919, and with the fresher title *Preußentum und Sozialismus*, the book was published after having been written in the period from August to November of that year.<sup>271</sup>

Spengler's main thesis throughout the book was that the political dividing lines in German political life were artificial, because the antagonism between the German conservatives and the socialists was based on a big misunderstanding: they thought of each other as bitter enemies, while in reality they had overlapping interests in the fight against both Marxism and parliamentary democracy.<sup>272</sup>

The book as such was therefore in practice an attack on the new republic, and became both one of the first and most successful such.<sup>273</sup>

Below, a content analysis will be carried out on three main points in the book - the spirit types, the concept of socialism and how socialism could be integrated into a state and nationalist framework. The section on the types of spirits may at first glance seem out of place in an assignment about the combination of socialism and nationalism, but it is nevertheless important because Spengler's cultural emphasis marks a clear distance from the biologically and anthropologically inspired contemporary racism, and thus also to the National Socialists.

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<sup>266</sup> Woods 1996:56.

<sup>267</sup> Woods 1996:56.

<sup>268</sup> Kottanek 1963:115. Letter to Hans Klöres 27.12.1918; Felken 1988:95.

<sup>269</sup> Felken 1988:95.

<sup>270</sup> Kottanek 1963:115. Brev til Hans Klöres 27.12.1918: "These days I have my manuscript *Römer und Prussia made again* [...].

<sup>271</sup> Felken 1988:95. The book was also republished in 1932 as part of Spengler's political writings; Spengler, O. 1932: *Political Writings*. CH Beck Verlag. Munich.

<sup>272</sup> Hughes 1992:106.

<sup>273</sup> Felken 1988:95.

### 4.4.1 Content analysis

#### Ethical ideals

Like Naumann, Spengler tried to clarify his own political concepts by making them visible contradictions, i.e. clarifying the ideological good by comparing it with it ideologically bad. For Spengler, this comparison was consistent between Prussia and England, where a strong Prussian state based on nationalism, "Prussian" socialism, *Volksgemeinschaft* and *Kultur* were emphasized through the negation of "English" liberalism, "power struggle", "plutocracy" and *Zivilisation*. In some places in the book it is hard to see clear to himself what kind of alternative political system Spengler envisioned, because so much space remained applied to the negation of Marxism.

Spengler's political alternative was essentially based on the concept of a distinctive type of spirit, and was not directly based on a distinction between cultural or ideological opposites: the spirit type encompassed both.

As the concept of "Prussian" socialism rested so heavily on the concept of spirit type, it is necessary to describe the idea of types of spirit in order to explain the difference between "Prussian" socialism and Marxist socialism.

But what did Spengler mean by the term? The spirit type was an ideal type – a pure form of state of mind that was considered particularly typical of a people. Spengler used the term "*Preußentum*" to describe the type of spirit which in practice was identical to the German, and defined it like this:

*"Prussianness is a way of life, an instinct, not being able to do otherwise. [...] In this Words mean everything that we Germans do not depend on vague ideas, wishes, ideas, but possess fateful wanting, having to, being able."* <sup>274</sup>

Since the term was ideological-cultural, the spirit type was something that had to be maintained and transmitted passed on to the next generation. And to prevent the spirit type from getting too far away from what it is "originally", this could be continuously adjusted towards the Prussian ideal.

The spirit type was not something that lay in the "blood", as Spengler saw it, because it was quite possible to lose it his spirit type. This happened because the people neglected their own, and adopted other people's ways of thinking and

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<sup>274</sup> Spengler 1921:29.

world view. In that case, according to Spengler, they became pure "caricatures", since they imported principles that were not created by themselves.<sup>275</sup>

The closeness to a cultural view of the spirit type can be seen when Spengler described how the spirit type had arisen: A people could get its distinctive way of thinking, sensing and feeling through a twofold process. First by the fact that the people formed a special type of spirit, and then that the spirit type formed the people. This was a lengthy process. And it wasn't always descriptive either. Not all Germans were in possession of the Prussian type of spirit, nor all Britons in possession of the British.<sup>276</sup>

The geopolitical location of the states was absolutely central to explaining that the spirit types were different, he thought. The Germans had no natural boundaries against their enemies, and had to have a strong one state to survive. The consequence was that it became authoritarian, and made the military and work compulsory for the individual loudly. But in England the island (sic!) in itself constituted a natural defence, and replaced the need for the organized state.<sup>277</sup> In such a state, the individual was given far greater leeway, but was at the same time left to himself to a greater extent. Thus there emerged one authoritarian and one liberal state. As Detlef Felken wrote in his book *Oswald Spengler*, he stands here close to the thesis about that inversely proportional relationship between external pressure and internal freedom, which in his time was formulated by the English imperialist theorist John Seeley, and who in Germany was promoted by historians such as Hermann Oncken and Gerhard Ritter.<sup>278</sup> However, he was not entirely on the same wavelength, since he saw no clear connection between a strong state and lack of freedom – quite the contrary.

The spirit type was an ideological-cultural phenomenon that largely existed beyond it conscious. It was expressed through actions and ideas, but it was not *identical* to these.

As a cultural phenomenon, the culture cycle theory could also be applied to the spirit types: Spirit types had after this a biological life course that went in cycles; from birth to death. And as one as a consequence of this, the different peoples also had different "ages". "Age" meant in this context where in the course of life the spirit type was. Was it young and vital, or was it old and on the way back? Spengler identified the Prussian people as "born" in the 18th century, and formed by the Hohenzollern.<sup>279</sup> It was the "*youngest*"<sup>280</sup> of the peoples of Europe.

It was not a long leap from thinking about the age of the peoples to drawing conclusions about which ones ideas that came to outlive the others. Spengler was therefore convinced that the Prussian

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<sup>275</sup> Spengler, for example, used this argument when he argued that Marxism was "English". See for example Spengler 1921:29ff.

<sup>276</sup> Spengler 1921:29.

<sup>277</sup> Spengler 1921:32.

<sup>278</sup> Felken 1988:101. Felken viser her også til Faulenbach, B. 1980: *Ideology of the German way. The German History in historiography between the German Empire and National Socialism*. Munich, p. 184ff.

<sup>279</sup> Spengler 1921:32.

<sup>280</sup> Spengler 1921:5.

instinct, which was practically identical with the German, had time on its side and would survive everything other.

The distinction between the spirit type and nationalism and Prussian socialism was unclear. By doing nationalism and socialism to partly cultural phenomena, political ideology was taken up as one part of German culture. So by promoting such a culture in Germany, one would at the same time come closer to one goal of increased political consensus – something that could also, in theory, be considered to put a damper on class antagonisms. Whether this was realistically feasible in the desperate situation in Germany in 1919 is rather doubtful.

Both Spengler's anti-liberalism and anti-Marxism had anti-Anglican undertones, but anti-Semitism, unlike that of the National Socialists, was not set in an ideological system as one central part of the ideology and thus had no ideological function.

The view of England as a trading nation, imbued with money power, thus shines clearly through, but he still had to admit that there were elements in *the aristocracy* that had not been given a position by wealth alone.<sup>281</sup> This claim simultaneously modified the view of England as a pure plutocracy, where money alone was decisive for social position. The decline of English the aristocracy may also be associated with anti-Anglican tradition from the First World War, which also implied a desire to differentiate the English and the Prussian spirit.

Spengler interpreted the First World War as a struggle between these instincts – in practice between "Prussian" socialism and English liberalism; although outwardly the conflict took the form of a war between great powers.<sup>282</sup>

Spengler considered liberalism and free trade to be two of the English's most important weapons in this context:<sup>283</sup> two concepts which (according to the English) were supposed to serve all humanity, but which in reality were only a strategy to secure world domination.<sup>284</sup> Only a strong state could resist these currents, and their "by-product" in Marxism.

One of Spengler's main objections to Marxism was that it was rooted in the two-class thinking of British society, and rested on premises that had no validity in Germany:<sup>285</sup> the thus only had its counterpart in English Manchester capitalism, and to use it in Germany

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<sup>281</sup> Spengler 1921:44.

<sup>282</sup> Spengler 1921:6. *"The World War is, in the evening of Western culture, the great conflict between the two Germanic ideas, ideas which, like all real ones, were not spoken but lived". Ibid.*

<sup>283</sup> Spengler 1921:65-66.

<sup>284</sup> Spengler 1921:50. It is interesting here to see the similarity with the National Socialists' argument at a later time, where England was simply replaced with the Jews as a group, and responsible for exactly the same thing; among other things, Marxism and liberalism, and a plan to conquer the world.

<sup>285</sup> Spengler 1921:15. Se også side 43-44: *"The English people are built according to the difference between rich and poor, the Prussian people according to that of command and obedience."*



was, according to this line of thinking, tantamount to "treason", not least since it had support among the victors after the First World War.<sup>286</sup>

Spengler's sense of cultural superiority over the English had several important implications. He saw German culture as healthier and more vital than the English one, argued out from quasibiological culture cycle theory. Symptoms such as Marxism, liberalism, individualism and parliamentary democracy was subsequently seen as a sign of cultural decay, and as a cultural superior Germany should get rid of as soon as possible.

### Economic distribution

An important consequence of the view of socialism as an unarticulated instinct was that it did not necessitated changes in property conditions. Spengler effectively positioned himself that way outside the link between socialism and material goods. A consequence of this was that the workers according to Spengler's model, did not receive promises of an improved economic situation. There is little doubt that Spengler's view of *the status quo* in property relations as optimal would favor them already dominant social groups.

One should nevertheless question his choice of the word "*socialism*", with all its connotations opportunities for misunderstandings and conceptual confusion. That one could only find *true* socialism in one authoritarian, aristocratic state was a claim that initiated a struggle to own the terms.

Socialism for Spengler was a *Weltanschauung*.<sup>287</sup> It was not about changing the property conditions in German society, or the struggle for the rights of the working class in Marxist sense. Instead, he believed that socialism was only a superficial expression of a deeper state of mind. It was an instinct that lay in the blood of the Germans:<sup>288</sup> "*Wir Deutsche sind Socialists, even if it had never been talked about. It can't be the others.*"<sup>289</sup> Som sitatet viser, var den tyske sosialismen særegen, i follow Spengler. den kunne av the reason is not transferred to other nations. This is closely related to Spengler's view of nations and cultural circles as living organisms with their own characteristics, and which were at different stages in their life courses. Transferring anything between nations of different "blood" was therefore a project that was doomed to failure, and socialism was no exception in that regard.

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<sup>286</sup> Spengler 1921:18-19.

<sup>287</sup> Spengler 1921:83.

<sup>288</sup> Spengler 1921:1.

<sup>289</sup> Spengler 1921:4.

Social status was to a far lesser extent than in England based on economics, but more on the right to determine society.<sup>290</sup> The real lower class was therefore not necessarily those who owned little, but those who had the least influence. And there was no linear connection between these.<sup>291</sup> Marxism was also pure theoretical social criticism<sup>292</sup> - "literature"<sup>293</sup> - which was of inorganic character.

It was therefore necessary to free German socialism from Marx.<sup>294</sup> German socialism did not have had something to do with Marx, but had roots that went back further than him. "*Friedrich Wilhelm I. und nicht Marx ist [...] der erste bewußte Sozialist gewesen.*"<sup>295</sup> Furthermore, German socialism was not to be considered a movement of interests for a single group in society. One like that socialism would divide the Germans, and pit them against each other. German Socialism on the other hand, should include the entire population, and had no ambitions to change property distribution. One might be tempted to think that Spengler was not interested in it social issues or workers' conditions. In any case, he devoted very little space to this topic in *Preußentum und Sozialismus*. This does not necessarily have to be synonymous with lack of empathy with the workers: and to understand this one must try to get into Spengler's the imaginary world and goals of socialism. Socialism had no favorite with the workers who it should be fought for material goods for, but should be an ethos with the goal of "[...] *Änderung of social consciousness*".<sup>296</sup> Thus it is clear that German socialism could not be linked directly to money or property, but rather to a sense of community that encompassed all Germans - not just the workers. That this was just a tactical move to keep the workers in check is more doubtful, and could only have been valid if he had *only* attacked the workers conflict of interest. But it wasn't like that. He made big capital as big an enemy as Marxism, because he believed that both represented an English way of thinking that was far removed from it German, and whose goal was to use the state as a tool to promote narrow group interests.

There is therefore no reason to believe anything other than that Spengler's concept of socialism hangs along with his anti-modernism in this field, in the sense that he must have disliked every one loss of vertical ties of loyalty in society and less strong state authority. This was totally

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<sup>290</sup> Spengler 1921:43-44.

<sup>291</sup> Spengler 1921:44.

<sup>292</sup> Spengler 1921:1. "[...] Marx was only the stepfather of socialism. There are older, stronger, deeper traits in him as its social criticism. They were there without him and have continued to develop without him and against him. They are not written on paper, they are in the blood. And only blood decides the future."

<sup>293</sup> Spengler 1921:80.

<sup>294</sup> Spengler 1921:4.

<sup>295</sup> Spengler 1921:42.

<sup>296</sup> Felken 1988:112. Siter from. Bracher, KD 1970: *The German Dictatorship*. Cologne/Berlin, p. 367.

other values than the parliamentary democracy of 1918 could boast - after Spengler's perception had not progressed for the better.

Spengler must have seen the necessity of vertical loyalty ties, both between states, employer and worker. This was a premise for the state to function as one organism, instead of splitting up into interest groups that worked to promote their own goals. In practice it was this equates to a paternalistic attitude among all parties in working life, where everyone saw the work of the others as equally important for the nation.<sup>297</sup> In addition, such a system immunized against both big capital and Marxism, both of which relied on socio-economic horizontal loyalty bond.

It must be emphasized that the German socialism Spengler described had nothing to do with it National Bolshevism to do, which was simply a nationalist variant of communism, but which nevertheless rejected internationalism.<sup>298</sup> Although also the National Bolsheviks had an unorthodox view of socialism, it was nevertheless not a pure ethos, but basically related to property. And the idea of an alliance with Russia off nationalist and geopolitical reasons must have been at the back of his mind when he later scolded them as *"idiots"*.<sup>299</sup>

#### Distribution of power

The political outline of Spengler with regard to the distribution of power is at some points unclear, because the book was based to a far greater extent on political philosophy than on a political science analysis. Nevertheless, it is clear that the state in Spengler's political model had absolute sovereignty through a constituent assembly with a monarch at the head.<sup>300</sup> The state should, in line with reception from Nietzsche, act beyond good and evil.<sup>301</sup>

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<sup>297</sup> Spengler 1921:77: "[...] no difference in the moral dignity of work: the judge and scholar "work" as well as the miner and iron turner."

<sup>298</sup> Ernst Niekisch was a politician and author and one of the most important exponents of National Bolshevism. He was member of the SPD, with the exception of the period 1919-23, when he was part of the USPD. Niekisch was also the leader of the workers' and soldiers' councils in connection with the revolution in Munich.

<sup>299</sup> Felken 1988:111. 300

Felken 1988:110. Se også Spengler 1921:91: "But the top management cannot be republican. republic means today, if one puts all illusions aside, that executive power can be bought by private capital. A prince obeys the tradition of his house and the worldview of his profession. Whatever one thinks of it, that relieves him of the interest politics of today's parties. He is his arbiter, and if in a socialistically conceived state the professional councils up to the highest state council are selected according to practical ability, he can make a narrower selection according to moral qualities. But a president or prime minister or plenipotentiary is the creature of a party, and a party is the creature of those who pay it. A prince is today the only defense of a government against merchantism."

Sammenligne her med Sombart, W. 1915: *Merchants and Heroes*. Published by Duncker & Humblot. Munich –

The strongest opposition to the Prussian instinct, or spirit, was the English.

Spengler described this in *Preußentum und Sozialismus*, and summarized it this way:

*"Power belongs to the individual. Free struggle of one against the other; triumph of Stronger: liberalism, inequality. No more state. When everyone fights for themselves, it ultimately benefits everyone."*<sup>302</sup>

He summarized the German, Prussian instinct as follows:

*"The power belongs to the whole. The individual serves him. The whole thing is sovereign. The king is only the first servant of his state (Frederick the Great)."*<sup>303</sup>

There are several interesting things one can point out with regard to the descriptions above, including that original view of a *de facto* totalitarian government and personal freedom. But as shown above is socialism and capitalism only a small part of the instinct Spengler writes about, and only one small part of the spirit type. In other words, the struggle between these political trends has deep roots down to the individual people's innermost identity and culture. So a political battle similarly becomes one culture battle, where it is a matter of winning or perishing.

The starting point for Spengler was that the state should form a powerful superstructure for the individual to ensure the welfare of every individual citizen. In such a setting there was little room for market forces or private interests that ran counter to the interests of the community. The ideal was, as mentioned, that power belonged to the individual, and that the

<sup>304</sup> Everyone had to be quiet

individual was sovereign. up for all<sup>305</sup> instead of thinking about their own interests, and through collective self this was to benefit everyone: The will of the individual was to be dissolved in the common will, and the people eventually acted as an impersonal unit.<sup>306</sup> This was "real" socialism.<sup>307</sup> Spengler's thoughts here are akin to modern communitarianism, which is also critical of Example

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Leipzig. For a more general introduction to anti-Anglicanism in Germany in the period around the First World War, see Stibbe, M. 2001: *German Anglophobia and the Great War 1914-1918*. Cambridge University Press.

<sup>301</sup> Spengler 1921:76. Spengler was probably influenced here by reception from Nietzsche's book of the same name from 1885. <sup>302</sup> Spengler 1921:14.

<sup>303</sup> Spengler 1921:15. The prøyssiske and the angelic instinct fikk henholdsvis navnene "*Ordensgeist*" and "*Vikingergeist*", and ble ansett som rake motsetninger innenfor rammen av den Germanske idé: "*Some carried the Germanic idea in themselves, the others felt it about themselves: personal independence and suprapersonal community.*" Spengler 1921:31.

<sup>304</sup> Spengler 1921:15.

<sup>305</sup> Spengler 1921:34.

<sup>306</sup> Spengler 1921:37.

<sup>307</sup> Spengler 1921:38. Spengler writes here that Prussian socialism is exclusive, and that socialism in other countries is egoistisk skinnsosialisme ("*[...] egoistic pseudo-socialism*").

economic liberalism and capitalism, at the same time that society as a collective is being adjusted to a more important role.

Spengler's thoughts may sound like a herd mentality, with real limited freedom for it individual. Spengler strongly refuted this, and drew a clear distinction between what he called *practical freedom* in England and *profound inner independence* in the German system:

***"Freedom pays with the other: the Englishman is inwardly a slave, as a puritan, as a rationalist and sensualist, as a materialist."***<sup>308</sup>

There was nothing in what Spengler wrote in *Preußentum und Sozialismus* that indicated that he was interested in giving workers better living conditions or extended democratic rights. Their increased numerical strength and increased economic importance would therefore not translate into increased political importance. On the contrary, Spengler advocated making strikes illegal as a means of action, which in to a greater degree would favor the industrial elite, both economically and politically.

There is reason to believe that Spengler's fascination with the concept of socialism was partly of a utilitarian nature.<sup>309</sup> The experiences from the revolution in 1918 showed that socialism had really broken through in Germany as well, and that it was thus a political force that could be counted on in the following year. But it also represented a dangerous idea for the German nationalists. The emphasis of proletarian class struggle across nation-states was the antagonism of nationalism. Spengler was, as a nationalist, naturally interested in preventing this from happening.

Spengler had two possible strategies: first, he could go to war against socialism as ideology. But this alone would not remove *the reasons* why it had become so widespread in Germany. This could almost only be attributed to the workers' question, and an increasingly large group of workers who lived under poor conditions. The other option they had was to assimilate socialism to fit German society and German traditions. It was this one the path Spengler chose. In this way, one could both take the sting out of a political force that was hostile to nationalism, make it their own, and use it to promote their own goal. Thus Spengler wanted to merge the two strongest ideologies of the time and create one third way.

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<sup>308</sup> Spengler 1921:38.

<sup>309</sup> Spengler 1921:98: "[...] *der Sozialismus bedeutet Macht, Macht und immer wieder Macht.*" But this does not mean that Spengler was a manipulator of power, but that he saw the necessity of the combination between political ideas and political power: If one did not succeed in uniting ideas with the strongest political forces of the time, the ideas themselves were of little value. *Ibid.*

The need for strong national integration and a strong state meant that it was drawn up clearly borders on any political movement that went across this. The natural opponents were therefore the powerful international currents of the time in the form of Marxism and liberalism, which both was in the process of dissolving the tight ties of the nation-state, as well as weakening the state's power. From a class perspective it may of course sound paradoxical, but Spengler rejected them both as expressions of English "Manchester capitalism".<sup>310</sup>

Spengler took a good place in *Preußentum und Sozialismus* to criticize Marxism, both in and outside Germany. The heaviest of Spengler's verbal barrage was directed at Marx's transference of social criticism based on English conditions, to have universal validity. He determined that he would probably never have written his manifesto if he had had a deeper understanding of Prussian work and service in the name of the community<sup>311</sup> and that "*Sein Denken ist durch Manchesterlich [...]...*".<sup>312</sup> By this he meant not only that Marx was English in his way of thinking, but also that he watched work as a pure commodity - and not as something one was obliged to do for the sake of the community: the state was also missing in his criticism,<sup>313</sup> because there was only a two-class thinking where there was competition to control the market, without regard for what existed *above* the market. Said with in other words: the aim was not to prevent the premises for exploitation of the working class from arising or being kept the same, but to take over the market itself in order to promote its own class interests.<sup>314</sup> In this context, the state was only an obstacle in the way, and Marxism was thus nothing more than the workers' own capitalism.<sup>315</sup>

With such a starting point, it goes without saying that he must have considered Marxism incompatible with the German state. That a group like the Marxists formed a common front against both other groups and the state itself, helped to undermine the premises and supporting walls for the Spenglers future state.

He therefore saw the revolution in 1918 as a grave mistake and a betrayal.<sup>316</sup> But a real revolution "*[...] is only that of a whole people, a cry, an iron grip, a rage, a goal. And that, this German socialist revolution, took place in 1914*".<sup>317</sup> Says på en annen manner; if one had already had a successful German socialist revolution in 1914, was

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<sup>310</sup> Spengler 1921:63; Felken 1988:108.

<sup>311</sup> Spengler 1921:74.

<sup>312</sup> Spengler 1921:75.

<sup>313</sup> Spengler 1921:75.

<sup>314</sup> Spengler 1921:75

<sup>315</sup> Spengler 1921:75. "*Class egoism has been raised to a principle. The manual worker not only wants to trade, he wants to dominate the market. The genuine Marxist is hostile to the state for exactly the same reason as the Whig: it prevents it from ruthlessly pursuing its private business interests. Marxism is labor capitalism.*" Ibid.

<sup>316</sup> Spengler 1921:19.

<sup>317</sup> Spengler 1921:12.

the revolution of 1918 only harmful in the sense that it tried to achieve something that already existed. In addition, one was in danger of destroying it in the process. But on the other hand, if the revolution had been so successful in 1914; why did the workers now seek against marxist double-class thinking at the expense of his national romantic visions? Spengler explains this partly in that the workers are said to have been manipulated by the victors after the First World War, but fails, in my opinion, in explaining why the revolution in 1918 could occur, when the "whole" people was involved in the revolution in 1914. One could not expect it to immunize against "class egoism", also in working-class circles? Had it only been a passing expression of national euphoria, and not a profound social revolution?

But whatever the reason for Marxism gaining a foothold in Germany, it represented the English "money style".<sup>318</sup> Spengler saw this money style as an expression of the trading instincts of the English, of which the spread of liberalism and free trade was only a part in a planned plundering of the rest of the world. Trade was supposed to be supranational and worldwide, and in practice a euphemism for British rule.

Spengler's description may of course resemble a conspiracy theory, but it was unlikely as he meant it. The behavior of the British people was not the result of conscious thought, where world domination was conspired, but was a direct consequence of the spirit type. Therefore, it also existed to a large extent beyond the conscious, and was to that extent outside of rationality control. The fight against the "money style" was therefore not necessarily a fight against a conscious one English politics, but was a battle of fate in which German national romantic *culture* faced Engelsk *civilization*.

In this process, the state was to have an important role for the Germans: As English "money style" had broken through in the form of parties, which either represented "money" or "work", it would one suppresses the other. In other words, it would be random about the English spirit type should suppress the German or vice versa. But this was something he was not interested in leave to chance – in other words, it was a battle that could not be waged with the help of parliamentary means.<sup>319</sup> The state had to establish an absolute authority in this area; it had to reject all currents of ideas or revolutions that could pose a threat to themselves. This also included a ban on strikes.<sup>320</sup>

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<sup>318</sup> Spengler 1921:29.

<sup>319</sup> Spengler 1921:78.

<sup>320</sup> Spengler 1921:77.

Perhaps most important of all, it was to constitute a bulwark against multinational corporations and global trade, which were about to "enslave" the world.<sup>321</sup> To prevent this, Spengler turned to Adam Müller's romantic ideal of a *Volksgemeinschaft*.<sup>322</sup> The state was to have the role of neutral manager, and should at all times rule in the best interest of the community. It is possible that Spengler in this context has drawn inspiration from state monopoly during the First World War and dismissed it as *the realization* of this ideal, but it is possibly also connected with a general conservative criticism of the modern,<sup>323</sup> which could, after all, be perceived as the basis for problems of the time.

Spengler saw the lack of national integration among the workers as a mistake of the past, which could be rectified through the combination of socialism and a strong state. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Spengler's ideas lacked a social dimension<sup>324</sup> – a social program and a plan for how it could be implemented in practice. The workers' expectations of his future state, on despite all the praise, therefore had to be somewhat lukewarm because all this was missing.

#### 4.4.2 Reception and impact analysis

In pure sales figures, the book was a clear success. Some of this can of course be explained by the fact that Spengler was already famous for *Untergang des Abendlandes*, which in itself must have done interest in the book greater than usual. Another factor that can speak for higher sales figures was a active marketing from the publisher, including by means of free copies for newspapers, political leaders and intellectuals.

The free copies were typically sent out to newspapers and others who were thought to be particularly interested to read the book. Among other things, copies were sent to Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg and to Benito Mussolini. Both wrote back, thanking them for the books and writing that they had read them "*with great interest*".<sup>325</sup> Spengler's own opinion was that the book had a particularly strong effect among younger politicians and industrialists, and was optimistic enough to believe that the book alone could form it ideological basis for gathering between the politically moderate elements of the workers and those høyrenasjonale: "[...] from here alone the construction can take place, which in the tactical

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<sup>321</sup> Felken 1988:109-110. See også Spengler 1921:90: "*Today the large trusts are already private states, which a exercise protectorate over the official state.*"

<sup>322</sup> Felken 1988:109.

<sup>323</sup> Felken 1988:110-111.

<sup>324</sup> Felken 1988:112.

<sup>325</sup> Bethmann-Hollweg's reaction can be read in Koktanek 1963:149. Letter from Heinrich Beck. Mussolini's thank you card Finnes i Bavarian State Library, Ana 533/110.



*Union of the decent workers with the right-wing nationalists to fight against*

326 *Stock Exchange and Mob rests.*"

The book sold faster than expected, and a new edition had to be printed already before New Year 1919, and the publisher was satisfied with the sales.<sup>327</sup> In a letter from Heinrich Beck on 2 July 1920, it emerged that the book had by then been printed in 33,000 copies, including 3,000 free copies.<sup>328</sup> In 1930, a total of 74,000 copies of the book had been printed.<sup>329</sup>

Left-wing reaction appears to have been largely negative to the book; perhaps especially so Spengler in practice went to semantic war against them. Ernst Niekisch was one of those who reacted. As former leader of the Central Workers' and Soldiers' Council during the revolution in Munich, he had little to spare for Spengler's argument, which he thought was the old one the sovereign state in a new and misleading packaging:

*"Spengler's Prussian socialism was the bolt that locked any serious socialism that no capitalist X could be fooled into a socialist U, the German house closed.*

*Spengler's socialism is the old authoritarian state once again, to be blindly parried with that of the workers has."*<sup>330</sup>

August Winnig, on the other hand, belonged to the exceptions. He was a social democrat and deputy general for them Baltic states at the time, later became *völkisch* nationalist and anti-Semitic. He wrote that he was so influenced by Spengler's ideas in the book that he began to argue "*Spenglerian*"<sup>331</sup> in his own party, and also asked Spengler to take part in the work with his journal *Der Morgen*: "*Ich habe seen the effect of this writing in the East. Fichte's 'Speeches to the German Nation' have that hardly influenced the political spirit of German youth more strongly and lastingly than this writing.*"<sup>332</sup>

Barely a year before the NSDAP took power, in 1932, *Preußentum und Sozialismus* was published again, and this time as part of a larger book with several of his political writings. The book was practically unchanged since 1919 despite major domestic political changes. In the years after 1919, the National Socialists had filled their national "socialism" with their own meaningful content and also succeed in conveying it to large sections of the population.

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<sup>326</sup> Kottanek 1963:160. Letter to Hans Klöres.

<sup>327</sup> Kottanek 1963:148. Letter from Heinrich Beck on 20/12/1919.

<sup>328</sup> Bavarian State Library, Ana 533/71. Brev by Heinrich Beck 2.7.1920.

<sup>329</sup> Bavarian State Library, Ana 533/110.

<sup>330</sup> Felken 1988:113. Sitert fra Niekisch, E. 1958: *daring life*. Cologne - Berlin, p. 135.

<sup>331</sup> Felken 1988:113. Sitert from Winnig, A. 1937: *Oswald Spengler*. In: Reusch, P. (ed.), *Oswald Spengler on the idea*. Nördlingen, p. 119.

<sup>332</sup> Felken 1988:113. Sitert from Winnig, A. 1937: *Oswald Spengler*. In: Reusch, P. (ed.), *Oswald Spengler on the idea*. Nördlingen, p. 119.

I forbindelse med nypubliseringen i 1932, skrev *Municher Latest News* and relative flattering review. The reviewer was of the opinion that Spengler was absolutely right that German socialism in particular differed from the Western variety, since it was both "*Prussian*" and "*anti-French*", and also advocated a stronger connection with Russia, and a fight against both the Entente powers and high finance.<sup>333</sup> The author therefore believed that Spengler, by and large, had straight.

The conservative newspaper *Der Ring*, on the other hand, had some objections to the book - and the author. After writing about how Spengler, in *Der Ring's* opinion, neglected race, the paper wrote that Spengler ble stadig mer og mer politisk isolated: "*With this writing, Spengler addressed a youth that is turning away from him today.*"<sup>334</sup>

A similarly unflattering review appeared in the newspaper *Literarische Rundschau*. According to this could the content of all Spengler's books - including *Preußentum und Sozialismus* - be traced back to "*a few simple thoughts*".<sup>335</sup>

The NSDAP, which had now come to power, in practice described the party's official line to the book i partiorganet *National Observer*. Alfred Bäumler, som var en av nasjonalsosialistenes leading ideologues, reviewed *Preußentum und Sozialismus* in connection with the publication of Spengler's politiske skrifter: "*The German youth will never forget what they owe to the writings 'Prussianism and Socialism' and 'New Construction of the German Reich'.*"<sup>336</sup> Bäumlers perception was that certain elements in Spengler's work, such as philosophy of history and historical prophecies was not particularly relevant to the youth - to whom he had, after all, addressed himself in *Preußentum und Sozialismus* - but that his anti-liberal, irrational and imperialist elements, on the other hand, had meant a lot to many young people.<sup>337</sup> But Bäumler also reacted strongly to Spengler's socialism and race concept, because in his opinion Spengler viewed the former in purely ethical terms, and did not emphasize the latter sufficiently: "*So enthüllt sich der große Philosoph der world history as a philosopher of ethos who despises realities such as race and socialism.*"<sup>338</sup> Hvis ordet "*volk*" bare betydde romantikk for Spengler, avsluttet Bäumler i article, he also did not understand the meaning of the word socialism.

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<sup>333</sup> *Munich Latest News*, December 20, 1932; Bavarian State Library Ana 533/110.

<sup>334</sup> *The ring. Conservative Weekly*, December 25, 1931; Bavarian State Library Ana 533/102A. All together newspaper 09.12.1933, where it was once again claimed that Spengler did not emphasize "*folk biological considerations*", but this time in connection with the rise and fall of civilizations.

<sup>335</sup> *Literary Review*, September 10, 1933; Bavarian State Library Ana 533/102.

<sup>336</sup> *National Observer* 8/31/33. "*Revolution – seen from afar*". second supplement; Bavarian State Library Ana 533/102A.

<sup>337</sup> *National Observer* August 31, 1933. "*Revolution – seen from afar*". second supplement; Bavarian State Library Ana 533/102A.

<sup>338</sup> *National Observer* August 31, 1933. "*Revolution – seen from afar*". second supplement; Bavarian State Library Ana 533/102A.

Although Hughes called *Preußentum und Sozialismus* in his biography of Spengler "something that was "too 339 boom shots" eccentric [and] cut across too many party lines" 340, the question becomes about the book's reception a both- and. As Spengler was already famous, it is difficult to conclude something unambiguous from the sales figures in the first period, as one has to assume that more people bought the book because Spengler was famous, or because perhaps they liked *the Untergang des Abendlandes*, and were Curious to read more by him. But the fact that 74,000 copies of the book had been printed up towards 1930 does not seem to correspond to a publicist failure. However, the book sold pretty good for years after release. It is also worth noting that many obviously found Spengler's book relevant at a time of major changes in the political climate, and for many years after it was written. In my opinion, the reason for this is found primarily in the book's abstract, general and philosophical style.

Even after so many years, the book met with positive reactions in some newspapers. And even if someone were also clearly negative to Spengler's theses, one can hardly say that the book was generally neither slaughtered or boasted to the skies, but the archive material nevertheless shows a polarizing tendency which may indicate that Spengler's book was both loved and hated, but rarely something in between.

Spengler's own statement that the book had been the starting point for the national movement is very difficult - if not impossible - to decide on. It is very problematic to measure it concrete effect of a book over time, especially considering that society was at the same time so strong change for other reasons. Nevertheless, one should not completely disregard the fact that the book could have played a part in awaken a cultural identity that could also have political effects, such as strengthening the conservative the counter-revolution. As Felken wrote in his biography of Spengler: "*Die exklusive Würde des Prussianism filled the self-confidence of many Germans with new confidence and took oaths them at the same time on the counter-revolution. Because if the revolution was not over, concluded Spengler, then Germany's path to becoming a world power was still open.*" 341

In fact, Spengler was not alone in his view of the effect of *Preußentum und Sozialismus* as a starting point for the national movement. In 1932 he was supported by Ernst Jünger, who in a dediseringseksemplar av boken *The worker* from samme år skrev: "*For Oswald Spengler, who forged the first new weapons after Germany's disarmament.*" 342

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<sup>339</sup> Hughes 1992:110.

<sup>340</sup> Hughes 1992:110.

<sup>341</sup> Felken 1988:113.

342 Felken 1988:114.

## 4.5 Spengler and the NSDAP

Spengler's last publication came fourteen years after the first - in August 1933 - and was entitled *Jahre der Entscheidung*. Spengler threw himself here for the last time into the political debate.

The book was based on a 1929 lecture in Hamburg entitled *Deutschland in Gefahr*<sup>343</sup>, and was to prove to mark the final break between himself and the NSDAP. The book is interesting because it shows a strong attack on National Socialist ideology, which makes clear the great ideological contrasts between Spengler and the National Socialists, especially with respect to the biological concept of race and its importance.

The book was divided into four chapters, and contained a mixture of repetition of previously published material on cyclical philosophy of history, attacks on Marxists and class struggle, and not least a whole share pages about the "coloured" danger, which he had opened his eyes to in his earlier book *There Man and technology* from 1931.

Spengler had the book half finished when the NSDAP came to power in January 1933, and as writing and printing had taken place at about the same time, and he had printed the book "*front to side* 344 106" in January 1933, Spengler was left with a dilemma as to what to do further. He knew that those in power would hardly like some of the contents of the book, so he decided himself to refine the book and publish it as Part I with the subtitle *Deutschland und die weltgeschichtliche Entwicklung*. In addition, he gave the book a far more anonymous title, and wrote a new introduction,<sup>345</sup> in which he called the takeover of power in 1933 a powerful phenomenon that was thoroughly Prussian.<sup>346</sup> A few pages later, he nevertheless modified himself by writing:

*"These tasks are now [...] just being uncovered, are only partially understood, and have not been solved. This is nobody time or occasion for [...] triumph. Alas, those who mistake mobilization for victory! A movement has just started; it still has not reached its goal, and the great problems of our time have not in any way been changed by it."*<sup>347</sup>

In other words, the seizure of power was an important marking, but not really something to celebrate before that gave concrete results.

The book also contained several ugly remarks about the National Socialists, such as that they were incited by uniforms and badges, were "*social romantics as sentimental communists*" and

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<sup>343</sup> Spengler 1934:xi.

<sup>344</sup> Hughes 1992:127.

<sup>345</sup> Hughes 1992:128.

<sup>346</sup> Spengler 1934:xi.

<sup>347</sup> Spengler 1934:xii.

*"adherents of gold theories from sick minds" who knew nothing about the inner forms of modern economics.*<sup>348</sup>

*"They can only feel in the mass", he wrote, "a place where they can numb the gloomy feeling their weaknesses by multiplying themselves. And this they call coming beyond individualism."*<sup>349</sup>

Despite sending a copy of the book to Hitler in August 1933<sup>350</sup>, did not act those in power immediately. At first the book was severely attacked in the NSDAP-controlled press, but this had no negative effect on the sales figures - quite the contrary, since it created a big buzz the book. The journalists were then banned from mentioning his name in print, and it was at the same time made attempts to stop the sale of the books. But by then the sale had already been going on for three months, and 150,000 books had been printed.<sup>351</sup>

Despite this, Josef Goebbels tried to get Oswald Spengler's support in the vote on Germany's withdrawal from the disarmament conference in Geneva, as well as the withdrawal from the League of Nations.<sup>352</sup> On 26 October 1933, Goebbels wrote a letter to Spengler in which he requested that Spengler write a statement of support for Hitler with a view to publication in German newspapers.<sup>353</sup> November 3rd Skrev Spengler tilbake: *"Up to now I have never cared about election propaganda involved and will not do so in the future"*<sup>354</sup> and was bitter about *the "unqualifizierbaren attacks"*<sup>355</sup> in the press, where he had, among other things, been called *"Landesverräter."*<sup>356</sup> Spengler continued: *"I have experienced so much abuse over the past 15 years that I am sufficiently hardened am. But in my efforts to work for Germany, they are an obstacle that must be removed."*<sup>357</sup>

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<sup>348</sup> Spengler 1934:13. Page 101 of the same book is at least as unflattering: *"[...] This must be said again and again, and especially these days, when "national" revolutionaries in Germany talk wildly like beggar monks about universal poverty and misery - in good company with the Marxists, who declares all possession of wealth criminal and immoral, and makes war against all who have such superiority in high culture and anyone who surpasses others in abilities to acquire, hold and use property in a dignified manner, in envy of such abilities, which they themselves completely lack."*

<sup>349</sup> Spengler 1934:13.

<sup>350</sup> Kottanek 1963:699. Shorthand to Adolf Hitler of 18.8.1933.

<sup>351</sup> Hughes 1992:131.

<sup>352</sup> The letter from Goebbels is dated 26 October 1933, and must have referred to the referendum on 12 November 1933. Kottanek 1963:709. Se også Zurcher, A. J.: *The Hitler Referenda. American Political Science Review*, Vol. 29, No. 1. Feb., 1935, p. 91.

<sup>353</sup> Kottanek 1963:709: *"In view of the decisive importance of the forthcoming referendum for the future of German politics and the German people, I would be grateful if you could provide me with an essay which the German people should have on the scope of the Clarified the decision and committed to the politics of the People's Chancellor."* Ibid.

<sup>354</sup> Kottan 1963:710. <sup>355</sup>

Kottanek 1963:710.

<sup>356</sup> Kottan 1963:710. <sup>357</sup>

Kottanek 1963:710.

Spengler never again tried to gain political power, despite the fact that he had gained good political skills contacts. Of the most prominent were Edgar Julius Jung and Gregor Strasser, who both stayed killed on 30 June 1934. With such friends, and bearing in mind that he had come into contact with regime through his book *Jahre der Entscheidung*, and without concealing this in correspondence to Goebbels, Spengler probably decided to destroy the letters that could be of political disadvantage to him.<sup>358</sup>

He also retreated more and more into isolation, as the sign on his door clearly showed:

*"Registrations in writing. Hand in parcels to the caretaker."*<sup>359</sup>

On the night between 7 and 8 May 1936, he died suddenly of a heart attack in his residence in Munich, but for several months afterward there were rumors that he had been killed by the regime.<sup>360</sup>

He was given a simple burial at the Alte Friedhof in Munich. Heinrich Beck gave a memorial speech at the funeral, and said that he did not know Spengler as a pessimist. The war defeat in 1918 had he, for example, taken lightly, in spite of an ardent patriotism, since he looked on sammenhenger for seg. *"A pessimist would not have achieved this defiant power of resistance and this bold declaration of war against the powers of the day!"*<sup>361</sup>

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<sup>358</sup> Kottanek 1963:9.

<sup>359</sup> Hausmann 1974:53.

<sup>360</sup> Felken 1988:237.

<sup>361</sup> Copy av dr. Heinrich Beck's tale i Spengler's gravelse. Bavarian State Library, Ana 533/71.

## 5. Josef Goebbels and the NSDAP

The purpose of this chapter is to find an answer to my problem about ideological kinship between Naumann's and Spengler's combination of nationalism and socialism, and National Socialism before 1933. To find an answer to this, the National Socialist 25-point program of 24 February 1920 be analysed. I will then deepen this by showing how the program was expressed in selected articles and speeches by Goebbels. The latter I will moreover place in the ideological landscape of the NSDAP and show why Goebbels was very close Hitler ideologically. Finally in the chapter Goebbels' combination of nationalism and socialism in National Socialism is compared with Naumann's and Spengler's ideology, so that one can draw out crucial similarities and differences.

January 5, 1918 ble et antisemittisk parti som ble cold *free committee for one deutschen Arbeiterfrieden* founded in Bremen, and on 7 March 1918 the locksmith and poet Anton Drexler started a local team of this movement in Munich.<sup>362</sup> The right-wing radical esoteric and The anti-Semitic *Thule Gesellschaft* tried to gain a mass base at this time, and sent one of its members, the sports journalist Karl Harrer, to contact Anton Drexler.<sup>363</sup> I collaboration with other members of *the Thule Gesellschaft*, such as Gottfried Feder and Dietrich Eckart, the party name was now changed to *the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, or DAP.<sup>364</sup> It is unclear to what extent degree the party was inspired by the political counterpart of the same name that already existed in Austria.

In any case, it was the DAP that was the forerunner of the NSDAP. The party initially belonged to the pan-Germanic and *völkisch* tradition, and had only 54 registered members<sup>365</sup> when Hitler was sent by the army to investigate the party in 1919, which resulted in membership a few days later.

Although it is unclear how much the German NSDAP borrowed from the Austrian one the National Socialist Party (DNSAP), several Austrians associated with DNSAP, including Rudolf Jung<sup>366</sup> helped to develop the National Socialist *Weltanschauung* in this period.<sup>367</sup> A formalized collaboration with the Austrian wing was established from 1920.<sup>368</sup>

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<sup>362</sup> Maser 1973:142.

<sup>363</sup> Maser 1973:148.

<sup>364</sup> Maser 1973:148ff.

<sup>365</sup> Maser 1973:167. Hitler falsely claimed in *Mein Kampf* that he was member number seven of the party. The membership number was 555, but as membership numbers start at 501, Hitler was member number 55. Maser seen from the NSDAP's medlemsliste, which is finnes in the Bundesarchiv Koblenz, NS 26/230. *Ibid.*

<sup>366</sup> According to Rudolf Jung, the political circle in the Sudetenland, in what is now the Czech Republic, had come further in developing a combination between nationalism and socialism than the circle in Germany: "The synthesis of the two great dynamic forces of the century, of the socialist and the national idea, had been perfected in the German border areas

A main difference, however, was that DNSAP's program was based to a far greater extent on liberal and democratic tradition. The party was anti-monarchist, anti-clerical, anti-capitalist and anti-Semitic, and at the same time advocated the expanded use of referendums. The program of the NSDAP on the other hand, merged to a greater extent with the conservative illiberal and anti-democratic tradition from the Imperial Empire, which in practice could not be combined without paradoxes.<sup>369</sup>

According to Hitler, the purpose of the party program was to give the people a rough overview of the aims of the movement.<sup>370</sup> The party program itself had the aim of rallying the Germans through what Hitler saw as common (racial) interests, possibly inspired by racial theorists who Gobineau, Chamberlain and Lagarde,<sup>371</sup> rather than being divided through disagreements about money or values. One must nevertheless have *in mind* that Hitler's collectivist domestic policy was nothing goal in itself, but only a part of making the Germans better equipped to look after their own interests foreign policy. His political objective was to recreate the idyllic *Volksgemeinschaft*, where all Germans formed a biological community that fought its own social Darwinist life struggle to promote collective interests.

The combination of nationalism and socialism in the program reflected exactly this, for none of the ideologies had any other and independent function than to serve the race: An ethnic pan-Germanic nationalism defined who were Germans and clarified the boundaries between the Germans and those who were not Germans, while the main function of socialism was to function unifying and collectively empowering for those who came under this category.

After this, the concept of nation was clearly based on race. Point 4 of the program established that only those of "German blood" belonged to the nation and were to be considered citizens. This meant, among other things, that Jews were effectively excluded from the nation, but were to be allowed to live in Germany as "guests"<sup>372</sup>, as long

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[Sudetenland], and therefore lay far ahead of their fatherland." Quoted from: Kuehnelt-Leddihn, E. 1993: *Liberty or Equality*. Pulp Press. Vancouver, s. 257.

<sup>367</sup> Maser 1973:29. In 1919, Rudolf Jung had finished the book *Der Nationale Sozialismus*, to which he in the preface the book hoped to be as influential to the National Socialists as *Capital* had been to socialist Marxists. See also Jung, R. 1920: *Der Nationale Sozialismus*. Munich.

<sup>368</sup> Maser 1973:224,237.

<sup>369</sup> Compare here, for example, Rosenberg's anti-Christian and anti-Semitic book *Mythus des XX Jahrhunderts* from 1930, where Rosenberg argued for replacing "Jewish" Christianity with a "religion of blood", with anti-Semitic and racist statements from Hitler in *Mein Kampf* which are clearly launched from a "Christian" perspective (even though Hitler was not a Christian himself). See for example Hitler 1999:65: "And so I believe today that my action is in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator. By standing guard against the Jew, I fight for the Lord's creation." *Ibid.*, p. 286: "The act that creates such a development [racial mixing, HKB] is a sin against the will of the Almighty Creator." Racism was nevertheless a common denominator between Rosenberg and Hitler, also on this point.

<sup>370</sup> Hitler 1999:458,370.

<sup>371</sup> Klepsch 1990:86-87.

<sup>372</sup> See point 5 in the party programme. The program was translated into English in connection with the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, with the designation 1708-PS, and can be found in: *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, Vol. IV. Office of the United States Chief Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Washington, DC., 1946. A digitized version of the program is available at [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/document/nca\\_vol4/1708-ps.htm](http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/document/nca_vol4/1708-ps.htm)



it was possible to feed the entire population, and deported if that was not possible.<sup>373</sup> They were also not to have the right to vote,<sup>374</sup> and were to be subject to a separate legislation for foreigners.<sup>375</sup> Immigrants who had come to Germany after 2 August 1914 were also to be deported. <sup>376</sup> The combination of nationalism and socialism was thus made possible through an enemy image between the Germans and those groups who were considered enemies of the people; and it was necessary to maintaining this enemy image in order to maintain the combination between nationalism and socialism. Otherwise, it would be in danger of disintegrating because of the realpolitik contradictions between nationalists and socialists was not resolved through the attempt at ideological unification.

The concept of nation in the program was also imperialist and colonialist,<sup>377</sup> and was thus in all these respects strongly related to the concept of nation of the radical conservative the right in the Empire after 1890.

The socialism in the program was outlined without really compromising with the main lines of the nationalism – but rather to strengthen its popular base among both industrial workers and craftsmen. This was done in three ways; first, through economic concessions, for the other through opposition to what one must have thought was one of the strongest mechanisms for class struggle, namely materialism. And the third was to merge anti-capitalism with anti-Semitism, which characterized modern German anti-Semitism since 1879.<sup>378</sup> The Jew was thus considered the bearer of the negative sides of economic liberalism and capitalism.

The program therefore emphasized the right to work, and argued for the confiscation of war profits, municipalisation of shopping centres,<sup>379</sup> abolition of wages without work,<sup>380</sup> profit sharing in large firms,<sup>381</sup> nationalization of corporations (trusts),<sup>382</sup> old-age pension reforms,<sup>383</sup> a national program that ensured all gifted children's education,<sup>384</sup> and prohibition of child labour.<sup>385</sup> When it comes to the opposition to materialism, which can be found, among other things, in points 19 and 24, but

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<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*, pkt. 7.

<sup>374</sup> *Ibid.*, pkt. 6.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*, pkt. 5.

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*, pkt. 8.

<sup>377</sup> *Ibid.*, point 3: "We require land and territory (colonies) to feed our people and colonize with our surplus population."

<sup>378</sup> This year the author Wilhelm Marr published a pamphlet called *Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum. Vom nicht confessionellen Standpunkt aus betrachtet*, where he claimed just this. See, for example, pp. 18ff. In 1879 he also founded the short-lived anti-Semitic organization *Antisemiten-Liga*.

<sup>379</sup> The party programme, point 16.

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*, pkt. 11.

<sup>381</sup> *Ibid.*, pkt. 14.

<sup>382</sup> *Ibid.*, pkt. 13.

<sup>383</sup> *Ibid.*, pkt. 15.

<sup>384</sup> *Ibid.*, pkt. 20.

<sup>385</sup> *Ibid.*, point 21. No less than 10 of the 25 points were clearly aimed at the industrial workers to a greater or lesser extent.

also in point 11, which deals with the breaking of "interest slavery", this is quite paradoxical in the program. This is because the program was linked in such detail to concrete material goals, at the same time as signaling that materialism was both totally subordinate to the national collective, and that it was also directly harmful.

This paradox was resolved ideologically by dividing materialism into two, but not without creating a new paradox; a good, German materialism that promoted the common interests of the German citizens through strengthening the community, and a projected evil "Jewish" materialism that worked degrading to society: *"[The party] combats the Jewish-materialistic spirit in us and outside of us, and is convinced that our nation can only achieve lasting inner health through the principle: Common interest before self-interest."*<sup>386</sup>

Anti-Semitism was also a bridge-builder between nationalism and socialism in the program, since the Jew, considered a foreigner<sup>387</sup> and through a National Socialist link to capitalism,<sup>388</sup> was both identified as a threat to German nationalism and German socialism.

Such large-scale changes could only be implemented through centralization and a strong central power – a national parliament – and the formation of constituent assemblies based on status and profession for to implement the laws of the various states. The interesting thing about this is twofold. Before first a parliamentary system was mentioned, so there is little doubt that this society was dreamed of in 1920, although it had easily become authoritarian due to the centralization of power, i the starting point was to rest on a certain democratic foundation. The exception, however, was the ethnic ones the minorities. Secondly, the proposal for the formation of constituent assemblies and representation in state assemblies by occupational groups, as opposed to by parties, that party political antagonisms due to money or values would disappear – in all likelihood til for del for idéen om *national community*.

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<sup>386</sup> *Ibid.*, pkt. 21.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*, pkt. 4.

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*, point 17. On 13 April 1928, in connection with the re-establishment of the NSDAP in Berlin, Hitler said that point 17, which involved the confiscation of land without compensation, primarily concerned Jewish firms speculating in real estate. An overview of Hitler's speeches in this period can be found, for example, in Baynes, N. (ed.) 1969: *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939*. New York, or in: Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Ed.) 1992. *Hitler : Reden, Schriften, Anordnungen, Februar 1925 bis Januar 1933*. Munich.

## 5.2 Josef Goebbels

### 5.2.1 Biographical background

Paul Josef Goebbels was born on 29 October 1897 in Rheydt in the Rhineland, and had a doctorate in literature from the University of Heidelberg in 1921. He joined the NSDAP in 1924, and ended up quickly within the circle around Gregor Strasser, who emphasized socialism and the social question in National Socialism stronger than the circle around Hitler, and helped publish Strassers *Nationalsozialistische Briefe*, which also had a strong worker profile. After the Bamberg Conference On February 14, 1926, Goebbels decided to join Hitler's wing. On 28 October the same year he was appointed by Hitler as Gauleiter for Berlin-Brandenburg, and the following year he started the party organ *Der Angriff* with himself as editor.<sup>389</sup>

The reason why Hitler has not been chosen is that the main source of knowledge about Hitler's synthesis of Nationalism and socialism, *Mein Kampf*, largely describes nationalism, but writes little and vague about socialism. This makes a comparison a little less fruitful. One can therefore according to my opinion with advantage rely on the works of Goebbels, where socialism in National Socialism had a far more central place and is described in greater detail.

In this connection, a further delimitation has also been chosen, where his synthesis between nationalism and socialism in the editorials of the newspaper *Der Angriff*, where Goebbels sat as editor, is analyzed. The rationale for this is two-fold: Firstly, *Der Angriff* was special aimed at the workers, and with the aim of winning them over to the NSDAP. The combination itself of nationalism and socialism was absolutely essential to win the workers over to the party, and is therefore described in considerable detail in various editorials. Second, Goebbels sat as editor of *Der Angriff* before the seizure of power in 1933, so all the material below is based on National Socialist ideology from before the party became the governing party, and in the period 1927-1932. The benefit with this is that one gets a better insight into the ideological elements that created the voter base, and that at the same time, the ideological basis as a consequence of practical political life cannot be obscured the transition from opposition movement to government power.

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<sup>389</sup> From 1928 he became a member of the Riksdag; he was appointed the party's National Propaganda Manager in 1929, and became Minister for Propaganda and Public Information from 1933, and until his death. Goebbels committed suicide with his wife after poisoning their six children on 1 May 1945. The above paragraph and more biographical details are also uploaded to [http://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph\\_Goebbels](http://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Goebbels), where the undersigned has been a co

### 5.2.2 Ideologues

Goebbels' concepts of nation and socialism were in practice identical to the concepts as they appeared in the party programme. Goebbels defined *nationalism* as "*the doctrine of the blood, of the race*" <sup>390</sup>, saw nation-building as the result of an organic - racial - union of people with common interests.<sup>391</sup> His definition of socialism was not as concrete, but Goebbels pointed out that it did not have "*equality*" as its goal<sup>392</sup> - which probably had sting against the Marxist definition of the term. When Goebbels wrote about *socialism* he meant he a new social order where the division of society was determined according to criteria other than property or money, and in practice wanted a labor aristocracy that earned its own position through work and service.<sup>393</sup> He would replace the old aristocracy from it pre-industrial society with a labor aristocracy that had its source in the industrial society.

Goebbels' variant of nationalism was racist and exclusionary towards minorities, and it German nationalism should primarily have the function of safeguarding the interests of the ethnic Germans, and where minorities were consequently to be kept outside the concept of nation, and not considered "real" Germans.

What can be defined as official ideology is debatable – and likewise about it as a whole taken there was such a thing. Nevertheless, Hitler had such a dominant role as a politician that he, more than anyone else, was in a political position to also define the ideological content.<sup>394</sup> Hitler was still, in my opinion, not totally dominant, even though his role as leader of the movement was indisputable and unchallenged. In the party, there was still a core that had its own ambitions about defining National Socialist ideology, including the Strasser brothers, as with their social radicalism primarily appealed to the party's left wing. Another example is Alfred Rosenberg, who has been considered the most important ideologue in the NSDAP after Hitler.<sup>395</sup> The book "*Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*" from 1930, in my opinion, deviated from the party line to the right with a tone that was both extremely aristocratic and extremely anti-clerical.<sup>396</sup> And further, one can

<sup>390</sup> Goebbels 1942:330. Editorial in Angriff 30.7.1928.

<sup>391</sup> Goebbels 1978:75; Goebbels 1939:17. Leather items in the attack on July 9, 1928.

<sup>392</sup> Goebbels 1942:225. Editorial in Angriff 23/7/1928 Goebbels

<sup>393</sup> 1942:225. Editorial in Angriff 23/7/1928: "*We want a stratification of the people; high and low, above and below. But the aristocracy of the future state is not based on property or even money, but solely on performance and power. Merit is earned through service. Work puts people up and down.*"

<sup>394</sup> See for example Jäckel 1981:28. Hitler also had his own ambitions to become the leader of the National Socialists ideologist, which was primarily made clear through the publication of the second volume of Mein Kampf in 1926.

<sup>395</sup> Kellogg 2005:267. <sup>396</sup>

Se for eksempel Rosenberg 1934:34, before han beundret aristokratiet for å for hindre raseblanding: "*A real aristocratic constitution prevented the blood mixture. The Nordic forces diminishing through struggle*

example mention Richard Walther Darré, who in his writing *"Neuadel aus Blut und Boden"* from 1930 who advocated a spiritual and racial renewal through the strengthening of agriculture and the rejection of the "Jewish-Bolshevik" and "Jewish-capitalist" industrial society.<sup>397</sup>

Ideologically, National Socialism was therefore multifaceted and apparently contradictory; but they saw the world in roughly the same way, although there were great differences in regard to solutions to the problems.

Goebbels has been set in stark contrast to Hitler's worldview.<sup>398</sup> The main argument i this view is that Goebbels was so far to the left on the political scale, close in fact the communists, that he was thus far away from Hitler. The latter, in turn, is most often placed well to the right on the political scale. The argument is straightforward enough, and the contrasts are in themselves even nothing to say. Nevertheless, one must take into account that the traditional political scale in a division between right and left - as between communism and neoliberalism - greatly simplified<sup>399</sup> reflects political dividing lines based on economics, and they are also only valid if the main ideological line of conflict is of an economic nature, as between employer and employee. But it wasn't like that with Goebbels, and it wasn't like that with Hitler. They were moderate on the economic scale, but at the same time were extreme in their view of a strong state authority. They considered all political issues through a *racial prism*. And any political, or for for that matter, economic or cultural issues, were considered in the light of how this would affect the race.<sup>400</sup> Everything that was considered positive in this light, they supported, while everything that was devastating in this view, they were negative to.

The combination of nationalism and socialism was, as we have seen earlier, desirable in order to unite the nation, which in turn was positive for the race. But seen through a racial prism, it was indifferent whether one chose to place himself on the right or on the left as long as the race was a political one

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*were strengthened by new immigrations." See også Rosenberg 1934:69: "Musically without invention, essentially completely without poetry, incapable of their own organic architecture, without any beginning to a real philosophy, we see this Near Eastern people with the greatest persistence of the bird, the viscera, the complicated magic and sacrificed; often technically competent, almost completely addicted to trade, impulsive and tenacious, it poisoned the Roman blood, transmitted its terrifying world of ideas of the torments of hell in the afterlife to the churches, the horrible animal human demons have become the permanent means of influence of the papacy and dominate those through the Roman church poisoned imaginary world of our "Middle Ages", about which the painting alone gives frightening information - even on the Isenheim Altarpiece, not to mention the descents into hell of other visual artists. Only when one has recognized this whole strange being, has become aware of its origins and has the will to resist and get rid of this entire dreadful spooky creature, only then have we overcome the "Middle Ages". As a result, however, the Roman church, which is forever connected with the Etruscan torments of the underworld, fell inwardly.*

<sup>397</sup> Darré, RW 1930: *Neuadel aus Blut und Boden*. JF Lehmann. Munich. Darré therefore became perhaps the most important the ideologue for the party when it came to securing votes from farmers.

<sup>398</sup> See for example Höver 1992:409ff.

<sup>399</sup> In reality, it will also have implications for the view of history, the view of democracy, how active the state should be, etc.

<sup>400</sup> Höver 1992:143-144.

fine, as long as one did not compromise this. For these reasons, it is considered simplistic to pitting Goebbels and Hitler against each other along a right-left axis alone.

Despite the differences mentioned above, it must also be pointed out that there were strong ones common features between Goebbels and Hitler, also within the traditional political scale. Both had both the bourgeoisie and the Marxists as enemies. Both held the bourgeoisie responsible for corrupting nationalism<sup>401</sup>, and the Marxists for corrupting "real" German socialism,<sup>402</sup> which made national unity between Germans impossible.<sup>403</sup>

### 5.2.3 Content analysis of Der Angriff

#### Ethical ideals

Goebbels was of the opinion that only a strong ethno-nationalist state could solve the problems of the time problems. This state was supposed to be isolationist in the sense that it implied a strong opposition between the national and the international. This contradictory relationship was both of ideological and racial character, where international currents such as Marxism, liberalism and capitalism posed a strong threat to German society and the German people. The only one the way to keep this in check was to unify German society ideologically, culturally and racy vinegar.

There was no clear distinction between the concept of nationalism and the idea of *Volksgemeinschaft* i partiprogrammet (siden *Volksgemeinschaft* skulle være enheten nationalism built on) and we also find no clear distinction in Goebbels. Goebbels put set himself the goal of bringing the nation together in a community of "*necessity, bread and destiny*", and then to fight for "*the nation's freedom*".<sup>404</sup> By this he clearly meant creating a *Volksgemeinschaft* which was strong enough to safeguard the community's interests in relation to foreign countries in a satisfactory manner. Goebbels thus wanted to recreate the idyllic notion of a *Volksgemeinschaft* because he felt that the Germans had to stand politically united against the victors after the First World War.

It was thus the consolidation of the nation that was supposed to be a premise for future nationalism assertiveness. This goal was paramount in Goebbels' political life: *in other words, he was*

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<sup>401</sup> Goebbels 1939:16; Hitler 1999:339ff.

<sup>402</sup> Goebbels 1942:246-247; Hitler 1999:30ff.

<sup>403</sup> Goebbels 1942:223-224. Editorial in *Angriff* 16.7.1928.

<sup>404</sup> Goebbels 1978:75. This also included the requirement for increased living space. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

*positive towards everything that strengthened the community, and hostile towards everything that weakened it.* This also applied to areas such as culture and economics.<sup>405</sup>

We see here that Goebbels not only embraced the concept of a *Volksgemeinschaft* that would include the ethnically German and exclude all others, but that one cannot draw anything clear either distinguish between his idea of *Volksgemeinschaft* and his variant of nationalism. Both were strong characterized by racism, and with a sting against everyone who either rejected the way of thinking or who stayed identified as deviating from the categories due to group affiliation or on an individual basis.<sup>406</sup>

The program in and of itself did not contain any directly anti-Semitic statements, but it is either no doubt that some of the points were intended to hit the Jews as a group, and therefore among other things excluded them from the right to citizenship and political influence. The key role of the Jews in the program was that they were both given the role of the biggest obstacle to a nationalist *Volksgemeinschaft*, and thus also became an obstacle to German socialism.

Goebbels identified the Jews as the main enemy, and the citizen as partially responsible for it. The situation that arose was part of a simplified picture of the enemy that should make it easier to combine nationalism and socialism on an ideological level and in practical political life. Among other things based on the forgery "*Zion's Wise Protocols*", which told of a Jewish world conspiracy, was the Jews were considered enemies in both domestic and foreign politics, and were designated as the forces who threatened to destroy Germany from the outside through harmful ideologies and ideals, and through the spread of nationally corrupting values and ideologies in domestic politics. All of this was supposed to have the psychological function of making people feel that they were under attack from enemies who wanted to exterminate them, to make the Germans seek together and put aside all internal strife. The strategy for combining nationalism and socialism therefore rested to a greater extent on techniques to make people forget political strife by focusing on constructed enemy images, i combination with social reforms, than actually trying to fuse nationalism and socialism on a theoretical-ideological level.

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<sup>405</sup> Höver 1992:143-144. There was an indistinct distinction between *the Volksgemeinschaft*, the concept of nation and the idea of the state in Goebbels. <sup>406</sup>

An example of this was assimilated Jews who felt like Germans and who tried to be accepted as Germans, but who were nevertheless identified as Jews, and excluded from the idea of *Volksgemeinschaft*. Because of his purely ethnic definition of nationalism and the close connection between race and nationalism and between nationalism and the idea of *Volksgemeinschaft*, this shows that he considered all political questions from a racial perspective.

According to Goebbels, the Jews were an antagonism to Germany as a whole because of the impact on the social question: *"The Jew has no interest in the solution to the question of German destiny. He cannot have it, since he lives off the fact that it is unresolved."*<sup>407</sup>

According to Goebbels, the Jews used two tools to maintain this division, and to secure their own position of power: capitalism<sup>408</sup> on the one hand, and Marxism<sup>409</sup> on the other: Goebbels thus used the Jews to make two ideological enemies look like one. The Jews became like that link between capitalism and Marxism - and Goebbels was thus able to unite the fight against the negative aspects of the market economy, with Marxism as ideology in the Jewish one the stereotype. This simplification meant that anti-Semitism became not only a struggle against the Jews, but at the same time a fight against everything that was perceived as harmful and unhealthy for German society.<sup>410</sup>

Both capitalism and Marxism were seen as originally foreign to the German population, where the Germans who had taken up such thinking could quickly be identified as nationally unreliable, at the same time as it became a characteristic of the Jewish minority. Goebbels argued, in other words, for a connection between national loyalty and political opinion, and a corresponding lack of loyalty between the Jewish minority and the state.

The main objection to the "Jewish-led" *capitalism*<sup>411</sup> was that it was destructive and plundering: it stood in direct opposition to Goebbels' ideas, since the goal of profit towered over everything else; also the effect the system had on the people as a whole. About whether the community was strengthened or weakened made little difference as long as a profit could be made. With in other words, instead of money serving production, and production serving the people, he saw in capitalism a system where the people served production by means of money power.<sup>412</sup> Capitalism thus functioned as a destructive factor against the people as an "organic" unit, and remained so thus one of his archenemies.

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<sup>407</sup> Goebbels 1942:329. Editorial in Angriff 30.7.1928. He further wrote: *"Make a single community of the German people and give them freedom for the world, and the Jew no longer has any place under us. [...] The Jew is to blame for our distress, and now he lives off it."* Ibid.

<sup>408</sup> Goebbels 1942:330. Editorial in Angriff 30.7.1928.

<sup>409</sup> Hovdkinn 1975:55. Quoted from DzR, p. 32.

<sup>410</sup> This was also a characteristic of Stöcker's anti-Semitism.

<sup>411</sup> *"[Capitalism] is not creative, but a draining and parasitic capital. It is not tied to land, but is landless and international. It does not work productively, but has infiltrated the normal production process in order to extract profit."* Hovdkinn 1975:48. Quoted from *Der Kleine ABC des Nationalsozialisten*, p. 11.

<sup>412</sup> Goebbels 1942:188-190. Editorial 15.7.1929. One of the consequences was that the German worker was reduced to a producing machine: See Goebbels 1942:225. Editorial in Angriff 23.07.28.



He believed that the international "Jewish-led" *Marxism* had as a consequence that it destroyed people and nations, and annihilated their organic existence.<sup>413</sup> In concrete terms this happened through the people being divided against themselves through a destructive class struggle, which removed the prerequisites for the gathering of the nation, and thus the solution to the social question. On despite this, he still had an understanding of the worker's struggle, but not of the means by which this struggle was fought.<sup>414</sup>

Goebbels identified the German citizen as partly responsible for this situation. Before first, the bourgeoisie had perverted nationalism and mixed it with their own narrow class interests<sup>415</sup> in order to safeguard their property interests. Second, they had through their selfishness and lack of willingness to sacrifice created fertile ground for Marxism. Goebbels was of the opinion that one could not build up a mass movement from such material, and was more than willing to sacrifice the bourgeoisie in favor of the workers.<sup>416</sup>

Goebbels believed that neither Marxism nor bourgeois nationalism was suitable for reaching the goal of national freedom: a true socialist was therefore, in his eyes, against international Marxism, and a true nationalist was against "false" bourgeois nationalism.<sup>417</sup> It was this combination he longed for: a socialism and a nationalism based in an organic view of the nation.

The concern that some workers in his eyes were nationally unreliable was central to Goebbels' attempt to win them over to the National Socialists. He saw that the worker was about to with removing themselves from *the "blood community"* in favor of international "Jewish" Marxism, which was harmful to the nation as a whole, and that winning the workers over from such an ideology was at the same time the key to the solution to the social question.<sup>418</sup> This was again a prerequisite for the consolidation of the people as a biological unit, which was a premise for Germany's struggle for

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<sup>413</sup> Goebbels 1942:246-247. Editorial in *Angriff* 24.8.1930. But he also pointed out that the Russian Bolshevism was not international socialism, but *de facto* "pan-Slavism". Goebbels 1926:76.

<sup>414</sup> Goebbels 1978:75-78. 415

Goebbels 1939:16. *"He says Germany and means the monarchy. He proclaims freedom, and means black-white-red."*

*Ibid.*

<sup>416</sup> Goebbels 1978:80. Goebbels believed that the Jews were dependent on, and could only maintain, their power through the support of the bourgeoisie. Goebbels 1926:81. At the same time, he criticized the excessive anti-Semitism in certain bourgeois circles: *"Anti-Semitism is the beginning of our knowledge. But it is not everything. It is only a beginning [...]. You stand firmly at this beginning: You rage in the most primitive ways against the Jews and their companions, and do not see the fault of your own or your own fault. Let's not be stupid: all peoples have the Jews they deserve; the German people in their present form deserve no other Jews than those they have."* Goebbels 1978:81.

<sup>417</sup> Goebbels 1942:223-224. Editorial in *Angriff* 16.7.1928.

<sup>418</sup> Goebbels 1942:329-331. Editorial in *Angriff* 30.7.1928. The leader *"Warum sind wir Judengegner"* identifies the Jews as *"cause and beneficiary of our slavery"*. Goebbels wrote that the broad strata of the people had been abused by the Jews, which had deepened the class divisions and divided Germany into two parts. *"The Jew has no interest in the German destiny question being resolved. He can't, since he makes a living from it being unsolved. Make a single community of the German people, and give them their freedom before the world, and the Jew has no more place under us. [...] The Jew is to blame for our distress, and today he lives off it."* *Ibid.*

*"freedom", against "slavery".*<sup>419</sup> Although Goebbels was undoubtedly a Social Darwinist, he was wary of themselves to use the aggressive, militaristic and expansionist rhetoric that had been among nationalists with Social Darwinist leanings in the Empire. Instead clothed Goebbels consistently played the role of victim. Germany was a victim of economic warfare, a victim of *"Jewish" capitalism and "Jewish" Marxism*, which separately, and not least together, came to take break Germany and the German people. In that way he tried to present his political views enemies as aggressive, while he himself only acted in pure self-defense.

He considered it *"horrific"* that communist and national socialist workers should die loose on each other when they had every interest in standing united against the *real* enemy – capitalism.<sup>420</sup> *"We fight each other without actually being enemies. Thus our forces are divided, and we never reach the goal. Perhaps the most extreme need brings us together."*<sup>421</sup>

But this presupposed that the communists would become nationalists, and there is little doubt that Goebbels was far too naive in his belief that a political gathering could arise between National Socialists and communists. The political differences between the National Socialist left wing and revisionist Marxists was not insurmountable with respect to the social question, but the the big bow lay in the sight of race. Goebbels of course knew this, but probably underestimated it the ideological faith of the Marxists if he calculated that they would embrace a racist program in exchange against substantive concessions – that is; if they had even taken such an offer seriously, considering the political distrust between the Marxists and the rest of the political spectrum.

### Economic distribution

The party program went a long way in promising social reforms that would undoubtedly improve the workers' situation, as shown earlier.<sup>422</sup> Nevertheless, the appeal to the workers was limited to promises of material goods, which could be exchanged for a nationalist worldview.

On this point, Goebbels was very faithful to the party program, and in practice only built on the existing points about social reforms in the program from 1920.<sup>423</sup> Goebbels had faith

<sup>419</sup> Goebbels 1942:120-125. Editorial in Angriff 23.9.1929. Goebbels was primarily referring here to the Young plan, and wrote that it was *"[...] the continuation of the war with financial means"*.

<sup>420</sup> Goebbels 1978:78: *"We fight each other without actually being enemies. Thus our powers are divided, and we never reach the goal. Perhaps the most extreme need brings us together."*

<sup>421</sup> Goebbels 1978:78. 422

Reference is made here to, for example, section 14 on profit sharing in large companies, section 13 on nationalization of corporations (trusts), section 15 on old-age pension reforms, section 20 on education for all gifted children, regardless of the parents' income, and section 20 on prohibition of child labour.

<sup>423</sup> See, for example, section 13 and point 14 in the party programme, compared to the rejected proposal for the party programme from 1925/26. The program can be found in Strasser, Goebbels, *et al.* 1978:85, and is described in more detail in the footnote below.

that the workers' loyalty could be secured through raising their material situation, but in practice without giving them increased civil rights. In the discarded proposal for a party program that Goebbels was participated in drafting together with Gregor Strasser among others in 1925/26, the workers were to be made co-owners of the companies they worked in by receiving ten percent of the company's shares.<sup>424</sup>

In January 1926, however, he was in the process of drawing up a program of his own, since he was of the opinion that the program from the previous year had not been radical enough on this point.<sup>425</sup> Although this program has been lost, one can guess the main features, since Goebbels treated the question in other contexts. In the writing *"Der Nazi-Sozi"* he wrote that all the natural resources in the principle belonged to the people as a whole, although in reality they were often privately owned. But the prerequisite for this private ownership was that the resources were managed in a way that was in community interest. If this was not done, the state could step in and confiscate the property.<sup>426</sup> *"Property is only sacred when it is acquired and managed in a sacred way."*<sup>427</sup>

It must therefore be emphasized that Goebbels never wanted to abolish private property rights or set all means of production under state control, although in practice his proposal meant a certain restriction of it, and not least for the employers: they had to find themselves giving up parts of the property to the workers, so that they became co-owners in the companies.

One must assume that the reason for this view was pragmatic on Goebbels' part, and partly inspired by Lenin's agrarian reforms: *"In Russia, the peasants were given private property in land. Today he is willing to fight to the last drop of blood for this Russian fatherland."*<sup>428</sup> Goebbels admired Lenin in the way he had managed to bind the peasants to the nation and turn them into loyal supporters for the regime by giving them property. And once they had property, they would do what they could to preserve *the status quo*:<sup>429</sup> then suddenly they had something to lose, and little to gain on a line which was not loyal to nation and state. In other words, in the citizens' place, but within others framework.

In order to incorporate the workers into the national organism, they had to get out of their *"tight material and spiritual existence"*, and raise their material standard to such an extent that it stood in

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<sup>424</sup> Strasser, Goebbels, *et al. eel.* 1978:85. With regard to industrial policy, all enterprises that were started on a given day in the past or later are converted into joint stock companies. These were to be divided into two groups – essential industry (key industry, weapons industry, banks, chemical and electrical industry) and non-essential industry (finished goods industry, export industry and others). In all limited companies connected to essential industry, 51% of the shares were to be owned by the people, while non-essential industry was to have 49%. The proposal was rejected by Hitler at the Bamberg Conference in 1926 to the disappointment of Goebbels, but not because he disagreed with its content. Hitler believed that a new party program was not necessary at that time. *Ibid.*

<sup>425</sup> Heiber 1962:55,56. Goebbels' diary, 18.12.1925, and 23.12.1925; Hover 1992:136. The program is lost.

<sup>426</sup> Hover 1992:138, 427

Goebbels 1942:228. Editorial in *Angriff* 14.11.1929.

<sup>428</sup> Hover 1992:139.

<sup>429</sup> Hover 1992:139.

a direct relationship to their work performance and responsibility.<sup>430</sup> In order to raise the worker's material status, it goes without saying that the best-off in society had to be willing to sacrifice. Goebbels believed that the citizens lacked exactly this: *"For the German citizen, Bolshevism begins with the demand for personal sacrifice. For him, everything that touches his wallet is Bolshevism."*<sup>431</sup>

This is not to say that Goebbels wanted to keep the bourgeoisie out of the commonwealth, for he had, after all, a vision of a future society where citizen and proletarian worked together to consolidating the nation internally and externally. But he realized at the same time that he had to choose between them and could not bet on a pure compromise proposal.<sup>432</sup>

#### Distribution of power

There are two main points on this point with Goebbels; firstly, that a dictator should have absolute power, and that the old aristocracy should be replaced by a workers' aristocracy.<sup>433</sup>

There was nothing in point 24 of the programme, which was the only thing that addressed the idea of the state, which stated that the NSDAP was *founded* with dictatorship in mind. One rightly advocated centralization and stronger federal power, but this power should rest with parliament at the federal level, while state assemblies were to implement the laws in the various states. The system that was described was therefore a parliamentary and democratic system - for the German majority. The most totalitarian aspects of National Socialism must therefore have developed later, and Goebbels reflects this development.

The idea of the state was, in line with foreign policy, very little central to Goebbels, if one judging by how little he wrote about them. In terms of domestic politics, there is still no doubt that he tried to combine a new modernized version of the administrative state, adapted to the industrial society, and glued together by social reforms and internal and external enemy images to build political bridge between the right and the left.

Goebbels's idea of the state was both hierarchical and totalitarian, with the state as the most important role to look after the interests of the ethnic Germans. He wanted a hierarchical division in society, which, unlike pre-industrial society, was not based on heredity, but on effort.<sup>434</sup>

A main difference between the society Goebbels wanted and the pre-industrial society was that

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<sup>430</sup> Goebbels 1942:229. Editorial in Angriff 13.10.1929.

<sup>431</sup> Goebbels 1978:77.

<sup>432</sup> In other words, he did not repeat the mistake of Naumann, who tried to rise above class interests without having a group as power base.

<sup>433</sup> Goebbels 1942:225. Editorial in Angriff 23/7/1928.

<sup>434</sup> Goebbels 1942:225.

Goebbels did not mind that all ethnic Germans basically had equal *opportunities*, something which in practice was in direct conflict with aristocratic ideals. However, he did not guarantee that they would should have *turned out well*. In other words, he wanted to replace one hierarchical order with another<sup>436</sup>, by replacing old aristocratic and hereditary privileges, which had their origin in it pre-industrial society, with a National Socialist labor aristocracy that was based on efforts for the state:

*"We want a stratification of the people; high and low, above and below. But the aristocracy in the future state is not based on property or even money, but solely on performance and power. Merit is earned through service. Work puts people up and down."*<sup>437</sup>

This state was also to be totalitarian, where one man would take all important political positions avgjørelser. I artikkelen *"Golden words for a dictator and for those who become one wollen"* from Angriff in 1932, Goebbels left little doubt that the article was both coined Adolf Hitler, and that he himself gave full support to both the leadership idea and Adolf Hitler personally as dictator.<sup>438</sup> In the article, Goebbels argued that a dictatorship could be the salvation when previous forms of government proved unsuccessful, but with the assumption that the dictator was the right man in the right place, and that he had the trust of the people.<sup>439</sup> A common thread throughout the article was that the dictator, even if he was absolute in principle, also had a responsibility to have the people behind him themselves. This did not mean that the dictator should see where the political wind was blowing at all times and follow the majority based on this: the dictator should also have the opportunity to take controversial point of view, but he also had a responsibility to act in the best interest of the people and to convince the people to follow him.<sup>440</sup>

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<sup>435</sup> Goebbels 1942:225.

<sup>436</sup> Goebbels 1942:225.

<sup>437</sup> Goebbels 1942:225.

<sup>438</sup> Goebbels 1939:325. Editorial in Angriff 1.9.1932.

<sup>439</sup> Goebbels 1939:325. Editorial in Angriff 1.9.1932. *"If the man is missing, it is hopeless; if the idea lacking it is impossible; and if the entourage is lacking, the dictatorship is only a bad joke."* Ibid.

<sup>440</sup> Goebbels 1939:325. Editorial in Angriff 1.9.1932. There is little doubt that the propaganda machinery was to be used for precisely this. It has been pointed out that this rested on the premise that the propagandist could in practice isolate himself completely from the influence of the people he exposed to propaganda, which is hardly entirely correct. It is also a paradox that, with this as a background, Goebbels loyally followed Hitler until the latter's death on 30 April 1945. One can indeed question the order to destroy all infrastructure, and to continue fighting a war that, from a military point of view, long since lost, was in the best interest of the people. According to this logic, the moral basis for the dictatorship as a system would then fall away for Goebbels. Yet this did not happen - instead, both Goebbels and Hitler found moral justification for the situation through Social Darwinism: Since the German people had proved "too weak" to win, they had no sympathy for them either.

Quantitatively, the program of the NSDAP showed that the workers were a main target group, as ten out of twenty-five points dealt with them. The NSDAP thus attempted to create a mass party with a strong worker profile.

The workers had at least as central a role in Goebbels' *Angriff*. The workers seemed to be a completely clear target group for the party organ, which Goebbels both identified with and wanted to fight up to a dominant place in German society, at the expense of the bourgeoisie. The enmity against the bourgeoisie can be found both in Goebbels and in Hitler in *Mein Kampf*, but directly references to the bourgeoisie are actually missing from the party programme.

## 5.2.4 Ideological vs. tactical factors

Goebbels was in the paradoxical situation that on the one hand he was strongly against Marxists socialism and communism - which were traditionally very strong within the labor movement in Germany - and that on the other hand he was completely dependent on support from the same group. The workers therefore had to be turned against their traditional ideology, and integrated into it the National Socialist movement. It goes without saying that this was an ambitious task – namely to take over his main political opponent's bastion of power, and try to make it the backbone of his own own. But to the extent that it was successful, one also removed the most important seed of resistance to oneself policy. The National Socialists did not try to win over the workers by taking sides in one traditional right-left politics. Instead, they tried to rise above special economic interests through an emphasis on alternative values,<sup>441</sup> which both referred the class struggle to a subordinate position, and which appealed to all social groups.

The labor issue was at the same time the key to political power. In other words: they were unable to gaining supporters from the working class, or at least neutralizing them, the NSDAP was unlikely to get into a government position. But in addition to the power politics, there is also the social politics aspect interesting: the workers were in a very strong position, since they were the tipping point between success or failure of the party; they were promised major concessions in return for supporting the NSDAP, both socially, through an elevation of their social status, and moreover by their material situation should be improved.

There was a need for this: the Weimar Republic was from the beginning attacked both from the right and the left, both from ideological factors, in desperation over poor living conditions, and in disappointment

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<sup>441</sup> See for example: Goebbels 1942:225. Editorial in *Angriff* 23/7/1928.

over what they experienced as a lack of results.<sup>442</sup> Large sections of the German population had refused to accept the Treaty of Versailles,<sup>443</sup> and had unrealistic hopes about what the government could achieve with small resources. The Republic's economic scope was largely restricted up of war reparations as a result of the Treaty of Versailles, and as a direct result of the war defeat.<sup>444</sup> For example, Germany was to pay 20 billion gold marks in war reparations to the Allies and the United States by May 1921.<sup>445</sup> When large groups of the people also demanded an immediate increase in the standard of living,<sup>446</sup> the republic failed to live up to the expectations.

### 5.3 Komparasjon med Naumann's democracy and empire

Comparison, or comparison, is methodologically important in this task to find decisive similarities and differences between Naumann, Spengler and Goebbels in the intersection of nationalism and socialism. In that way, one can identify which characteristics have been ideological necessary to combine nationalism and socialism, and which have not been. By using the matching method takes as a starting point units that are as similar as possible, for then to look for the decisive difference, and with the difference method one starts from units that are as different as possible, but with one common variable, in order to find the decisive agreement.<sup>447</sup> Here, a combination of these two methods is used to find both crucial ideological similarities and differences. In the comparisons between Naumann's *Democracy and empire* with Goebbels' *attack*, he explained at både Naumann og Goebbels, i addition to Spengler, which will be dealt with later in the chapter, wrote for target groups they wanted to influence to the greatest extent possible. Naumann and Goebbels were also established in their respective political and social environments on which they depended; and one cannot rule out that these environments may have exercised a certain political pressure on them in individual cases where there may have been a deviation from the official one the party line. However, this does not apply to Spengler, who did not belong to any party.

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<sup>442</sup> The new republic was in many cases unwelcome among the political right who had been loyal to the Empire - primarily the middle class. And parts of the political left disliked the republic because it had not taken the opportunity to carry out a socialist revolution according to the Marxist model. See for example Feuchtwanger, EJ 1996: *From Weimar to Hitler: The Rise and Fall of the First German Democracy*. In: Gilbert Pleuger: *Essays on German History 1862-1939*. Sempringham Publishing, Bedford, pp. 33-41.

<sup>443</sup> Bessel 1993:254.

<sup>444</sup> Bessel 1993:255. <sup>445</sup> Henig 1998:19.

<sup>446</sup> Bessel 1993:254. <sup>447</sup>

Kjelstadli 1999:266-268.

All in all, one can still state that the similarities and differences presented here are representative of both Naumann and Goebbels as persons, and to an almost equal extent for *the Nationalsozialer Verein* and *NSDAP* - before 1933.

### 5.3.1 Similarities

Both Naumann and Goebbels were on the political left, but there were still certainties differences. Naumann found himself politically in a centre-left position, between the conservative and the socialist bloc, while Goebbels was in reality inside the socialist bloc bloc, where he attacked revisionist social democrats from the left, at the same time as he tried to bring about a political alliance with the revolutionary Marxist elements. So although both can be placed on the political right, there is still no doubt that Goebbels was far more radical and was much further to the left than Naumann.

One can of course object that such a placement may have been purely tactical, since it exploited it greatest vulnerability in the political left, which was the split between the revisionist and the revolutionary elements of the Marxist labor movement. In my opinion it is little to suggest that it was pure tactics on Goebbels' part, for he looked at the revolutionaries the elements among the workers as the new ruling class of the new Germany that was to replace the bourgeoisie, and identified himself with them, and was also willing to fight forward great material concessions for them on top of this. In light of this, it was also logical that he attacked the revisionists from the left.

Both also saw a strong state as a prerequisite for combining nationalism and socialism. The strong state should be based on patriotism, and should be based on one on one side be the glue that would hold the nation together, and on the other side be a superior protector of German interests and protection against market forces. This was only possible through a strong state that also showed foreign policy assertiveness. Here we must also take into account that they foreign policy conditions had changed significantly: When Naumann wrote *Demokratie und Kaisertum* was primarily in view of military rearmament to secure the country's borders for outside attack and to create a navy capable of securing Germany's trading interests abroad. In interwar Germany, the situation was quite different whether the state should have the same tasks when it came to combining nationalism and socialism, paradoxically enough, Goebbels' state thought was both more totalitarian and more defensive than Naumann's, because one literally saw oneself "surrounded by enemies".



The strong state should also have a role as a mediator between the different sides in working life, and they advocated a corporatism in the economic area, where employers and workers essentially had the same interests, but where in Goebbels' case should follow the dividing lines according to the German *Volksgemeinschaft* with the ethnic restrictions this meant; with Naumann, it was to include all citizens, regardless of religion and ethnicity.

Naumann's and Goebbels' combination of nationalism and socialism were both counter-revolutionary in the sense that they opposed an uncontrolled political revolution from the left side. Naumann considered such a revolution to be impossible, considering the technological aspects the advances and centralization of power that had made the state far more effective at striking down revolutions. In that case, the workers had to find themselves in obtaining benefits through negotiations. Goebbels, on the other hand, was more radical. He did not want to destroy the political order, and aimed (as in with Naumann) never towards a classless society, but he instead wanted a political one controlled "revolution", where the workers were to replace the bourgeoisie as the most politically important the group.

They were both very forward-looking, in the sense that they both identified with the social groups that had emerged as a result of the industrial revolution, and not them the pre-industrial elites.

### 5.3.2 Differences

By far the biggest differences between Naumann and Goebbels we find not unexpectedly within racial issues. It must be particularly emphasized here that the issue of race was not just one of several central areas in Goebbels' world view, but in practice that question everything else was measured from. The differences on this point are therefore so fundamental that they also have ripple effects on them most other points.

While Goebbels was both an anti-Semite, a racist and a social Darwinist, he lacked all of this Naumann. Although in his youth Naumann found himself in a circle where anti-Semitism was very strong widespread, and although his main political mentor was anti-Semitic, he rejected anti-Semitism 448 som ufruktbar i *democracy and empire*. There are also no references in the said book or in the biographical material used for this thesis that suggests relatives racist statements. Naumann's association with the liberal movement and a nationalism which built on a bourgeois, and not ethnic, view of the state, seems to have immunized against this.

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<sup>448</sup> Naumann 1905:106: "*There is no more convenient, but also no more sterile basic political formula than anti-Semitism.*"

Goebbels' anti-liberal attitudes are therefore also in sharp contrast to Naumann's, and especially as Goebbels linked the liberalist ideology to economic liberalism, and thus also capitalism and "Jews". Anti-Semitism was therefore also a panacea that could be used against liberal ideology, which may also be part of the explanation for why Naumann rejected it.

Another big difference is the view of the aristocracy. Naumann viewed the aristocracy generally, and then especially the agrarian aristocracy, as a threat to the democratization of Germany. It had to therefore put in check so that increased democratization could take place, and to achieve this goal suggested Naumann several measures that would harm the agrarian aristocracy both economically and politically. One hierarchical social order was, in this view, an obstacle on the way to modernity and democratization. Goebbels, as a Social Darwinist, did not only have a Social Darwinist view between nations, but to a great extent also domestic politics. And an important premise for social Darwinism was that the strongest group in the German *Volksgemeinschaft* should occupy a leadership role. Goebbels identified the workers as the group to take over. The "socialist man" was to replace "liberalist man", and the values "money, property and ancestry" were to be replaced by the socialist values of "performance, work and blood".<sup>449</sup> *"Der Zutritt for leadership is performance, and performance in turn is the best measure of breed. [...] Fulfilled duties give greater rights, not the other way around."*<sup>450</sup>

Another crucial difference was the view of democracy. Naumann was, and in retrospect is many best remembered for his work for expanded democracy in German society. Democratization was for Naumann an important prerequisite for the right and left to be able to cooperate, so that a combination of nationalism and socialism could be created. Naumann therefore did not share the view that large population groups could be bought to accept an undemocratic system, but considered democratization a necessary step to modernize Germany. Goebbels supported comparison only democracy in theory, but was in practice a warm supporter of a totalitarian dictatorship, and is also on this point in total disagreement with Naumann.

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<sup>449</sup> Hoover 1992:167. 450

Hoover 1992:167. Sitert from *The New Type*, in: NS Yearbook 1927, pp. 128-132.

## 5.4 Komparasjon med Spengler's Prussianism and Socialism

### 5.4.1 Similarities

Spengler, like Goebbels, was anti-Semitic,<sup>451</sup> but it must be pointed out that this was none biological anti-Semitism, but anti-Semitic clichés that were not uncommon in bourgeois circles.

These were mostly based on a link to liberalism and other ideologies that, in Spengler's opinion, characterized Western *Zivilization*, as opposed to German *Kultur*. The anti-Semitism of Spengler was moreover, far less central than with Goebbels, and was actually completely missing in *Preußentum und Sozialismus*: Anti-Semitism as a link between nationalism and socialism was therefore not developed at Spengler. The sources one has for Spengler's anti-Semitism are, however, in both private letters and in his best-known work, *Untergang des Abendlandes*. Within this branch of anti-Semitism Spengler was actually one of those whom Goebbels both read and admired for having gone to the root of the theme, and which undoubtedly came to "[...] create a spiritual clarification of the Jewish problem".<sup>452</sup> The biological-racist variant of anti-Semitism is, however, missing in Spengler, however, was quite clear in the material from Goebbels' *Angriff*, especially throughout stereotypical caricatures of Jews.

Both Spengler and Goebbels favored a strong state and centralization of power in order to combine the national with the social. In Spengler's case, the strong state had its most important role in the combination of nationalism and socialism, in the sense that it should constitute a protective superstructure which in practice should remove the basis for class conflicts. The strong state would protect the citizens against unrestrained market liberalism, and also prevent that there arose a connection between money and political power - that is, the danger that political influence should increase in line with the individual's income and wealth. Instead, it should be individualized influence is secured through service to the state. Spengler does not seem to have become significantly disturbed by the totalitarian consequences such a proposal would necessarily entail; for the state would, in practice, become totally sovereign with regard to what kind of actions it wanted to reward, and what kinds of actions should be met with indifference or punishment. The price one had to pay to prevent class struggle and unite the nation domestically was in practice a totalitarian state, itself if Spengler instead of a dictator wanted a monarch.

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<sup>451</sup> According to Ernst Nolte, all the major ideologies of the 19th century each had their own variant of anti-Semitism. The liberals traditionally accused them of being intolerant, anti-historically rigid and of forming a nation within the nation. For the socialists, the Jews most often represented capitalism, and the conservatives disliked their alleged revolutionary drive. Hitler's biological anti-Semitism combined all these directions in that it rested on race, but drew in all the arguments of the liberals, socialists and conservatives alike. See  
<sup>452</sup> Reuth 1990:58. Sitert fra Josef Goebbels: *Excerpts from contemporary German literature*, October 30, 1922.

Spengler was completely in line with Goebbels on the question of democracy. He didn't see anyone connection between the introduction of democracy on the one hand and the combination of nationalism and socialism on the other. The political goals could be implemented without giving wider strata of the people increased political influence. Even with the differences in desired state form, as mentioned above, both were supporters of a meritocracy, on which political influence was not dependent age and citizenship, but of the individual's merits - in practice the extent to which one acted in line with the wishes of those in power.

Both were also elitist, but had a fondness for different elites. It is little doubt that the military aristocracy, as the most important bearers of the state's values, should have a hero special place in Spengler's idyllic Prussian state, and that they would gain disproportionately large power. Goebbels, on the other hand, wanted the best workers to have an equally dominant role, and they had therefore a model with a greater degree of social mobility.

## 5.4.2 Differences

A couple of the most glaring differences between Spengler and Goebbels were found within the fields of social Darwinism and racism. In *Preußentum und Sozialismus* one can correctly find examples of statements that could be interpreted as racist if they were presented in biologically racist terms sense; but Spengler's concept of race had nothing to do with biological racism, and was more akin to the ideological-cultural spirit type - which Spengler considered characteristic of a people group.<sup>453</sup> It was therefore not a matter of race in a purely biological sense, and Spengler had here a concept of race that was closely related to Goethe's. This racial concept was one of those things Spengler received the harshest criticism from the National Socialists, and he was therefore in total opposition to Goebbels on this issue.<sup>454</sup> It is impossible to imagine Goebbels' combination of nationalism and socialism without racism, but Spengler thus lacked both racism and social Darwinism *Preußentum und Sozialismus*, which tells us that they were not conceptually necessary to combine nationalism and socialism.

Another point where the two were in strong disagreement with each other was in their view of finances concessions. Spengler was not willing - or did not find it necessary - to undertake any economic changes to create a combination of nationalism and socialism on a realpolitik plan. Spengler attempted to resolve the ideological challenges that had arisen as

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<sup>453</sup> See for example Koktanek 1965:238-239,304.

<sup>454</sup> For racism other than the more common anti-Semitism in Angriff, see the editorial "*Der Neger als Kollege*" from 2. 2.1931. Quoted from Höver 1992:165.

a consequence of the industrial revolution by turning time back to an ideal state before it the industrial revolution had broken through, despite the fact that this condition was in a far greater state out of step with modern industrial society. He thought – somewhat naively – that the industrial workers would find themselves living in an authoritarian state with limited democratic rights and with little opportunities to improve their material situation. Goebbels' model would in practice give the industrial workers great economic concessions, but against accepting an undemocratic state form.

As both launched a combination of nationalism and socialism, one would think that both Spengler and Goebbels were to be found not far from the political centre. But this was not the case. The idea of the state with the monarchy at the center, the economic policy and the support for the pre-industrial the elites tell us that Spengler was far to the right of the political spectrum, while Goebbels who famously lay somewhere between the Social Democrats and the Communists.

In economic life, attitudes reflected this scale: The main difference between Spengler and Goebbels were in view of the new social classes that had emerged as a result of the industrial revolution; with Spengler identifying with the pre-industrial the economy, and saw the modern economy as a sign and symptom of empty materialism on cultural decay, while Goebbels identified with the new social classes, but at the same time without excluding artisans and workers in traditional occupations.

## 6. Conclusion

The political models presented here were nationalist attempts to win over the workers to the nationalist side, away from Marxist socialism. Although the two ideologies were very different in many ways, as in the view of the nation and in economic matters, they also had certain common features, such as emphasizing an exclusionary brotherhood - albeit with different content and enemy image. The chance they had to succeed was initially not equal because they the ideological prerequisites for successfully combining nationalism and "German" socialism changed dramatically just before, during and just after World War I, where the threat of war, the war itself and the consequences of the war helped to put class antagonisms in second place - from *Geist von 1914*, to *Burgfrieden* and to the dream of the idyllic *Volksgemeinschaft*. Before this was the distance and mistrust between the right and the left was so great that it was practically unrealistic to bring them together politically.

The background for this was that both Naumann, Spengler and Goebbels were dependent on workers' support to secure future success for their policies. However, did not lie the conditions conducive to political successes for a combination of nationalism and socialism before Weimar Republic. This political model now received increased support both because of the new foreign policy situation where Germany was far more isolated, because the acceptance of collectivist solutions from the First World War were stronger and the poor living conditions that did that wider strata of the people out of desperation and necessity sought against radicals, and most often collectivist political solutions.

As previously shown, it is too easy to connect Naumann's combination of nationalism and socialism directly against older tradition from the Christian Social movement, although this too contained elements that wanted to raise the living conditions of industrial workers. Naumann was, however exposed to influence from several quarters, and perhaps primarily from Adolf Stöcker, Rudolf Sohm, Max Weber and the *National Social Association*. Fra Adolf Stöcker kom ønsket om å spre Christianity and patriotism to the industrial workers, from Rudolf Sohm came the desire to operate with a separation between religion and politics, and from Max Weber came the desire for a close connection between economic strength and a broad nationalism, where the industrial workers were "raised" to act politically responsible and gained ever greater power, at the expense of the aristocracy. Like political concept my findings do not suggest that the national social ideology that was described in *Demokratie und Kaisertum* was a success, neither in terms of reception in the press nor in

pure case numbers. And the *Nationalsozialistischer Verein*, which was based on this programme, was also not successful in the Riksdag election with its 27,000 votes and 0.3 per cent of the vote.<sup>455</sup> After the material I have found, this must be attributed to a lack of political experience, tactical mistakes, and not least the strong political polarization between the right and the left that existed around the turn of the century, and which meant that he was attacked politically from both sides.

With Oswald Spengler it was far more difficult to point out predecessors. He lived all the time relatively withdrawn, mostly read classic books and in reality never belonged to anything active political environment. He had authors such as Goethe and Nietzsche as role models, and combined to difference from the latter's state-conforming nationalism with culturally critical and culturally cyclical thinking. The latter can also be attributed to, among others, Machiavelli and Vico, whom Spengler must have known to. But the final source analysis for *Preußentum und Sozialismus* still rests on a certain uncertainty as to which authors had the greatest influence on him. It is anyway clearly that the revolution of 1918 and the subsequent Soviet republic, as Spengler experienced, was its triggering reason for him writing the book.

The book rested heavily on cultural cycle theory, where he made use of pseudobiological ones metaphors and anti-Anglican tradition to reject "English" liberalism, capitalism and Marxism as the expression of a lost and decadent culture. The only thing that could prevent the import of these ideological expressions was "Prussian" socialism, where the will of the individual was "dissolved" in the common will under a strong state.

My findings do not indicate that *Preußentum und Sozialismus* was a great success in terms other than sales figures. The year it was first published was 1919, and Spengler was already a well-known author then with the first volume of *Untergang des Abendlandes*, which was published the year before. The reception of the book in the press was highly mixed, and the left was, with very few exceptions, negative about the book. The political effect the book had therefore cannot have been particularly great, possibly with exceptions by certain conservative circles.

Goebbels was chosen as a representative of the National Socialists because socialism in National Socialism had a far more prominent place than with, for example, Hitler, who otherwise would have been a natural choice to study. The material in *Der Angriff* used in this one the thesis does not confirm any strong ideological opposition between Hitler and Goebbels with regard to neither nationalism nor socialism in National Socialism. Goebbels was nobody national-minded socialist, but a national socialist who looked at all political questions through a racist prism – just like Hitler. The overall political objective was the aforementioned

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<sup>455</sup> Hübinger 2000:171.

*Volksgemeinschaft*, which in the world of the National Socialists was synonymous with a racial community where the racist loyalty to each other, and the dictator's national neutrality, should overshadowing all internal strife between the Germans. I would also argue that it was unclear distinguish between *Volksgemeinschaft* and socialism in National Socialism, since socialism does not had any independent function other than creating or maintaining the former. And accordingly *Volksgemeinschaft* was at the same time the goal of nationalism, so there was also a blurred distinction between nationalism and socialism in national socialism, where nationalism was a tool for to achieve the goal of a *Volksgemeinschaft*.

Although one can never completely rule out that Naumann and Spengler may have had an involuntary influence the development of National Socialism insignificantly, it is more likely that National Socialism rested to a far stronger extent on older traditions from the Imperial Empire. This can cannot be answered based on a table alone, without having dealt with the topic in depth. This is not either has been done because it falls outside the task's problem, but it could have been an idea for further research to study the ideological similarities between the racist and imperialist *Agitationsverbände* or the ideological similarities with anti-Semitic Christian Socialists who for example Karl Lueger in Austria. Perhaps more interesting would be to research why the National Socialists just after the First World War succeed better than anyone else in filling the concept of *Volksgemeinschaft* with its own content. With this they put down a very central one cornerstone of National Socialism. The concept of a collectivist *Volksgemeinschaft* is as mentioned in most cases difficult to distinguish from the real socialism in National Socialism, so without "owning" the content of *the Volksgemeinschaft*, it would have been more difficult to spread the political the message to other groups, and thus gain power.



The similarities and differences between Naumann, Spengler and Goebbels can be summarized in following table:

	Ethical ideals	Economic distribution	Distribution of power
Naumann	Strong nationalist state. Anti-Marxism. Social contributions and needs. Service to Corporatism. majority democracy. the state.	Distribution by economic Imperial power. Broad	Democracy.
Spengler	Strong nationalist state. Marxism. property distribution. <i>national community</i> . Prussian Socialism. Service to the state. <i>cultural</i>	No change in Anti-Socialism an instinct.	Monarch and Stender Assembly. Power through service to the state.
Goebbels	Strong nationalist state. Marxism. Service service to the state. <i>national community</i> . Racial purity. Anti-Semitism. <sup>456</sup>	Distribution by work and The Dictator represent Anti-Marxism. totalitarian power.	Labor aristocracy.

The table shows a summary of the main ideological elements, in the form of ethical ideals, economic distribution and distribution of power – or more simply written, who should have the power. The very combination of nationalism and socialism has after this table, and within the assignment's delineation several main tendencies: My findings show that it was consistently based on the desire for a strong state in the form of a vital nationalism, which consistently rejected the concept of class struggle and Marxist revolution to change property conditions. The view of the nation as one corporate entity, with the exclusion of and anti-Semitism against the Jewish minority which by-product, was dominant. This anti-Semitism was not necessarily based on racism, cf. Spangles. There was also a tendency for the combination of nationalism and socialism to be anti-liberal, anti-democratic and elitist.<sup>457</sup> On these points, the combination of nationalism and socialism very closely related to conservative tradition from the Imperial Empire, and had little or no resemblance to the liberal or Marxist tradition.

All three strongly emphasized that a nationalism with a mass base was essential, although the variants had ideological undertones that were strongly contradictory and drawn from different traditions.

<sup>456</sup> As Goebbels believed that the Jews were using capitalism and Marxism to gain world domination, anti-Semitism at the same time also a fight against capitalism and Marxism.

<sup>457</sup> Naumann was here the only exception.

Naumann's nationalism was based on democracy and political liberalisation, while Spengler's variant was bourgeois, conservative, illiberal and authoritarian, and Goebbels' variant was based in practice on race. It is therefore not likely that Naumann or Spengler were the inspiration for Goebbels or other National Socialists for that matter.

With regard to financial distribution, I have found that there appears to be none similarities between Naumann, Spengler and Goebbels. Naumann represented in practice a mixed economy based on corporatist principles where a certain political managed equalization of society's resources against the workers, but without budging the property conditions. Spengler, on the other hand, did not want to do anything with the distribution of prosperity since socialism in his eyes was an instinct that had nothing to do with money. Like Naumann, Goebbels represented a mixed economy based on corporatism principles, and was willing to level society's resources. However, this was based on contributions to the state, and not necessarily according to purely economic criteria. With his desire to distribution of resources in favor of the workers represented Goebbels' ideas that were not common accepted among the right wing of the party.

With regard to the power aspect, they envisioned three very different models. Naumann was supporter of an imperial power, based on a broad nationalist majority democracy and corporatism. Spengler was a supporter of a monarchy and a corporative state assembly, and an important role for the aristocracy. Goebbels, on the other hand, wanted a dictator who could "lead" the people forward without being bound by majority decisions, act as an independent corporate mediator in financial matters, and where a new labor aristocracy had gained a dominant place in society through service to the state. On this point, there are big differences between Naumann and Goebbels, and a collision between a basically democratic system and an authoritarian system where the aristocracy was supposed to be have a dominant role. Although there are also few similarities between Spengler and Goebbels regard to who should have power, both represented top-heavy and authoritarian politics system, despite their differences otherwise.

My findings also show that the strategy in other areas was so uncoherent, and on many areas, so strongly divergent, that it is difficult to extract any general rule. Goebbels was, for example, the only one of the above-mentioned individuals where racism was one prominent part of the ideology. In the matter of the approach to the new industry and their social groups, the strategy was equally incoherent and unsystematic. Goebbels and Naumann laid far out on the left, close to the workers, both were modernists and both wanted concrete social reforms for the workers. Spengler's view was totally antagonistic to this, and was thus

completely in accordance with conservative tradition on these points, where he worked to preserve the privileges of the pre-industrial elites.

It is possible that Naumann may have contributed to the combination of nationalism and socialism known, so that due to the repetition of a known concept it may have increased the chance of support among the National Socialists. But this influence has been far less anyway important than the ideological and topical effects of the First World War. Spengler did not succeed in transfer their combination of nationalism and socialism to the National Socialists, but succeeded on the other hand, in attacking the Weimar Republic journalistically. However, the book was hardly instrumental that the republic failed or a direct cause of the NSDAP's growth. The absence of direct ideological bond makes a causal connection between Naumann's *Demokratie und Kaisertum*, Spengler's *Preußentum und Sozialismus* and National Socialism, represented by Goebbels, seem to missing. In my opinion, therefore, they cannot be called stepfathers of National Socialism.

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